Snyder v. General Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 July 1955
• Docket Number: No. 32976
• Citation: Snyder v. General Elec. Co., 287 P.2d 108, 47 Wn.2d 60 (Wash. 1955)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Homer SNYDER, Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and G. H. Fisher, Respondents.

Page 60

47 Wn.2d 60

287 P.2d 108

Homer SNYDER, Appellant, v.GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and G. H. FisherRespondents.

No. 32976.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

July 28, 1955.

Horrigan, Merrick, Peterson & Merrick, Pasco, for appellant.

Moulton, Powell, Gess & Loney, Kennewick, for respondents.

HILL, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial.Liability was conceded in a personal injury action, and the only issue submitted to the jury was the amount of damages.The verdict was for $2,412.50 for special damages and $39,944 for general damages.The trial court entered an interlocutory order providing that unless the plaintiff would agree to accept a reduction of the jury's verdict for general damages to $19,500, a new trial would be granted.The plaintiff refused to accept the reduction and an order was entered granting a new trial, the trial court's reasons being stated as follows:

'It Further Appearing To The Court from the testimony introduced that the disability of the plaintiff's shoulder was fixed at approximately ten percent and that his permanent partial disability to his knee would, in all probability, be twenty-five to thirty percent, based upon one hundred percent of amputation at the knee, and * * *

'It Further Appearing To The Court that the prospective loss in wages of $1.00 per hour, as testified to by witnesses for the plaintiff, projected at that rate over the remaining work years of plaintiff, is not a just or true criterion of compensation for injuries such as are shown in this action, and that the verdict, if allowing $10,000 for pain and suffering as requested by plaintiff, allows at least $29,994.00 for a permanent disability of twenty-five to thirty percent of the leg based upon amputation at the knee, and ten percent impairment of the right shoulder, which total verdict under all the circumstances is so excessive as to constitute an injustice, and

'It Further Appearing To The Court that, although the verdict does not unmistakably indicate prejudice and passion on the part of the jury, in the opinion of the court, the total amount of the verdict under the circumstances indicates that undue significance was attached to the mathematical formula for damages as propounded by the plaintiff with the result that the verdict awarded by the jury is out of reasonable proportion to the injuries shown, is punitive in nature, and unjust to the defendants and that unless a new trial is granted an injustice will be done. * * *'

Appellant's first assignment of error is that the trial court granted a new trial on the ground that substantial justice had not been done, which ground was not included in the defendants' motion for a new trial.

We have always recognized and all our decisions have proceeded upon the principle that a trial court has the inherent power to grant a new trial if, in the exercise of its sound discretion, it is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done, even though in the past that was not listed by rule or statute as one of the grounds for a new trial.Sylvester v. Olson, 1911, 63 Wash. 285, 115 P. 175;Brammer v. Lappenbusch, 1934, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P.2d 947;Coppo v. Van Wieringen, 1950, 36 Wash.2d 120, 217 P.2d 294.In Sylvester v. Olson, supra, we recognized that the power could be exercised sua sponte.In that case a motion for a new trial was not timely made but a new trial was nevertheless granted.We upheld that order on the basis that, in the absence of any motion, the inherent power of the trial court to grant a new trial where an injustice has been done cannot be denied.

In 1951, Superior Court Rule 16 was amended (34A Wash.2d 117) to enumerate the grounds on which 'The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a new trial granted, on the motion of the party aggrieved'.(Italics ours.)For the first time in either rule or statute, 'That substantial justice has not been done' was listed as one such ground.It is urged that since that rule became effective in its present form, a new trial cannot be granted by the trial court for that reason unless it is included in 'the motion of the party aggrieved.'

Appellant cites such cases as Orme v. Watkins, 1954, 44 Wash.2d 325, 267 P.2d 681, in which the error assigned was the trial court's failure to grant a new trial.In such a casean appellant can rely only upon the grounds which he brought to the attention of the trial court by his motion.See, also, De Vall v. De Vall, 1911, 60 Or. 493, 118 P. 843, 120 P. 13, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 291, which emphasizes the distinction between the situations when the trial court is satisfied with the verdict and when it feels that justice has not been done.

The Oregon statute construed in De Vall v. De Vall, supra, contained language very similar to that of Rule 16.In that case, although there was a motion to set aside the verdict, the trial court set it aside on a ground not assigned in the motion.The appellate court, after an exhaustive discussion of cases from other states, said, 60 Or. at page 500, 118 P. at page 845:

'Thus we see that, by virtue of the inherent power of the court, it has authority, on its own motion, or for causes other than those assigned in a motion, to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial, unless such power of the court has been limited by statute.The statute of Oregon (section 174, L.O.L.), relating to motions for new trials, is in effect the same as that of Iowa, above quoted, namely: 'A former judgment may be set aside and a new trial granted on the motion of the party aggrieved for any of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of such party,' etc.It contains no limitation upon the power of the court to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial upon its own motion and it was within the court's discretion to set the judgment aside, if error appeared in the record that did or might result in a miscarriage of justice.The court only sought to rectify its own error in giving the instruction mentioned, which instruction we must assume was erroneous, and this was within its power that the rights of the litigant might be protected, and also in justice to the court, as responsible for the impartial administration of the law.'

Rule 16 does not attempt to limit the inherent power of the superior courts to grant new trials because substantial justice has not been done; it does not say that the courts may not exercise their inherent power sua sponte.It neither confers any power upon the superior courts that they did not already inherently possess nor attempts to restrict them in the exercise of their inherent power, except to make the exercise of that power subject to review by this court under certain conditions, just as any other exercise of a discretionary power would be.The rule does list certain causes for which a new trial may be granted 'on the motion of the party aggrieved'.Our holding, therefore, is that Superior Court Rule 16 does not restrict the inherent power of the superior courts to grant new trials on the ground that substantial justice has not been done, even though that ground be not enumerated in the motion for a new trial and even if there be no motion for a new trial.

It does not follow from such a holding, however, that the order granting a new trial should be affirmed.The other assignments of error raise a further question: It being conceded that the trial court had the inherent power to grant a new trial on the ground that substantial justice had not been done, do the reasons of law and fact given by the trial court in its order granting the new trial furnish an adequate basis for the action taken and, if not, does the order constitute an abuse of discretion?

It should be noted that the reasons given by the trial court do not suggest that there is anything outside the record that would warrant the granting of a new trial; hence this is precisely the type of case which we indicated in Coppo v. Van Wieringen, supra, should be subject to review by this court.It should also be noted that, while the trial court was convinced that the general damages allowed were excessive, it negatived any idea that they were so excessive as to indicate unmistakably the existence of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.

The trial court's reasons as to why justice was not done by the verdict in this case, as stated in its order which we have quoted, may be summarized as follows: (1) The damages are disproportionate to the disabilities sustained; (2) the jury based its verdict upon or attached undue importance to a formula based upon testimony that the plaintiff would, as a result of his disability, be capable of earning one dollar an hour less than if he had been able to continue his employment as a heavy-duty mechanic.The reasons given are definite and comply with Rule 16.The question remains whether they are sufficient to justify the action taken.

The trial court stated in its order that, all that was asked for pain and suffering ($10,000) being deducted, the remaining $29,994 allowed for general damages must have been based upon a reduction of one dollar an hour in appellant's earning capacity.Appellant was at the time of trial forty-four years of age.The application of any such formula based upon a forty-hour week for twenty-one years (assuming full-time...