Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., A--452

Decision Date19 December 1958
Docket NumberNo. A--452,A--452
PartiesMartin SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. I. JAY REALTY CO., and Arnold Sachs, Isidore Sachs, and J. Milton Sachs, partners, trading as New Jersey Knitwear Co., and New Jersey Knit Wear Co., a corporation of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Bernard Chazen, Hoboken, argued the cause for plaintiff-appellant (Theodore Schwartz, Hoboken, attorney; Nathan Baker, Hoboken, of counsel; Bernard Chazen on the brief).

James P. Beggans, Jersey City, argued the cause for defendant-respondent I. Jay Realty Co. (Beggans and Keale, Jersey City, attorneys; Robert E. Tarleton, Jersey City, on the brief).

George W. Connell, Newark, argued the cause for defendants-respondents, Arnold Sachs, Isidore Sachs and J. Milton Sachs, partners, t/a the New Jersey Knitwear Co. and New Jersey Knit Wear Co. (Shaw, Pindar, McElroy & Connell, Newark, attorneys).

Before Judges GOLDMANN, FREUND and HANEMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FREUND, J.A.D.

The plaintiff, