SNYDER v. HEIDELBERGER

• Decision Date: 12 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2-08-1061.,2-08-1061.
• Parties: Judith J. SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elliot HEIDELBERGER, Defendant-Appellee (Steven W. Snyder, Defendant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

403 Ill.App.3d 974
933 N.E.2d 1235
342 Ill.Dec. 942

Judith J. SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Elliot HEIDELBERGER, Defendant-Appellee (Steven W. Snyder, Defendant).

No. 2-08-1061.

Appellate Court of Illinois,Second District.

Aug. 12, 2010.

933 N.E.2d 1235

Timothy J. Klein, Bloomingdale, for Appellant.

Patricia L. Argentati, Mulherin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, P.C., Wheaton, for Appellee.

933 N.E.2d 1236

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

342 Ill.Dec. 943

403 Ill.App.3d 975

Plaintiff, Judith J. Snyder, sued defendant attorney Elliot Heidelberger for malpractice in the drafting of a deed to real property that her late husband, Wilbert Snyder, allegedly intended to convey to her as his joint tenant. She also requested a constructive trust in order to prevent defendant Steven W. Snyder from dispossessing her via an action for forcible entry and detainer (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (West 2008)). Heidelberger moved to dismiss the malpractice count (see 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2008)) on several bases, including as barred by the statute of repose (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1994)). The trial court granted Heidelberger's motion, based solely on the claimed violation of the statute of repose. Plaintiff appeals (see 210 Ill.2d R. 304(a)). We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff's two-count complaint, filed February 28, 2008, alleged the following facts. Plaintiff married Wilbert Snyder (Wilbert) on March 7, 1997. Since then, she had resided continuously at the property at issue (the premises). On May 23, 1997, Wilbert retained Heidelberger to change either the legal title to, or the beneficial interest in, the premises. Wilbert, Heidelberger, and plaintiff intended to make Wilbert and plaintiff co-owners in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. On May 23, 1997, Heidelberger prepared a quitclaim deed that, by its terms, conveyed title to the premises from Wilbert to Wilbert and plaintiff in joint tenancy. The next month, Heidelberger recorded the deed. Although the complaint did not so state, plaintiff later alleged that Heidelberger negligently failed to recognize that Wilbert did not hold title to the premises but merely held the beneficial interest in a land trust that did. Thus, she alleged, the quitclaim deed conveyed nothing to her.

The complaint continued as follows. On December 26, 2007, Wilbert died. On February 19, 2008, Steven W. Snyder (Steven), Wilbert's son and plaintiff's stepson, filed a forcible entry and detainer action against plaintiff. Plaintiff's complaint does not explain Steven's suit. However, a judgment of January 2, 2009, ¹ granting Steven relief stated as follows. The quitclaim deed did nothing because title to the premises always had been, and still was, in the land trust. Thus, plaintiff never

403 Ill.App.3d 976

acquired any interest in the premises. On June 26, 1980, Wilbert amended the land trust agreement to provide that, when he died, the entire beneficial interest would go to Steven. Therefore, Steven was now entitled to possession of the premises. Count I of plaintiff's complaint, against Heidelberger for malpractice, alleged that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the professional relationship between Heidelberger and Wilbert and that Heidelberger breached his duty of due care to plaintiff. Count II sought to impose a constructive trust on the premises, contending that Steven should not be unjustly enriched by Heidelberger's negligence.

Heidelberger moved to dismiss count I on several bases, including the statute of repose, which, in pertinent part, reads:

“(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise * * * against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services * * * must be commenced within 2 years from the time the person bringing the action knew or reasonably

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933 N.E.2d 1237

should have known of the injury for which damages are sought.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action described in subsection (b) may not be commenced in any event more than 6 years after the date on which the act or omission occurred.

(d) When the injury caused by the act or omission does not occur until the death of the person for whom the professional services were rendered, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the date of the person's death * * *.” 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1994). ²

Heidelberger reasoned that, because the allegedly negligent act or omission occurred on May 23, 1997, subsection (b) of the statute barred any action filed after May 23, 2003.

