Snyder, Matter of, 84-8017

• Decision Date: 31 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-8017,84-8017
• Parties: In the Matter of Attorney Robert J. SNYDER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 334

734 F.2d 334

In the Matter of Attorney Robert J. SNYDER.

No. 84-8017.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 16, 1984.

Decided April 13, 1984.

Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing En Banc May 31, 1984.

Robert J. Snyder, Bismarck, N.D., pro se.

David L. Peterson, James S. Hill, Irvin B. Nodland, Patrick W. Durick, Robert P. Bennett, John C. Kapsner, Charles L. Chapman, Bismarck, N.D., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and HEANEY and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Chief Judge.

This case comes before us on an order issued to attorney Robert Snyder of Bismarck, North Dakota, to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice in the federal courts. Attorney Snyder has been cited: (1) for his refusal to continue to perform services in indigent cases under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A (1982); and (2) for his disrespectful refusal to comply with the guidelines under the CJA relating to the submission of expenses and attorney fees.

Facts

On March 14, 1983, Attorney Snyder was appointed by Judge Bruce Van Sickle of the District of North Dakota to represent an indigent defendant under the CJA. There is no issue concerning his services being performed competently. After the proceedings, pursuant to Sec. 3006A(d)(4) of the CJA, Attorney Snyder submitted to the district court a claim for services and expenses in the amount of $1,898.55. On August 17, the district court judge reduced the claim by $102.50 and approved the modified request.

Under the CJA, the chief judge of this court must review and approve any expenditures for compensation in excess of the $1,000 limit. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(d)(3). Snyder's application was deficient in that the CJA requires an attorney to attach a memorandum Snyder then sent to the district judge's secretary a letter, dated October 6, "for the purpose of responding to" the chief judge's request. Snyder stated that he was "appalled" at the small amount paid to attorneys for indigent criminal defense work. He indicated his displeasure at the "extreme gymnastics" required to receive "puny amounts." He then stated to the court: "We have sent you everything we have concerning our representation, and I am not sending you anything else. You can take it or leave it." Snyder concluded his letter by stating that he was "extremely disgusted" by the treatment of him by the Eighth Circuit, that he wished to be taken off the list of attorneys willing to accept appointment in indigent cases, and that he had "simply had it." ³

                of hours expended and an itemized list of expenses. 1   Snyder did not attach the necessary information to his application.  Accordingly, his application was returned to the district court with the request that Attorney Snyder provide the proper attachments.  Thereafter, Snyder returned the application to the secretary of the district judge with a monetary, not an hourly, breakdown of his time and again without the requested itemization of expenses. 2   Once again his application was returned by the chief judge with the notation that compliance with the CJA guidelines was still necessary to process the application
                

Upon receipt of this information, the chief judge requested the district court to confer with Snyder and to determine if Snyder would retract his disrespectful remarks to the court. Snyder refused. On December 22, 1983, this court issued an order to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law in the federal courts for his refusal to offer services under the CJA and to comply with relevant guidelines. Snyder requested a hearing by the full court. See Fed.R.App.P. 46(c). The full court voted to refer the matter to a panel.

At oral argument, Attorney Snyder was requested once again to purge himself, as an officer of the court, by agreeing to accept appointment under the Act and by otherwise complying with the Act's guidelines. The panel also requested him to demonstrate in writing that he would be respectful in his relations with the federal courts and to offer a retraction and sincere apology for his disrespectful remarks rendered in his letter of October 6. Snyder conditionally offered his continued services under the CJA, but contumaciously refused to retract his previous remarks or apologize to the court.

Attorney Snyder's Remarks to the Court

We first turn to Snyder's refusal to comply with the guidelines under the CJA for documentation of expenses. An integral part of Snyder's refusal to comply with CJA guidelines was his explicit statement of disrespect to the federal court. Snyder's conduct not only constituted disrespect but served as well to impede the orderly processing of attorney fee applications. In this direct sense he has served to impede the administration of justice.

As a member of the North Dakota bar and as a licensed practitioner in both the federal district court and the court of appeals, Attorney Snyder is bound by the ethical canons of the legal profession. ⁴ The relevant disciplinary rule states: "A lawyer shall not: ... Engage in conduct Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts and the judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession, one dedicated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers in supporting the organized bar through the devoting of his time, efforts, and financial support as his professional standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.

                that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."    The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A)(5). 5   Equally important is the recognition that an attorney must maintain the proper respect for the court as an institution.  As stated in the Model Code
                

Id. at EC 9-6.

As we will discuss, Snyder now conditionally has offered to serve in indigent cases and to comply with the CJA guidelines. However, in a letter to the court he has otherwise refused to retract or apologize for his disrespectful remarks to the court. He asserts that, although his remarks were "harsh," as a "matter of principle" no further statement is due the court. Letter from Robert J. Snyder to Chief Judge Lay (February 27, 1984).

We find Snyder's present statement that he will conditionally comply with the guidelines not enough. His refusal to show continuing respect for the court and his refusal to demonstrate a sincere retraction of his admittedly "harsh" statements are sufficient to demonstrate to this court that he is not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts. All courts depend upon the highest level of integrity and respect not only from the judiciary but from the lawyers who serve in the court as well. Without public display of respect for the judicial branch of government as an institution by lawyers, the law cannot survive. ⁶ This is not to say that courts cannot and should not be subject to proper criticism and comment; however, when an attorney becomes disrespectful in response to a court's request that counsel comply with a congressional mandate, then we deal with a different matter. Without hesitation we find Snyder's disrespectful statements as to this court's administration of CJA contumacious conduct. We deem this unfortunate.

We find that Robert Snyder shall be suspended from the practice of law in the federal courts of the Eighth Circuit for a period of six months; thereafter Snyder should make application to both this court and the federal district court of North Dakota to be readmitted.

Implementation of the CJA in North Dakota

In further response to the show cause order Attorney Snyder alleges that This court has consistently recognized the duty of an attorney practicing in the federal courts, as an implied obligation, to serve willingly as an officer of the court in a capacity pro bono publico (for the public good). See, e.g., Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir.1971). In the case of Tyler v. Lark we noted:

the implementation of the CJA in North Dakota relies exclusively on an attorney list of those "willing" to serve. He therefore asserts that his refusal to accept any future CJA cases was in compliance with the plan and that he should not be censured for his lack of willingness to serve any more than the vast number of lawyers within the district who were not on the list by reason of their unwillingness to serve. Second, Snyder asserts that, because he lives in a rural area with a smaller population and his firm is willing to try criminal cases, whereas the vast number of lawyers in the district are not so willing, his firm receives a disproportionate number of appointments under the CJA. He also protests that the statutory fee under the CJA is inadequate to compensate him even for his overhead. Third, Snyder complains that the North Dakota list of attorneys willing to serve is not a current list; it does not include lawyers newly admitted to the bar and includes a number of lawyers who are deceased or inactive. He asserts, however, that he is now willing to continue to serve on the CJA panel provided that other qualified attorneys are placed on the list for appointment. We find merit in Snyder's conditional offer of service.

"An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order. Thus, the lawyer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that...