Snyder v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc

• Citation: 22 A.2d 181,112 Vt. 190
• Parties: LOUIS SNYDER v. CENTRAL VERMONT RAILWAY, INC
• Decision Date: 07 October 1941
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

22 A.2d 181

112 Vt. 190

LOUIS SNYDER v. CENTRAL VERMONT RAILWAY, INC

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 7, 1941

May Term, 1941.

Statutory Construction.---1. Legislative Intent.---2. Ordinary Meaning of Words.---3. Statutory History.---4. County Court Venue Generally.---5. History of P. L. 1565.---6. No. 20 of the Acts of 1853.---7. "May" and "Shall."---8. "Allow" and "Permit."---9. Venue of Action Against Railroad, P L. 1565.

1. In determining whether the word "may" when used in a statute is to be construed as imposing an absolute duty or merely a discretionary power, the general rule of statutory construction that the true intent and purpose of the Legislature should be carried into effect should be applied.

2. In construing a statute, the ordinary meaning of the language must be presumed to be intended unless it would manifestly defeat the object of the provisions.

3. In ascertaining the intention of the Legislature on a question of statutory construction, the history of the statute in question becomes material.

4. Statutes relating to venue generally of county court actions were enacted prior to those having to do with such actions in which a railroad corporation is a party, P. L. 1565, Revision 1787, page 27.

5. The clause in P. L. 1565 governing actions in which a railroad corporation is defendant was first enacted as No. 20 of the Acts of 1853 and the provision applying when the railroad is plaintiff came into effect as No. 6 of the Acts of 1857.

6. It is apparent that the object of No. 20 of the Acts of 1853 was to enlarge the venue of county court actions in which railroad corporations are named as defendants.

7. The use of the word "may" in one section of the statute and the use of the word "shall" in another section indicate an intention to differentiate between the sections---"may" meaning permissive while "shall" is of restrictive import.

8. "Allow" and "permit" are synonymous and convertible and are of the same intent as "may."

9. P L. 1565 allows an action against a domestic railroad to be brought in any county court having jurisdiction under the general venue of plaintiffs or defendants as well as in such a court in a county where its railroad is located.

ACTION OF TORT for negligence. Special plea to the venue. Plaintiff's demurrer sustained, September Term, 1940 Rutland County Court, Cushing, J., presiding. Cause passed to Supreme Court before final judgment pursuant to P. L. 2072. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

Horace H. Powers for defendant.

Fenton, Wing & Morse (John D. Carbine and James T. Haugh) for plaintiff.

Present: MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.

OPINION

JEFFORDS

The plaintiff, a resident of Rutland County, alleges that he was injured in a grade crossing accident which happened in the town of Sheldon in Franklin County. He brought this suit to the Rutland County Court. The defendant filed a special plea setting forth that the said court has no jurisdiction of the action because the defendant does not now and never has owned or operated any line of railroad in Rutland County. To this plea the plaintiff filed a general demurrer which was sustained pro forma and the cause passed to this Court under the provisions of P. L. 2072.

The result here reached depends on the construction to be given to P. L. 1565 which reads as follows:

"Actions before the county court shall be brought in the county in which one of the parties resides, if either resides in the state; otherwise the writ, on motion, shall abate; if neither party resides in the state, the action may be brought in any county, but actions of ejectment and actions in tort for trespass on the freehold shall be brought in the county in which the lands lie. An action brought by a domestic railroad corporation to the county court shall be made returnable either in the county in which such corporation has its principal office for the transaction of business, or in the county in which such corporation has its principal office for the transaction of business, or in the county in which a defendant resides; and an action or suit brought in the county court, in which such corporation is defendant, may be brought in any county in which a road owned or operated by such corporation is located."

The defendant claims, in effect, that the last clause in the statute is mandatory and not permissive, or, in other words, that "may" as therein used should be construed as meaning "must." It says the legislative history of the statute supports its contention.

In determining whether the word "may" when used in a public statute is to be construed as imposing an absolute duty or merely a discretionary power the general rule of statutory construction that the true intent and purpose of the Legislature should be carried into effect should be applied. The ordinary meaning of the language must be presumed to be intended, unless it would...