Snowden v. State

• Decision Date: 13 June 1888
• Citation: 14 A. 528,69 Md. 203
• Parties: SNOWDEN v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

14 A. 528

69 Md. 203

SNOWDEN v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 13, 1888

Appeal from circuit court, Harford county.

Indictment of Edward Snowden for selling fertilizers in Harford county without the license prescribed by Acts Md. 1882, c. 451.

S A. Williams, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Whyte and C. Y. Maynadier, for the State.

MCSHERRY J.

The appellant was indicted by the grand jury of Harford county for selling fertilizers without having procured the license prescribed by the act of Assem. 1882, c. 451. He demurred to the indictment, and upon the demurrer being overruled he pleaded not guilty, was put upon trial, was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine. Whether the circuit court was correct in its ruling on the demurrer is the question presented for review by the writ of error under which the case has been brought into this court. The act of 1882, which is entitled "An act to prevent fraud in the manufacture and sale of commercial fertilizers and bone dust in Harford county," provides, in substance, that every person who shall offer for sale any commercial fertilizer or bone dust, the price of which shall exceed 10 dollars a ton, shall affix to every package a certificate stating the number of pounds contained therein; the name or trade-mark of the article; the name of the manufacturer, and the place of manufacture; and a chemical analysis stating the percentage of certain of the article's ingredients; that a certificate of the said analysis, verified by affidavit, shall be filed with the clerk of the county commissioners; that the seller shall pay, annually, a license fee of $25, and shall give bond, which shall be answerable for the damages and fines imposed by the act; and that a chemist shall be appointed by the governor to make analyses in the cases designated. For a violation of the provisions of the act a fine is prescribed of not less than $200 for the first offense and of not less than $500 for every subsequent offense. These fines and the license fees, after the payment of enumerated expenses, are directed to be placed to the credit of the public roads of Harford county. The judgment of the circuit court is alleged to be erroneous, on two grounds, viz.: First, because an indictment does not lie to enforce the penalty prescribed by said act for its violation; and, second, because the act of 1886, c. 477, works a repeal of said act of 1882, and because the last-named act is in abeyance and inoperative so long as said act of 1886 remains in force.

It has been insisted by the appellant that an indictment is not the proper mode of procedure for enforcing the fines provided by the act of 1882, because of the provisions of sections 7 and 9 of that statute. Those sections declare that "suit may be brought for the recovery of fines and damages," and that "all suits for the recovery of fines under the provisions of this act shall be brought by the clerk to the county commissioners in the name of the state of Maryland." It has been argued that the word "suit," used in these sections, necessarily means civil proceedings, and that consequently no indictment will lie. In other words, it is insisted that wherever a statute points out the mode of enforcing penalties imposed by it that mode alone must be pursued; that this act does point out a mode of enforcing its penalties; that the mode pointed out is by civil suit; that therefore all criminal proceedings are, in terms, excluded. This is a construction, which, in our opinion, ought not to prevail. It could scarcely, we think, have been the intention of the legislature to allow the clerk to the county commissioners to use the name of the state in prosecuting civil suits for the recovery of fines under this act, without having made some appropriate provision for the appearance, in behalf of the state, of the attorney general or, at least, the state's attorney of Harford county. The statute is a penal one, and the penalties are very heavy. It would require the use of explicit language in such a statute, or, in its absence, a strong implication equivalent to such language, to warrant the court in holding that a subordinate officer, a mere clerk to the county commissioners, was intrusted with the exclusive power to sue in the name of the state for the recovery of such severe fines as are provided in this statute. We see nothing in the language quoted from the act, or in any of its provisions, to justify this court in assenting to the construction contended for. That construction involves, if adopted, a denial of jurisdiction in the circuit court as a criminal court, and a wide departure from the system established by the act of 1880, c. 211, for the recovery of fines and forfeitures in all similar cases. These consequences, in this instance, are urged as the inevitable results following from the use of the word "suit," as heretofore stated. But the meaning ascribed to the word "suit," as used in this act, is entirely too narrow. "In its most extended sense the word 's...