Snyder v. Floyd

• Decision Date: 10 February 2023
• Docket Number: 2:22-CV-10472
• Parties: VAN ORION SNYDER, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE FLOYD, Respondent,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

VAN ORION SNYDER, Petitioner,
v.
MICHELLE FLOYD, Respondent,

No. 2:22-CV-10472

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

February 10, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER (1) SUMMARILY DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, (2) DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND (3) DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

HONORABLE PAUL D. BORMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Van Orion Snyder, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Michigan Department of Corrections Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his conviction for two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(b). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, on the ground that it was not timely filed in accordance with the statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1). (ECF No. 20.) Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is summarily denied with prejudice.

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I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Schoolcraft County Circuit Court.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction on October 26, 1999. People v. Snyder, No. 210802, 1999 WL 33434595 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1999). Petitioner never filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. See Affidavit of Larry Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court. (ECF No. 21-11.)

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on February 22, 2022. (ECF No. 1.)^[1]

II. DISCUSSION

In the statute of limitations context, “dismissal is appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.” Harris v. New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2nd Cir.1999); see also Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2007).

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute of limitations upon petitions for habeas relief:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was originally recognized by the Supreme Court if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Although not jurisdictional, the AEDPA's one year limitations period “effectively bars relief absent a showing that the petition's untimeliness should be excused based on equitable tolling and actual innocence.” See Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252, 260 (6th Cir. 2009).

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction on October 26, 1999. Petitioner never filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.

If a habeas petitioner appeals to the Michigan Supreme Court, but does not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, his judgment of conviction is finalized when the time for taking an appeal to the United States Supreme Court expires. The one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run

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until the day after the petition for a writ of certiorari was due in the United States Supreme Court. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009).

However, when, as in this case, a habeas petitioner only appeals his judgment of conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and fails to file an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the additional ninety days for filing an appeal to the United States Supreme Court is not taken into account. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (clarifying that when a petitioner does “not appeal to the State's highest court, his judgment [becomes] final when his time for seeking review with the State's highest court expire[s]”).

Under at M.C.R. 7.302(C)(3), the court rule in effect at the time of Petitioner's conviction, Petitioner had 56 days to file an appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, the highest court in the State. The expiration of the 56 days represents the expiration of the time for seeking direct review of Petitioner's judgment of conviction, therefore, the one-year statute of limitations began to run at that time. Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 150.

Because Petitioner did not file a timely application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, his conviction became final, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), on December 21, 1999, when the time for seeking leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court expired. See Brown v. McKee,

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232 F.Supp.2d 761, 765 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Erwin v. Elo, 130 F.Supp.2d 887, 889 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Petitioner had one year - until December 21, 2000 - to timely file his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner's habeas corpus petition was filed on February 22, 2022, some 21 years after the one year limitations period expired and is thus untimely.

Petitioner suggests or implies in his Response that the Petition should be granted because his claims are meritorious. Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, it is permissible for a respondent to file a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, rather than an answer on the merits. See Jackson v. Straub, 309 F.Supp.2d 952, 959 (E.D. Mich. 2004). It was thus proper for Respondent to file a motion to dismiss the Petition on statute of limitations grounds, rather than initially file an answer addressing the merits. In addition, a merits decision is unnecessary where a district court denies a habeas corpus petition on statute of limitations grounds. See Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979, 982 (6th Cir. 2007).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) statute of limitations “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling “only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way'” and

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prevented the timely filing of the habeas corpus petition. Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “the doctrine of equitable tolling is used sparingly by federal courts.” See Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 784...