Snowden v. Anne Arundel County
Decision Date | 23 February 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 92,92 |
Citation | 456 A.2d 380,295 Md. 429 |
Parties | Carl SNOWDEN v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, Maryland. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Stephen H. Schwartz, Annapolis (Alan Hilliard Legum, P.A., Annapolis, on brief), for appellant.
Ronald H. Jarashow and Goldsborough, Franch & Collett, P.A., Easton, on brief, for amicus curiae Anne Arundel County, Lodge No. 70, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc.
Robert C. Wilcox, Asst. County Sol., Annapolis (Steven P. Resnick, County Sol., Annapolis, on brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.
The issue presented in this declaratory judgment action is whether a charter county is empowered to enact an ordinance authorizing payment to certain of its public safety employees for legal expenses incurred in a successful defense against criminal or departmental misconduct charges.
The challenged ordinance was passed as Bill 201-81 by the Anne Arundel County Council and is codified as Anne Arundel County Code §§ 1-1400--1-1405 (1982). It authorizes the creation of a Criminal Reimbursement Expense Fund to prepay or reimburse legal expenses incurred by sworn paid members of the County police and fire departments, detention center officers, members of volunteer fire departments and of rescue squads, who are charged with a criminal offense or departmental violations arising out of the performance of their duties. To be eligible for payment under the ordinance, an employee must receive a final determination which exonerates him of all criminal or administrative charges. The ordinance permits advance payments for legal expenses, provided the employee posts adequate collateral and signs a note for the amount of the advance, promising to repay the money if not ultimately cleared of the charges. The County retains the right to determine the reasonableness of the expenses submitted, subject to an appeal process.
The appellant Snowden petitioned the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to declare the ordinance violative of the County Charter and the law of Maryland. Snowden claimed that the ordinance did not serve a public purpose but rather unconstitutionally authorized the use of public funds for a private purpose. The court (Goudy, J.), after finding that there was no material factual dispute, granted the County's motion for summary judgment; it concluded that the ordinance served a valid public purpose and was therefore a lawful enactment. We granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals of Snowden's appeal to consider the significant issue of public importance which the case presents.
Snowden contends that Anne Arundel County was not empowered to enact the challenged ordinance because the authorized expenditures were for a private and not a public purpose. No public purpose is served, he argues, because the ordinance directly benefits a limited class of private individuals--principally police and fire department personnel--"despite the fact that others may also need this service." Snowden further argues that since an employee who has been acquitted of criminal or departmental charges may still be guilty, no public purpose could be served by reimbursing his expenses. To do so, Snowden maintains, "could make an officer less inclined to exercise proper due care and restraint." He urges that we hold that "[t]here is a greater public benefit in avoiding this ordinance than there is in maintaining it."
As we noted in Mont. Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 158, 252 A.2d 242, 245 (1969), "[t]he power of a political subdivision ... to enact laws depends on the extent to which the General Assembly has delegated to it its legislative powers which 'are plenary, except as limited by constitutional provisions.' " As a charter county formed under the provisions of Article XI-A of the Constitution of Maryland, Anne Arundel County is empowered by the Express Powers Act, Maryland Code (1981 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5(S) "to pass ... such ordinances as may be deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the county." This "general welfare" or "general grant of power" clause has been broadly construed to permit charter counties to legislate beyond the powers expressly enumerated in the Express Powers Act. As we noted in Greenhalgh, supra, 253 Md. at 160-61, 252 A.2d 242:
We have held that § 5(S) authorizes a charter county to enact fair housing laws, Greenhalgh, supra, regulate landlord-tenant relations, County Council v. Investors Funding, 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973), direct the activities of volunteer fire departments which accept county funds, Prince Geo's Co. v. Chillum-Adelphi, 275 Md. 374, 340 A.2d 265 (1975), and waive sovereign immunity, Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979).
Anne Arundel County is authorized to exercise the full extent of its delegated powers. Section 304 of the County Charter provides:
"[T]he County Council shall have and may exercise all legislative powers which, under the Constitution and laws of this State, it would be competent for this Charter specifically to enumerate."
Section 305 makes the exercise of the County Council's powers "subject to the express limitations imposed by this Charter and by all applicable provisions of the Constitution and laws of this State." One such limitation upon the County's broad grant of legislative power is the constitutional requirement of Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights which in effect prohibits the expenditure of county tax revenues for other than a public purpose. 1 In Balto. & E.S.R.R. Co. v. Spring, 80 Md. 510, 31 A. 208 (1895), suit was filed to enjoin a legislatively authorized issuance of bonds by Talbot County. The proceeds of the bonds were to be applied to payment of debts owed by a bankrupt railroad. We concluded:
Giving content to the "public purpose" requirement has not been a simple task. 2 As we said in Finan v. M. & C.C. of Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 565, 141 A. 269, (1928), and more recently in Horace Mann League v. Board, 242 Md. 645, 685, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97, 87 S.Ct. 317, 17 L.Ed.2d 195 (1966): "What is a public purpose for which public funds may be expended is not a matter of exact definition; it is almost entirely a matter of general acceptation." In Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 16, 136 A.2d 852 (1957), we discussed Spring and Finan, commenting "that the line of demarcation is not immutable or incapable of adjustment to changing social and economic conditions that are properly of public and governmental concern." We said, 215 Md. at 19, 136 A.2d 852
Frostburg involved a legislative enactment which authorized the use of public funds to finance the construction of buildings to be sold to manufacturing companies. We there noted the duty of the courts to "determine whether the particular use is within the scope of the constitutional powers," id. at 16, 136 A.2d 852; we concluded that the purpose of the expenditure, to encourage industrial development in the city, had "a substantial relation to the public welfare and can fairly be said to serve a public purpose." Id. at 19, 136 A.2d 852.
Our cases have consistently upheld the propriety of payment of public funds to private institutions or individuals, as long as a public purpose is served thereby. See, e.g., Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977); Wilson v. Board of Co. Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974). See also Horace Mann League v. Board, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97, 87 S.Ct. 317, 17 L.Ed.2d 195 (1966); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 86 A.2d 892 (1952). The legislative body is primarily entrusted with ensuring that the public purpose requirement is fulfilled, and the courts have no duty unless and until a perversion of public funds to private purposes is obvious. Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1938). A court does not "sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,' " Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2213, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). As we noted in McBriety v. Baltimore City, 219 Md. 223, 233, 148 A.2d 408 (1959):
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Beretta U.S.A. Corp. v. Santos
...260, 513 A.2d 314 (1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 920, 93 L.Ed.2d 973 (1987); see also Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 432-33, 456 A.2d 380 (1983); Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 298-99, 396 A.2d 255 (1979); Steimel v. Board of Election Supe......
-
Wright v. City of Danville
... ... The circuit court of Vermilion County found that indemnity was not warranted and dismissed the complaint under ... Reid, 397 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla.App.1981); Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 439, 456 A.2d 380, 385 (1983) ... ...
-
Tyma v. Montgomery County, 20
...opinions of this Court in Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. at 161, 252 A.2d at 247, and Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 438, 456 A.2d 380, 385 (1983), the County argues that it clearly is authorized to extend employment benefits "where those benefits serve a va......
-
Bowling v. Brown
...80-4 and 80-5 were passed to alleviate those conditions, they were passed for a public purpose. In Snowden v. Anne Arundel County, 295 Md. 429, 434, 456 A.2d 380 (1983) the Court "Giving content to the 'public purpose' requirement has not been a simple task. As we said in Finan v. M. & C.C.......