Snyder v. Grandstaff

• Decision Date: 17 November 1898
• Citation: 31 S.E. 647,96 Va. 473
• Parties: SNYDER et al. v. GRANDSTAFF et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

31 S.E. 647

96 Va. 473

SNYDER et al.

v.GRANDSTAFF et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 17, 1898.

Equity—Pleading—Multifariousness —Mistake —Bona Fide Purchasers—Conveyance in Consideration of Marriage—Burden of Proof— Construction of Deed.

1. A bill in equity, presenting different views of the same collocation of facts, stated in the alternative, is not multifarious because thereof.

2. Where a bill to reform a deed was based on an alleged mutual mistake, it was not demurrable, though it failed to allege notice to a purchaser for value.

3. A mutual mistake in a deed on the part of antecedent parties will not affect a purchaser for value and without notice.

4. A deed made by a man to his intended wife, followed by marriage, is conclusively presumed to be in consideration of marriage, and is based on a valuable consideration.

5. Under a bill to reform deed, on the ground of mutual mistake, against a purchaser for value, the burden of showing that such purchaser had notice was on complainants.

6. Testator devised his whole estate to his three grandchildren, in equal shares, but provided that, "on the death of either of them without issue, his or her share should pass to the survivors or survivor, and, in case all died without issue, then to collateral kin." After his death the devisees, by deeds reciting that under such devise they were each entitled to one-third of the estate, that they had agreed on a partition thereof, and that they desired "to vest exclusive title to the several parcels of land in the said parties to whom they had been assigned and allotted, respectively, " conveyed to each other, respectively, his or her heirs and assigns, "all right, title, and interest of the said parties of the first part" in the property described in each deed. Thereafter the brother of complainants, referring to their deed to him for description, conveyed the land embraced therein, in fee, with general warranty, to the feme defendant, on the expressed consideration of one dollar, and thereupon married her, and soon afterwards died without issue; leaving his father as his heir, and his widow and father as his distributees. Complainants claimed the real estate in question as surviving devisees, and that, if their deed to decedent was inconsistent with such claim, it was executed under a mutual mistake and contrary to the real intention of the parties; and the widow claimed to be a purchaser for value, without notice, and that the consideration of the deed to her was marriage. Held, that the absolute title, devested of their right of survivorship, passed by such deed of complainants to decedent, and by his deed to his grantee.

Appeal from circuit court, Shenandoah county.

Bill by L A. Snyder and another against A. J. Grandstaff, administrator of the estate of Joseph V. Snyder, deceased, and Flora Snyder, widow of decedent, to enforce an alleged claim to certain real estate, as sur viving devisees of Israel Allen, deceased, and for other relief. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Walton & Walton, for appellants.

Barton & Boyd and L. Triplett, Jr., for appellees.

CARDWELL, J. This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Shenandoah county. In deciding the case the learned Judge of that court delivered the following opinion, which is filed with, and made a part of, the record:

"Israel Allen devised, in the third clause of his will, that after the death of his wife his whole estate, real, personal, and mixed, should pass to his three grandchildren, L. A. Snyder, Amanda Long, and Joseph V. Snyder, to be equally divided between them, share and share alike, but on the death of either of them without issue, his or her share should pass to the survivors or survivor, and, in case all died without issue, then to collateral kin.

"By deed dated 20th July, 1895, L A. Snyder and wife, Amanda Long and husband (Joseph V. Snyder signing the deed as party of the second part), reciting that under the third clause of the will the said parties were entitled to one equal third of the estate, that they had agreed upon a partition of the real estate, that Jos. V. Snyder was to be equalized by payment to him of $3,000 out of the personal estate, that the said parties desired 'to vest exclusive title to the several parcels of land in the said parties to whom they had been assigned and allotted, respectively, ' in consideration of one dollar, etc., conveyed unto the said Joseph V. Snyder, his heirs and assigns, 'all right, title, and interest of the said parties of the first part' in the described property.

"Similar deeds were made to each of the grantors by the other two devisees for the tracts assigned and allotted to each.

"On the 7th of April, 1896, Joseph V. Snyder, referring to this deed for description, conveyed the real estate embraced therein in fee to Flora Grandstaff, with general warranty, and upon the expressed consideration of one dollar cash in hand paid, and on the same day, and shortly thereafter, intermarried with her. This deed was duly recorded on the 8th, and within some six weeks thereafter Joseph V. Snyder died, without issue or possibility of issue. His father is his heir, and A. J. Grandstaff is his administrator, and his widow and father are his distributees.

"L. A. Snyder, Amanda Long, and Lee Long, her husband, filed their bill to December rules, 1896, claiming that under the will of Israel Allen they are entitled to the real estate, by virtue of survivorship; that Mrs. Flora Snyder withholds possession from them; that under a proper construction of the deed of 20th of July, 1895, they never parted with this interest; but if such deed should be otherwise construed, then it wasexecuted under a mutual mistake, and contrary to the real intention of the parties; and they pray that the same may be reformed, and for general relief. To this bill the administrator and widow are made parties. No claim is asserted against or through the estate of Joseph V. Snyder. The widow demurs to the bill, and files her answer. Depositions on the part of the plaintiffs have been taken, with intent to show mistake, and on the part of the defendants to show that the consideration of the deed to her was marriage. In her answer, after denying any mistake in the deed, she claims to be a purchaser for value, without notice.

"I do not think the bill is multifarious, for parties have the right to state their case in the alternative. Multifariousness does not arise from the presentation of different views of the same collocation of facts, but it must be two distinct collocations of distinct and different facts, each collocation presenting different rights and calling for different relief. Equity is the proper forum for the reformation of a deed, and I have reached the conclusion that this claim in the bill of a mutual mistake prevents the bill from being demurrable, even though the bill fails to allege notice to a purchaser for value. There is no doubt that complainants must prove notice to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, but under the decision of the court of appeals in Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 415, 2 S. E. 713, the defense must be made by plea or answer. This case seemingly conflicts with Carter v. Allan, 21 Grat. 241, on this point; but it is a later case, and the views of the court are sustained by reference to various authorities, and I have not observed that it has yet been overruled. Besides, in the case at bar the defense is made by answer, and can better be considered in connection with the evidence than upon demurrer. I therefore overrule the demurrer.

"Passing from the demurrer, the first suggestion is the question we adjourned from the demurrer, namely, assuming that a mistake has been made, how is the defendant affected thereby?

"1. A purchaser for value and without notice is not affected by any latent equity. A mutual mistake stands on the same footing as any other equity. Kerr, Fraud & M. p. 436, specifically lays this down as to mistake. I quote: 'As against a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice, no relief can be had in equity.' Almost the same words is Pom. Eq. Jur. § 776. But the case of Carter v. Allan, 21 Grat. 241 (and on this point it is cited with approval in Iron Co. v. Trout, supra), is directly in point: 'The doctrine that the courts of equity will not grant relief against bona fide purchasers without notice has always been adhered to as an indispensable muniment of title. It is wholly immaterial of what nature the equity is, —whether it is founded on a lien, or incumbrance, or trust, or a fraud, or any other claim; for a bona fide purchaser of the estate for a valuable consideration, without notice, purges away the equity from the estate, in the hands of all persons who may derive title under it, with the exception of the original party, whose conscience stands bound by the violation of his trust, and meditated fraud.' In Iron Co. v. Trout, supra, the same broad doctrine is laid down: 'It cannot be questioned at this day that the purchaser for value, without notice, actual or constructive, will not be affected by a latent equity, whether by lien, incumbrance, or trust, or fraud, or any other claim.'

"2. A deed made by a man to his intended wife, followed by marriage, is conclusively presumed to be in consideration of marriage, and is based on a valuable consideration. In Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 271, Chancellor Kent says: 'The marriage was a valuable consideration, which fixed the interest in the grantee against all the world, and as much as if she had paid an adequate consideration pecuniary. It has been a principle of long standing, and uniformly recognized, that a deed voluntary or fraudulent in its creation, and voidable by a purchaser, may...