Snyder v. Bell

• Decision Date: 10 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-00853., No. 98-00191
• Citation: Snyder v. Bell, 746 So.2d 1096 (Fla. App. 1999)
• Parties: Janet SNYDER, as Conservator of Frances Bell, Appellant/Cross-appellee, v. William G. BELL, in his capacity as Trustee of the Malvern Hill Bell Revocable Trust U/A/D 01-25-95 and in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malvern Hill Bell, deceased, Appellee/Cross-appellant. William G. Bell, in his capacity as Trustee of the Malvern Hill Bell Revocable Trust U/A/D 01-25-95 and in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malvern Hill Bell, deceased, Appellant/Cross-appellee, v. Janet Snyder, as Conservator of Frances Bell, Appellee/Cross-appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

746 So.2d 1096

Janet SNYDER, as Conservator of Frances Bell, Appellant/Cross-appellee, v.William G. BELL, in his capacity as Trustee of the Malvern Hill Bell Revocable Trust U/A/D 01-25-95 and in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malvern Hill Bell, deceased, Appellee/Cross-appellant.

William G. Bell, in his capacity as Trustee of the Malvern Hill Bell Revocable Trust U/A/D 01-25-95 and in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malvern Hill Bell, deceased, Appellant/Cross-appellee, v.Janet Snyder, as Conservator of Frances Bell, Appellee/Cross-appellant.

Nos. 98-00191, 98-00853.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 10, 1999.

A. Lamar Matthews, Jr. and Arthur S. Hardy of Matthews, Hutton & Eastmoore, Sarasota, and Robert E. Turffs of Brann & Turffs, Sarasota, for Appellant/Cross-appellee.

John J. Waskom, Thomas F. Icard, and Michael L. Foreman of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsberg, P.A., Sarasota, and Steven L. Brannock of Holland & Knight, LLP, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant/cross-appelleeJanet Snyder, as conservator¹ of Frances Bell(Frances), and Appellee/cross-appellantWilliam G. Bell, in his capacity as trustee of the Malvern Hill Bell(Malvern) Revocable Trust and in his capacity as personal representative of the estate of Malvern Hill Bell(the Estate), both appeal the final judgment of the trial court awarding each party damages in this dispute involving the Estate.Of the seven issues appealed to this court, we affirm six without comment.On the issue of the trial court's failure to permit Snyder to receive treble damages on a claim of civil theft against the Estate, we reverse.

Frances and Malvern married in 1976.Frances came into the marriage as a wealthy divorcee, but the amount of money Malvern brought to the marriage is disputed.Prior to their marriage, Frances and Malvern entered into a prenuptial agreement, which provided that any funds placed into joint accounts by either Frances or Malvern would remain that individual's separate property unless a gift could be proven.During the course of the marriage, Malvern assumed control over Frances' finances.

In 1994, Frances suffered a debilitating stroke.Frances' daughter, Snyder, made arrangements to have Frances transported to an assisted-care living facility in Tennessee, where she currently resides.Malvern continued to control Frances' finances and subsequently received a check from a brokerage house in the amount of $122,634.59 made payable to Frances.Malvern deposited the check into his personal bank account.The endorsement on the back of the check purported to be the signature of Frances.

In October 1995, Malvern entered the hospital for cancer treatments.Because of his illness, Malvern became physically unable to continue paying the bills for Frances' care.That event caused Snyder and Bell, Malvern's nephew, to become actively involved in the property and business matters of Frances and Malvern.Malvern's death in November 1995 quickly led to bitter feelings, allegations, and lawsuits between Snyder and Bell.

Snyder filed suit against Bell, and Bell counterclaimed.During the time between the filing of the suit and trial, the court consolidated the cases and the parties filed numerous pleadings and amendments.The amendments included a claim by Snyder for civil theft against the Estate, alleging that Malvern wrongfully deposited the $122,634.59 check and requesting treble damages in the amount of $367,903.77 pursuant to section 772.11, Florida Statutes(1995).

