Snow v. State, 0-699

• Citation: 245 Ind. 423,199 N.E.2d 469
• Decision Date: 24 June 1964
• Docket Number: No. 0-699,0-699
• Parties: J. R. SNOW, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 469

199 N.E.2d 469

245 Ind. 423

J. R. SNOW, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 0-699.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 24, 1964.

J. R. Snow, pro se.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing in this cause in which he alleges that in our opinion filed December 18, 1963, wherein we denied his petition for time to file a transcript and assignment of errors, we failed to consider certain cases which he claims give him a right to appeal from a judgment on a plea of guilty. He cites Kuhn v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 179, 52 N.E.2d 491, and Chandler v. State (1949), 226 Ind. 648, 83 N.E.2d 189.

In the Kuhn case the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of assault and battery and judgment was entered fining and sentencing him. He then appeared with counsel and filed a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his plea of guilty. The motion was overruled. Apparently no evidence was heard in regard to it. An appeal was taken from this ruling. The Attorney General moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that nothing was in the record to show that the trial court committed error in its ruling. This motion was overruled. The Attorney General then filed a brief confessing error. In our opinion, this court said (at page 182 of 222 Ind., at page 492 of 52 N.E.2d):

'In a reply brief appellant insists that the trial court should be ordered to vacate the judgment and accept his plea of not guilty. The character of the mandate is therefore our only problem.

'A judgment on a plea of guilty has the same finality as any other judgment. The defendant may challenge its validity by motion during the term, by appeal, or, in certain cases, by writ of error coram nobis after the term has expired.'

This court then remanded the cause to the trial court for answer, submission of evidence, hearing and decision on the issue tendered by appellant's motion. In so doing, it was stated that this did not foreclose the right of the trial judge to set aside the judgment and grant a trial upon a plea of not guilty without a hearing, if, in his discretion, he deemed it proper to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.

In the Chandler case the defendant was charged with first-degree burglary. He appeared before the court without counsel for arraignment, entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to prison for a term of ten to twenty years. He filed a request for an appeal as a poor person. This court ordered a transcript prepared and appointed counsel to prosecute the appeal. His main contention was that the court failed to advise him that he was entitled to counsel before he pleaded guilty. However, the court points out that after he entered his plea of guilty, the transcript of the arraignment proceedings showed that before sentence he was advised by the court that he had a right to counsel and a jury trial, which he refused. Thus, he waived his constitutional rights freely and with understanding. The conviction was affirmed.

In the opinion, the following statements are made upon which appellant relies (at page 654 of 226 Ind., at page 191 of 83 N.E.2d):

'The State filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that a judgment based upon a plea of guilty is not appealable but is final and conclusive until such plea of guilty is set aside. It is the State's contention that appellant's only remedies were by motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty, or by a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Certainly these remedies at proper times would be open to appellant, but a judgment on a plea of guilty may also be challenged by appeal. Kuhn v. State, supra. * * *

'We know of no reason why an appeal should not lie from the judgment in this case. The facts are in the record and the claimed error of the court in failing to advise appellant of and afford him his constitutional rights could be assigned as independent error in this court.'

In the Kuhn case we may assume that using the words 'by appeal' immediately following the words 'motion during the term,' the court intended to say that an appeal could be taken from the ruling on such motions which were made during term time if adverse to the defendant.

The Chandler case presents a different problem. There this court permitted the defendant to appeal from a judgment of the Bartholomew Circuit Court convicting the defendant on his plea of guilty. No motion for new trial was filed, nor was any other motion, such as to modify the judgment, set it aside or withdraw the plea of guilty. The transcript in that case reveals that defendant's assignment of errors relates purely to matters which were formerly brought up on writs of error coram nobis. He charged that the trial court erred in failing to advise him of his constitutional rights, that he did not have competent counsel, that he was intimidated, that he was deprived of his right to trial by jury, that the court entered judgment without hearing evidence, and that the court had no jurisdiction over him because at the time of arraignment, he was 'an inmate on Parole from the Indiana State Reformatory, and as such was a subject of the State of Indiana, and could not legally be prosecuted for another offense.'

The function of a coram nobis proceeding was limited to correcting errors in fact which did not appear of record. 6 West's Ind.Law Ency., Coram Nobis, § 2, p. 371. For a time, this court assumed jurisdiction to pass upon petitions for such writs as original actions. Davis v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375. However, we later held that such petitions belong solely in the court which originally tried the case. 6 West's Ind.Law Ency., Coram Nobis, § 12, p. 381. This has been the law of coram nobis proceedings until the present time. McCrary v. State (1961), 241 Ind. 518, 173 N.E.2d 300; Dobson v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 267, 177 N.E.2d 395.

In the Chandler case our court erroneously took the view that it would decide matters in an original action which pertained to writs of error coram nobis. Although named an 'appeal,' it cannot be regarded as such, for it had nothing to do with the merits of the case. No objection was raised which pointed out a defect or mistake in the judgment asking that the same be corrected in the trial court. No question of this nature was presented to this court. Tucker et al. v. Hyatt (1898), 151 Ind. 332, 338, 51 N.E. 469. A general objection to a judgment is not available on appeal. 1 West's Ind.Law Ency., Appeals, § 93, p. 589; Walter v. Walter (1889), 117 Ind. 247, 250, 20 N.E. 148. Thus, in so far as the Chandler case is regarded as authority for an 'appeal' in a criminal case where the defendant has pleaded guilty and judgment has been entered on such plea, the same in hereby disapproved. The proper...