Snyder v. De Forest Wireless Tel. Co.
Decision Date | 07 June 1907 |
Docket Number | 605. |
Citation | 154 F. 142 |
Parties | SNYDER v. DE FOREST WIRELESS TELEGRAPH CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Jas. A Allen and W. G. Chapman, for complainant.
Verrill Hale & Booth, and F. X. Butler, for respondents.
This bill was brought by the complainant, on behalf of himself and other stockholders of the De Forest Wireless Telegraph Company, against another corporation and certain individuals whom it is not necessary for our purposes to name. The bill with its amendment, covers 32 printed pages. Its allegations are complicated, and the various reliefs which it asks for are numerous and far-reaching. The amendment covers six printed pages, so that for the court to apply the amendment to the bill and analyze the bill with reference to determining the questions of law raised on its face would put on it a very serious and difficult duty and burden. All or some of the respondents filed a plea alleging that a suit of substantially the same character as that at bar, and asking substantially the same relief, was commenced in a state court of New York, before the filing of this bill, and the same is still pending. Also, on the same day on which the plea was filed, some or all of the respondents filed a demurrer alleging generally want of equity; that is, a general demurrer. They also on the same day filed a joint and several answer or answers. The complainant maintains that the plea demurrer, and answer, or answers, constitute in law a single instrument of defense; but, although filed at the same time, and in what might be called according to the common understanding a single document, the plan, demurrer, and answers are in law separate and distinct pleadings, and are to be regarded as such.
There was also a motion to dismiss, or discontinue, which presents the most important questions we have before us.
This plea of another suit pending in a state court clearly is not valid. It often happens that different suits covering the same subject-matter may be brought in different jurisdictions, or in the federal court and the state court in the same jurisdiction, without either being a bar to the other until some judgment is rendered; and this may be for reasonable and just causes. If, however, various suits are brought in different jurisdictions which are needless or oppressive, and which put the respondents to unnecessary or unjust labor or expense, it is in the power of a court in equity, whatever may be the powers of courts at law, to impose terms with reference to the method of proceeding in each of the various suits so as to prevent the defending or responding parties from being improperly harassed. Nothing calling for any action of that nature is pending before us, and therefore we can only enter a judgment overruling the plea with costs, under equity rule 34.
Within the spirit of the equity rules, a plea of the nature of that before us is not necessarily overruled by a contemporaneous or subsequent demurrer or answer. Nevertheless, with regard to a demurrer, the usual practice which prevails in equity, by virtue of which an answer overrules a demurrer, has been urged on us. The complainant for this reason moved to strike out the demurrer; but, in view of the ultimate result which seemed plain to us, we were not disposed to complicate the record by an order which we deemed unnecessary. We had no brief from the respondents, or anything analyzing the bill and its amendment; the demurrer is general; and, in view of the length and complexity of the bill which we have explained, the burden thrown on us, if we undertook to sift out the pleadings, would be of such a character that we do not feel called on to undertake it. We would be justified in this by a reference to our own rules, which require proper briefs in this connection; and particularly may we avail ourselves of the practice explained in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 185, 144, 145, 22 Sup.Ct. 552, 46 L.Ed. 838, which justifies us in reserving to the final hearing all substantial questions of law appearing on the face of the bill. For these reasons there will be a judgment overruling the demurrer, with costs as provided in rule 34, to which we have already referred.
We will next deal with the motion to dismiss, or discontinue, whatever it should be called. As we have said, this bill was brought by Snyder on behalf of himself and other stockholders in one of the corporations named as respondents. It was filed on February 13, 1906. On November 28, 1906, the complainant made an agreement with one of the respondents, as follows:
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