In July 1997, the trial court entered an interlocutory order on Snyder's civil theft claim dismissing Snyder's claim for treble damages.The court concluded that, as a matter of law, treble damages are not available against an estate.In a two-week trial, a jury considered Snyder's claims against the Estate and the Trust for constructive fraud, breach of prenuptial agreement, civil theft, and conversion; Snyder's claims against Bell, individually, for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty; and Snyder's claim against Bell for spoliation of evidence.The jury also considered Bell's claims against Snyder for conversion and spoliation of evidence.The trial court resolved Snyder's additional nonjury claims for an accounting and for removal of Bell as personal representative and trustee.

The jury made the following findings: (1) that Malvern committed constructive fraud against Frances and breached the prenuptial agreement, with damages in the amount of $140,000; (2) that Malvern committed civil theft of the $122,634.59 check; (3) that Malvern did not commit conversion; (4) that Bell, individually, did not commit conversion; (5) that Bell, as trustee, did not breach his fiduciary duty; (6) that Snyder converted property belonging to Malvern in the amount of $13,200, which merited punitive damages in the amount of $250,000; and (7) that Snyder spoliated evidence with damages in the amount of $40,000.The trial court subsequently reduced the punitive damages award to $30,000 and set aside the $40,000 spoliation verdict.The only issue we address is the trial court's failure to permit Snyder to recover treble damages for the civil theft of the $122,634.59 check.The Florida Civil Theft Statute, part of the Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act, provides as follows:

Any person who proves by clear and convincing evidence that he has been injured in any fashion by reason of any violation of the provisions of §§ 812.012-812.037has a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and, in any such action, is entitled to minimum damages in the amount of $200, and reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the trial and appellate courts....In no event shall punitive damages be awarded under this section.

§ 772.11, Fla. Stat.(1995)(emphasis added).Notwithstanding the mandatory requirement of the civil theft statute, the trial court ruled that, based on public policy reasons previously applied by the Florida Supreme Court to punitive damage claims in Lohr v. Byrd,522 So.2d 845(Fla.1988), treble damages cannot, as a matter of law, be recovered against a decedent's estate.

In Lohr, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the following question certified to be of great public importance:

MAY PUNITIVE DAMAGES BE AWARDED AGAINST A DECEASED TORTFEASOR'S ESTATE?

In answering this question in the negative, the supreme court analyzed the public policy considerations and ramifications of allowing such damages, which are solely meant to punish, against the innocent heirs or creditors of a decedent's estate.Specifically, the court stated that because the basic purpose of punitive damages is punishment and not compensation to the injured party, the imposition of these damages at the expense of innocent heirs and creditors "ignores our basic philosophy of justice."Id. at 847.

In this case, the trial court expanded Lohr to include treble damages.The basis for this ruling is found, primarily, in the trial court's conclusion that treble damages are a "form of punitive damages."According to the trial court, if treble damages are no more than a form of punitive damages and a court may not award punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, then a court may not award treble damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.

The trial court's position fails upon a critical examination of the differences between judicially-created punitive damages and legislatively-created treble damages.Florida's civil theft statute is without question remedial, rather than punitive, in nature.See§ 812.037, Fla. Stat.(1995)("Notwithstanding §§ 775.021,812.012-812.037 shall not be construed strictly or liberally, but shall be construed in light of their purposes to achieve their remedial goals.")(emphasis added).See alsoZiccardi v. Strother,570 So.2d 1319, 1321(Fla. 2d DCA1990)(finding that the Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act was remedial in nature);Stuart L. Stein, P.A. v. Miller Indus., Inc.,564 So.2d 539(Fla. 4th DCA1990);Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co.,450 So.2d 1157, 1165(Fla. 3d DCA1984)(finding that the prior version of the civil theft statute, then section 812.035, was remedial in nature);cf.Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701(1977)(stating that treble damage provision of Clayton Act to...