Snow v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | CR–13–1554. |
| Citation | 197 So.3d 549 |
| Parties | Brian McCall SNOW v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Kristy Waldron Dugan, Mobile, for appellant.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Michael G. Dean, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
On Return to Remand*
KELLUM
, Judge.
The appellant, Brian McCall Snow, was indicted by a Mobile County grand jury for one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A–12–231(11)
a., Ala.Code 1975; one count of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the first degree, a violation of § 13A–12–218, Ala.Code 1975; and one count of arson in the second degree, a violation of § 13A–7–42, Ala.Code 1975. On May 14, 2014, Snow entered a blind plea of guilt to all three charges for which he was indicted. On June 6, 2014, Snow filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in which he argued that he “wasn't thinking clearly at the time he entered [his guilty] pleas.” (C. 97.) Following a hearing on July 17, 2014, the Mobile Circuit Court denied Snow's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced Snow, as a habitual felony offender, to life imprisonment for each conviction. The circuit court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The circuit court further ordered that Snow pay all mandatory fines, fees, assessments, and court costs.1 This appeal followed.
I.
Snow contends that the circuit court erred by sentencing him as a habitual felony offender because, he argues, his sentence proceedings were governed by the presumptive sentencing standards. Snow contends that the State provided no proof of any aggravating factor that permitted the circuit court to depart from the recommended sentence under the presumptive standards and that the circuit court failed to state any reasons for its departure from the recommended sentence under the presumptive standards. Snow raises these issues for the first time on appeal. The State argues that the presumptive sentencing standards are not applicable in the instant case and that Snow's challenges to the failure of the State to provide proof of any aggravating factor and to the circuit court's failure to state reasons for its departure from the presumptive standards are not preserved for review on appeal.
At the outset, we must first address whether the presumptive sentencing standards apply under the particular facts of this case.
The presumptive sentencing standards apply only to those nonviolent offenses included in the “Property A” and “Drug Offense” worksheets. See Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 19. The presumptive sentencing standards do not apply to convictions carrying a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole or to sex offenses involving a child victim under 12 years of age. Id. Likewise, the presumptive standards do not apply to those offenses included in the “Personal Worksheets,” which include offenses such as assault, manslaughter, murder, rape, robbery and sodomy, or the “Property Worksheets,” which include only burglary offenses. See Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 53.
When the presumptive sentencing standards apply, sentencing worksheets are presented to the prosecutor, the defendant and/or his attorney, and the sentencing judge before sentencing. Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 17. “Worksheets must be completed and considered when the ‘most serious offense’ at a sentencing event is a worksheet offense in the same venue.” Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 20. “A sentencing event includes all convictions sentenced at the same time, whether included as counts in one case or in multiple cases, regardless of whether offenses are worksheet offenses.” Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 20 (emphasis in original). Four rules govern the determination of the “most serious offense” at a “sentencing event.” The third of the four rules, and the rule applicable to the instant case, provides: “Where a sentencing event includes both a worksheet offense and a non-worksheet offense and both carry the same statutory maximum penalty as governed by the felony offense classification, the worksheet offense is the most serious offense.” Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 20.
Circuit courts are given “significant discretion in arriving at sentencing decisions” under the presumptive standards. Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 14. That discretion includes a circuit court's decision, “in exceptional cases,” to depart from the durational or dispositional recommendation, or both, “upon a finding of aggravating and/or mitigating factors.” Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 24. A circuit court “must consider all aggravating and/or mitigating factors proven for a sentencing event, but the decision to depart from the presumptive sentence recommendation is in the discretion of the court.” Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 24. Before a circuit court chooses to depart from a dispositional or durational recommendation under the presumptive sentencing standards, certain procedures must be followed, among them that the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor exists. Id. The presumptive standards also provide that “[t]he defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the existence of any aggravating factor, unless the aggravating factor is admitted by the defendant or both the defendant and the prosecutor waive a jury determination and request the judge alone to decide.” Id.
In the instant case, Snow was indicted for, and pleaded guilty to, trafficking in “28 grams or more but less than 500 grams” of methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A–12–231(11)
a., Ala.Code 1975; unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the first degree, a violation of § 13A–12–218, Ala.Code 1975; and arson in the second degree, a violation of § 13A–7–42, Ala.Code 1975. Both the trafficking and manufacturing convictions are Class A felonies, see §§ 13A–12–231(12) and punishable by imprisonment “for life or not more than 99 years or less than 10 years.” § 13A–5–6(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. Arson in the second degree is a Class B felony. See § 13A–7–42(e), Ala.Code 1975. Following his guilty plea, the circuit court conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a sentence for each of the convictions.
One of the three convictions for which Snow was sentenced—unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the first degree—is a presumptive-standards offense listed under the “Drug Worksheets.” Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 19. Because Snow was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine—a worksheet offense—and trafficking in methamphetamine—a non-worksheet offense—and both are Class A felonies, Snow's conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine controlled for purposes of determining the application of the presumptive sentencing standards.2
The State argues on appeal that the manufacturing and trafficking offenses in this case do not carry the same statutory maximum penalty as provided by the felony offense classification. Indeed, the State contends that Snow's trafficking conviction is the “most serious offense” because “[u]nder the trafficking statute's internal sentencing provisions, the maximum penalty for trafficking in methamphetamine is life without parole. See Ala.Code § 13A–12–231(11)
d.” (State's brief, p. 12.) We disagree.
In this case, Snow was indicted for, and pleaded guilty to, trafficking in “28 grams or more but less than 500 grams” of methamphetamine in violation of § 13A–12–231(11)
a. While it is true that under § 13A–12–231(11) d. a defendant who is found guilty of trafficking 10 kilos or more of methamphetamine “shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,” it is undisputed that Snow was convicted under § 13A–12–231(11) a.—a Class A felony. Therefore, the maximum penalty under the law that he could have received was “life or not more than 99 years or less than 10 years” and not life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See § 13A–5–6(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. Accordingly, the presumptive sentencing standards were applicable in this case.
In light of our holding that the presumptive sentencing standards apply in this case, we must now determine whether the circuit court considered the presumptive sentencing standards and, if the court did consider the standards, whether Snow waived any procedural defects in the circuit court's consideration of those standards.
The record indicates that before Snow pleaded guilty the State filed a “Notice to Proceed under the Habitual Felony Offender Act” and a “Notice of Intent to Prove Aggravating Factors.” Regarding the aggravating factors, the State alleged that “[t]he crime involved multiple participants in the criminal conduct, and the defendant played a major role in the crime as the meth cook” and that “[t]he commission of the offense created a substantial risk to human health and safety or a danger to the environment.” (C. 91.)3 During the guilty-plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred:
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Showers v. State, CR–15–1387
...provides circuit courts instructions and worksheets to use in imposing a sentence under the presumptive standards. In Snow v. State, 197 So.3d 549 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), this Court provided the following relevant description of the presumptive standards:"The presumptive sentencing standard......