In response, plaintiff relied on subsection (d)'s exception to the six-year rule. She contended that her injury occurred only after Wilbert died, which was less than two years before she filed her action. Plaintiff reasoned that only after Wilbert died did Steven obtain the beneficial interest in the premises and thus become able to exploit the quitclaim deed's failure to give plaintiff any interest in the premises. In reply, Heidelberger argued that plaintiff suffered her injury on May 23, 1997, when his allegedly defective drafting of the quitclaim deed denied her the property interest that otherwise would have been conveyed to her immediately. The trial court agreed, dismissed count

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I, and made the order immediately appealable (see 210 Ill.2d R. 304(a)). Plaintiff timely appealed.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the dismissal was improper because subsection (d) of the statute excludes this case from the six-year statute of repose. She argues that the case is controlled by Wackrow. For the reasons that follow, we agree with plaintiff.

We review de novo a dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2008)). Wackrow, 231 Ill.2d at 422, 326 Ill.Dec. 56, 899 N.E.2d 273. A section 2-619 motion admits all well-pleaded facts, along with all reasonable inferences from those facts. Wackrow, 231 Ill.2d at 422, 326 Ill.Dec. 56, 899 N.E.2d 273.

In Wackrow, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that, in March 1993, the defendant attorney prepared an amendment to a living trust for the plaintiff's brother, Woods. The amendment stated that, upon Woods's death, the trustee would convey the title to Woods's residence from Woods to the plaintiff. ³ However, the defendant did not realize that Woods did not hold the title to the property; the actual owner was a land trust. Woods died in August 2002, and, after his will was admitted to probate, the plaintiff made a claim against his estate for the property. The estate did not deliver the property. In October 2003, the probate court denied the plaintiff's claim. On December 27, 2004, the plaintiff sued the defendant for malpractice in drafting the amendment, alleging that he should have learned beforehand that Woods lacked the title to the property. Wackrow, 231 Ill.2d at 420-21, 326 Ill.Dec. 56, 899 N.E.2d 273.

933 N.E.2d 1238

342 Ill.Dec. 945

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the six-year statute of repose. The plaintiff responded that, under subsection (d), her injury did not occur until Woods died. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court affirmed. The supreme court affirmed on a ground not pertinent here. Wackrow, 231 Ill.2d at 428-29, 326 Ill.Dec. 56, 899 N.E.2d 273. However, the court held:

“[I]t is clear that the injury in this case did not occur until the death of Woods. Plaintiff alleges legal malpractice in the drafting of the amendment to Woods' trust. Because Woods could have revoked that amendment or changed the beneficiary prior to his death, the injury did not occur until Woods' death. Consequently, section 13-214.3(d) applies to plaintiff's claim.” Wackrow, 231 Ill.2d at 425, 326 Ill.Dec. 56, 899 N.E.2d 273.

Plaintiff contends that Wackrow controls this case, given the essential similarities in the allegations of the respective complaints. In each case, the defendant attorney drafted a document that was

403 Ill.App.3d 978

intended to transfer title to real property from the client to the plaintiff. However, the attorney negligently failed to realize that the client did not actually hold title to the property, but held only the beneficial interest in a land trust. Thus, the purported conveyance of title did nothing, and the intent of the client was frustrated. As a result, when the client died, the plaintiff was injured, because she received nothing. Plaintiff completes the equation by concluding that, just as the plaintiff in Wackrow suffered no injury until Woods died, she suffered no injury until Wilbert died. She reasons that, just as Woods could have revised the living trust by amending it to effectuate his true intent at any time before he died, Wilbert, at any time between May 23, 1997, and his death, could have conveyed to her the interest that he had intended her to receive.

Heidelberger attempts to distinguish this case from Wackrow by seizing on a difference in the clients' intentions. He observes that, in Wackrow, Woods intended to convey an interest in the property to the plaintiff only after he died, whereas here, Wilbert intended that plaintiff receive an interest in the property as soon as the quitclaim deed took effect. Thus, in Wackrow, the plaintiff could not have suffered any loss until Woods died, because, even had the attorney drafted a proper amendment, she would have obtained nothing until Woods died. Here, by contrast, had Heidelberger drafted a proper conveyance, plaintiff would have immediately obtained something-a share in either the title to the premises or the beneficial interest in the premises. Heidelberger concludes that the complaint's allegations establish that plaintiff suffered an injury immediately upon the signing (or at least the recording) of the quitclaim deed, because she was deprived of a benefit that a properly drafted document would have given her immediately, while Wilbert was alive.

We disagree with Heidelberger that this difference between the...