Snukis v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 27 June 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-00135-TWP-MPB
• Parties: EDWARD C SNUKIS, JR Co-Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Snukis, and SAMANTHA SNUKIS Co-Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Snukis, Plaintiffs, v. MATTHEW O TAYLOR, TREVOR KOONTZ, NICHOLAS HACKWORTH, and CITY OF EVANSVILLE, INDIANA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

EDWARD C SNUKIS, JR Co-Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Snukis, and SAMANTHA SNUKIS Co-Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Snukis, Plaintiffs,
v.
MATTHEW O TAYLOR, TREVOR KOONTZ, NICHOLAS HACKWORTH, and CITY OF EVANSVILLE, INDIANA, Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-00135-TWP-MPB

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Evansville Division

June 27, 2022

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I-IX, COUNT XI, AND RELIEF SOUGHT

HON. TANYA WALTON PRATT, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Counts I-IX, Count XI, and Relief Sought (the "Motion") filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendants Matthew O. Taylor ("Taylor"), Trevor Koontz ("Koontz"), Nicholas Hackworth ("Hackworth") (Taylor, Koontz, and Hackworth, collectively, the "Officers"), and the City of Evansville, Indiana (the "City") (the Officers and the City, together, "Defendants") (Filing No. 33). Plaintiffs Edward C. Snukis, Jr. and Samantha Snukis (together, "Plaintiffs") initiated this action as the coadministrators of the Estate of Edward C. Snukis ("the Estate"), alleging claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and several state law claims. Plaintiffs seek to redress the deprivation of Edward Snukis' ("Snukis") constitutional rights after he was detained by the Officers and died in custody. Plaintiffs also assert several state law tort claims and request the equitable appointment of a receiver to train and supervise the City's law enforcement officers. Defendants seek dismissal all of Plaintiffs' claims except Count X, a claim of respondeat superior

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liability as to the tort claims, as well as dismissal of the request for equitable relief. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the Estate as the non-moving party. See Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).

At approximately 7:44 p.m., on September 13, 2019, an employee of an Evansville car dealership called 911 to report that Snukis was "hanging around" the dealership and "appeared to be impaired." The employee stated Snukis was standing near the road and that he was "afraid [Snukis was] going to get hit." The employee did not indicate Snukis was violent, armed, or had committed any crime (Filing No. 1 at ¶ 10). Approximately five minutes after the call, the Evansville Police Department ("EPD") issued a dispatch about an "intoxicated person". Id. at ¶ 11. The dispatch was categorized as a "Priority 4." The EPD Operational Guidelines define Priority 4 as a service call for "[s]ituations requiring a routine response in which there is no urgency involved . . . (Public Intoxication, Standby, General Complaints, etc.)". Id. at ¶ 12.

At approximately 7:52 p.m., two EPD officers-Taylor and Koontz-arrived at the dealership. Snukis was not injured, combative, or in a confined area. Id. at ¶ 14. He was unarmed. Id. at ¶ 18. Immediately upon arriving, Koontz approached Snukis and repeatedly demanded that Snukis place his hands on his head. Id. at ¶ 14. Koontz grabbed Snukis' arm. Snukis asked what was happening, but Koontz did not reply. Id. at ¶ 15. Koontz and Taylor began yelling at Snukis. At no point did Koontz or Taylor identify themselves, ask Snukis to identify himself, or explain why they were there. Id. at ¶ 16.

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Snukis pulled away from Koontz, but as he did, he fell and struck his head on the ground. Id. at ¶ 17. Snukis was tased multiple times. When Snukis tried to stand up, he was tased again. Once Snukis was finally able to stand, he ran away from Koontz and Taylor, who chased and eventually caught Snukis. Snukis fell face down onto the ground, and Koontz and Taylor proceeded to jump on Snukis and hold him down. Id. at ¶ 18.

While holding Snukis down, Koontz and Taylor repeatedly struck Snukis in the head, back and shoulders. They forced Snukis to remain prone with his head, face, and mouth on the ground while they attempted to handcuff him. Koontz and Taylor used their hands, arms, and legs to keep pressure on Snukis' head, neck, shoulders, chest, and back. Id. While subdued, Snukis' speech became slurred, and his breathing became difficult. Then Snukis stopped speaking and breathing altogether, but Koontz and Taylor continued to assault Snukis and restrain him in a prone position. Id. Hackworth then arrived and began assisting in restraining and handcuffing Snukis. Id. at ¶ 19. After Snukis had become unresponsive, the Officers left him face-down on the ground for several minutes without providing or calling for any medical assistance. Id. at ¶ 22. Snukis died while being detained as a result of the Officers' use of force. Id. at ¶ 21.

According to Plaintiffs, after Snukis died, the City failed to adequately investigate the Officers' conduct or discipline the Officers. Id. at ¶ 23(g). The City did not recognize or investigate "obvious falsehoods in the Officers' accounts that [Snukis] was 'aggressive' and was 'approaching the officers in an aggressive manner' when compared to video recordings and other evidence" of the incident "that demonstrate[] that the Officers' accounts were false. Id. at ¶ 23(h). The EPD investigated the incident, but no outside agency was involved in the investigation. Id. at ¶ 64. The Officers were not disciplined. Id.

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Plaintiffs allege Snukis' death resulted from certain de facto policies, practices, and customs maintained by the City that encourage the use of excessive force. Plaintiffs further allege that the City employs a "code of silence where officers and supervisors cover up the use of excessive force by fabricating accounts in police reports, internal affairs investigations, and statements to the media, all of which is designed to falsely exonerate officers and protect the City from potential liability". Id. at ¶ 32(b). Prior to Snukis' death, consistent with the "code of silence," the City negotiated a contract with the police union containing a provision regarding the use of force. That provision allows officers to take up to three days to make a statement to investigators, during which time the officers may speak with legal counsel and prepare a written statement, and allows the officers to refer to their written statements during investigative interviews. Id. at ¶ 65. Plaintiffs allege that the City's policies, practices, and customs "created an environment that allowed the Officers to believe that they could act with impunity and without fear of retribution." Id. at ¶ 63.

Plaintiffs further allege that the City failed to train its officers on "the reasonable and appropriate use of force during investigations, detentions, and arrests, and intervention in the excessive use of force by fellow officers," including training on the dangers of using TASER devices and of positional and compression asphyxia. Id. at ¶¶ 32(d), 70.

On September 1, 2021, two of Snukis' children-Edward C. Snukis, Jr., and Samantha Snukis-filed this action as the co-administrators of Snukis' estate, alleging Fourth Amendment violations, as well as numerous state law claims, against the Defendants. The Complaint alleges Snukis was unreasonably seized by the Officers in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the City is liable for the constitutional violations under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ("Monell") and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)

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("Canton"). Defendants seek dismissal of the Section 1983 claims, asserting the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity and that Hackworth did not participate in the alleged constitutional violation, and all but one of the state law claims, arguing those claims are barred by the Indiana Tort Claims Act ("ITCA").

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint that has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A party seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)'s requirement that the complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted bears a heavy burden. In making this determination, the court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff "receives the benefit of imagination" at this stage "[as] long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint." Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). "To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge . . . 'the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together,' and the question the court should ask is 'could these things have happened, not did they happen.'" Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis in original).

The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court

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explained that the complaint must allege facts that are "enough to raise a right to relief above the...