Snow v. State, 1998-DP-01499-SCT.

Decision Date27 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. 1998-DP-01499-SCT.,1998-DP-01499-SCT.
Citation800 So.2d 472
PartiesEric SNOW a/k/a Tony A. Hinton a/k/a T.T. a/k/a "Tony Anthony Hinton" v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Michael Adelman, Hattiesburg, Patricia F. Dunmore, Natchez, Richard Burdine, Columbus, for Appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Judy T. Martin, for Appellee.

EN BANC.

BANKS, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal arises from Eric Snow's ("Snow") conviction of two (2) counts of capital murder of Deputies Tommy Bourne ("Bourne") and J.P. Rutland ("Rutland") and the subsequent sentence of death on each count. We find no error requiring reversal of the conviction or sentence. Consequently, we affirm.

I.

¶ 2. These events began on February 21, 1997, when Eric Snow was sentenced to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for manslaughter and aggravated assault in Jefferson Davis County. Bourne, a jailer with the Jefferson Davis County Sheriffs office, and Rutland, a deputy sheriff, were assigned to transport Snow and Patricia Gholar ("Gholar"), another inmate, from the Jefferson Davis County Jail in Prentiss, Mississippi, to the Mississippi Department of Corrections in Rankin County, Mississippi.

¶ 3. As the four began their journey, Bourne drove and Rutland sat to the right of him in the front passenger seat. Gholar sat behind Rutland in the backseat and Snow sat behind Bourne. According to Gholar, somewhere in Simpson County, Mississippi, Snow fired a gun at the deputies from the backseat hitting Bourne. Snow climbed over the front seat and exited the vehicle from the front left window of the car. With the car still moving, Snow attempted to steer the vehicle while hanging in the window of the car. Gholar testified that Snow then stood in front of the sheriffs car and she heard him fire more shots into the car. Gholar was found in the sheriffs vehicle by another witness. Deputies Bourne and Rutland were found dead in the front seat of the car. After an extensive police search, Snow was apprehended that same evening in Mendenhall, Mississippi.

¶ 4. In March, 1997, the Simpson County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Snow with two counts of capital murder and one count of escape as an habitual offender pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-81. In June, 1997 an order allowing a transfer of venue was issued. Venue was initially transferred from the Simpson County Circuit Court to the Lauderdale Circuit Court and finally to the Lowndes County Circuit Court.

¶ 5. In August, 1998, after hearing testimony from Gholar, a witnesses to the incident; testimony regarding Snow's statement to police officers; a forensic scientist; and the coroner, a jury found Snow guilty of capital murder and escape from jail. Snow was adjudicated to be a habitual offender and sentenced to a penalty of five (5) years for the crime of escape. The jury also returned a verdict imposing a sentence of death for each count of capital murder.

¶ 6. Snow filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or a Motion for a New Trial and a Supplemental Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or a Motion for a New Trial, both motions were subsequently denied after oral argument and an evidentiary hearing. Snow filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

¶ 7. On appeal to this Court convictions of capital murder and sentences of death must be subjected to what has been labeled "heightened scrutiny." Under this method of review, all bona fide doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused because "what may be harmless error in a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death." Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 739 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted) (quoting Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 872 (Miss.1987)).1

III.

¶ 8. In the first assignment of error, Snow submits that the trial court erred in denying his Batson motion because the State's use of eight out of eight peremptory challenges against African-Americans, resulting in a final empaneled jury of consisting of ten Caucasian individuals and two African Americans, should be construed as creating a strong inference of discrimination against minority venirepersons.2 See Walker v. State, 740 So.2d 873 (Miss.1999)

.

¶ 9. Snow asserted a Batson challenge during voir dire pointing out that the State used eight of its peremptory challenges against African-Americans. Without ruling on whether a prima facie case was presented, the trial court required the State to give the race and gender of challenged jurors and its reason for striking the juror. After the State articulated its reasons, the trial court ruled that the State provided race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. Snow alleges that some of the reasons articulated by the State were pretextual. The State refutes this argument submitting that it provided race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges and, moreover, the reasons that it provided have been approved by this Court. See generally Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289 (1994)

; Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346 (Miss.1987).

¶ 10. The proper analysis for a violation pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) has been set forth by this Court in numerous cases. See Berry v. State, 728 So.2d 568 (Miss.1999)

; Randall v. State, 716 So.2d 584 (Miss.1998); McFarland v. State, 707 So.2d 166 (Miss.1998). The United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) provided Batson requires that:

The defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

The trial court's decision is accorded great deference on review and this Court will reverse only where the decision is clearly erroneous. Randall v. State, 716 So.2d at 587; Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss.1997). In establishing the necessary prima facie showing of discrimination a defendant must demonstrate:

(1) that he is a member of cognizable racial group; (2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race; (3) and the facts and circumstances raised an inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges for the purpose of striking minorities.

Walker, 740 So.2d at 879.

¶ 11. Although the trial court did not explicitly rule whether Snow established a Batson prima facie case, the trial court required the State to provide race-neutral reasons for its challenges and because the State provided explanations for its challenges, the issue of whether Snow established a prima facie case and whether the State should be required to give race-neutral reasons for its challenges is moot. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1297 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352-54,111 S.Ct. 1859,114 L.Ed.2d 395).

¶ 12. The State provided the following reasons for its strikes: (1) Annie Smith—excluded because she strongly disagreed with the death penalty and knew defense counsel, Richard Burdine; (2) Jill Renee Mann—excluded because of job and drug and alcohol rehabilitation center and presumption that she would be more "lenient and considerate of the defendant"; (3) Flora J. Stovall—excluded because prosecutor had information that a number of her family members had been arrested and convicted and she had complaints from writing bad checks; (4) Latonya Bush— excluded because related to a murder suspect who had been arrested and worked for defense attorney; (5) Diane Saffore— excluded because disagreed with the death penalty; (6) Darlene Edwards—excluded because disagreed with the death penalty; (7) Shirley Blevins—excluded because a relative was convicted of capital murder in that county and she or one of her family members was represented by defense counsel, Burdine; (8) Joyce Ann Cox— excluded because previously arrested for shoplifting. The trial court found that the reasons proffered by the State were race-neutral.

¶ 13. We find that the reasons articulated by the State are race-neutral. This Court has previously sanctioned these reasons. See Mack, 650 So.2d at 1300

(holding that it is proper to exclude potential venire persons for criminal activity and based upon opinion of the death penalty); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1351 (holding that strike based on perceived sympathy of ministers and conviction of relatives is race-neutral).

¶ 14. Snow urges that even though any race-neutral reason will suffice, the reason that is offered by the State must be true. See Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294, 302 (Miss.1993)(Hawkins, C.J., concurring)

(emphasis added). Snow, specifically noting the challenge to Flora Stovall ("Stovall"), maintains that the reason offered by the State for her challenge was not true as evidenced by the State's re-characterization of the challenge in argument.

¶ 15. The State emphasizes that the information provided by Harry Alderson, a criminal investigator with the District Attorney's Office, indicated that juror Stovall was involved with bad checks and members of her family had previous involvement with the law. The State also concludes that because the trial judge's ruling was not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Snow's argument is without merit.

¶ 16. The following exchange took place regarding the alleged check complaints against Flora Stovall:

BY THE COURT: ... Repeat No. 14, Flora J. Stovall.
BY MR. FORTENBERRY: Either I asked Mr. Alderson or DeForrest Allgood, but those are my reasons for Flora Stovall was that a number of those family members had been arrested and convicted is my recollection.
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