Snyder v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.
| Decision Date | 19 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. C11-06213 HRL,C11-06213 HRL |
| Parties | DAVID SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP.; ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
[Re: Docket Nos. 14, 29, 31]
Plaintiff David Snyder originally filed this action in Santa Cruz County Superior Court against numerous defendants alleging a variety of claims related to an unlawful detainer action against him. Snyder was the tenant and lessee of a residence originally owned by defendant Wayne Greene. Greene defaulted and the house was sold in a foreclosure sale to defendant Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac initiated an unlawful detainer action against Snyder, and was represented by defendants Malcolm & Cisneros and Melissa Sgroi. Snyder then sued Greene, Freddie Mac, Malcolm & Cisneros, Sgroi, as well as several others: (1) Bailey Properties, which managed the subject property during parts of Snyder's tenancy; (2) Gene Harding, who worked for Bailey Properties; and (3) a variety of Greene's acquaintances, who allegedly harassed Snyder, but who are no longer parties to this action.
The case is now before this court after its second removal from state court.1 Defendants Freddie Mac, Malcolm & Sgroi ("M&C") and Melissa Sgroi moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which this court granted on March 2, 2012. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, stating claims against Freddie Mac, Wayne Greene, Bailey Properties, and Gene Harding. Dkt. No. 13 ("FAC"). Greene, Harding, and Bailey Properties have not appeared. Freddie Mac again moves to dismiss. Dkt. No. 14 ("Motion to Dismiss"). Snyder did not file any opposition to the motion to dismiss. This court held a hearing on the motion on May 29. Snyder appeared and explained that he was seeking new counsel and intended to oppose the motion. The court gave Snyder an extension of time to file an opposition, with or without new counsel. That deadline, June 12, 2012, passed without any filing by Snyder. On June 14, Snyder filed a request for access to the court's electronic filing system. Dkt. No. 29. On June 18, he filed a motion for leave to amend the FAC, or, in the alternative, to dismiss Freddie Mac without prejudice. Dkt. No. 31.
All parties have consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Based on the moving papers, arguments presented at hearing, and all applicable authority, the court rules as follows.
On motion, a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The federal rules require that a complaint include a "short and plain statement" showing the plaintiff is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55 (2007). However, only plausible claims for relief with survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim is plausible if its factual content "allows thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949. A plaintiff does not have to provide detailed facts, but the pleading must include "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 1950.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is ordinarily limited to the face of the complaint. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). The factual allegations pled in the complaint must be taken as true and reasonable inferences drawn from them must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, the court cannot assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). "Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)), amended on other grounds by 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
"A court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). " " Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). "Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend." Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). An amendment would be "futile" if there is no set of facts can be proved which would constitute a valid claim or defense. See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff's FAC states three claims for relief: (1) breach of contract, against Wayne Greene; (2) constructive eviction, against Freddie Mac, Bailey Properties, and Harding; and (3) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, against all defendants. Only Freddie Mac has moved to dismiss.
Plaintiff purports to state a claim for "violation of rights of peaceable possession and constructive eviction." Dkt. No. 13, p. 5. Under California law, a constructive eviction occurs at the time possession is surrendered. Irvine Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18828 (9th Cir. July 29, 1996) (citing Petroleum Collections v. Swords, 48 Cal. App. 3d 841 (Ct. App. 1979)). "There can be no eviction, actual or constructive, if the lessee continues in the possession of the premises." Clark v. Spiegel, 22 Cal. App. 3d 74, 80 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1971) (citing Slater v. Conti, 171 Cal. App. 2d 582, 586 (1959)). Snyder admits that he continues to reside at the subject property. FAC p. 2. Accordingly, he cannot possibly state a claim for constructive eviction, and this claim should be DISMISSED in its entirety without leave to amend.
To the extent that plaintiff attempts to state a separate claim for "violation of rights of peaceable possession," no such claim exists. Rather, the term is typically used merely to describe an individual's actual possession of land. See, e.g., Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U.S. 266, 268 (1923). Additionally, proof of a plaintiff's peaceable possession is one element of a wrongful eviction claim. See Campos v. Bank of Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70407, *15-16 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (citations omitted) ( that peaceable possession, followed by wrongful dispossession, are the elements of a wrongful eviction claim under California law). Plaintiff has not stated a claim for wrongful eviction, and indeed, since he has not been dispossessed of the property, he cannot do so.
To state a claim for damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, a plaintiff must show: (1) there was a materially defective condition affecting habitability; (2) the condition was unknown to the tenant at the time of occupancy; (3) the effect of the condition on habitability was not apparent on a reasonable inspection; (4) notice was given to the landlord within a reasonable time after the tenant discovered or should have discovered the breach of warranty; and (5) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the defect while the tenant remained in possession. See Quevedo v. Braga, 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 7 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1977) (disapproved on other grounds by Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46 (Cal. 1981)).
The court dismissed this claim against Freddie Mac as it was presented in the original complaint. See Dkt. No. 12. In that order, the court noted that Snyder had failed to plead (1) that he did not know of the unsafe conditions at the time of occupancy; (2) that the conditions were not apparent upon a reasonable inspection; or (3) that he notified the owner or property manager of the conditions within a reasonable time after he discovered them. Id. at 8.
In his FAC, Snyder has added conclusory allegations meant to correct these deficiencies. See FAC ¶¶ 27-33. However, he has not provided any additional facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against Freddie Mac. There are three alleged defects: (1) a tree that fell onto the house after Snyder had taken possession, causing a leak; (2) a rotten deck; and (3) intermittent water service and low water pressure. Although these conditions certainly do merit attention by the owner and/or property manager, Snyder's FAC does not allege facts that show he was not aware of the conditions when he took possession of the premises (before Freddie Ma became the owner of the property), nor that they would not be apparent upon a reasonable inspection. In fact, he asserts that defendant Harding "could visually see" the defects when he visited the property while Snyder resided there, contradicting his allegation that "the effect of the condition on habitability of these defects was not apparent on a reasonable inspection." FAC ¶28; cf. FAC ¶ 27. Other than summarily alleging that "notice was given to Defendant Freddy Mac, including through the Defendant agents and its attorneys," plaintiff offers no facts whatsoever to support a claim against Freddie Mac.
Snyder has...
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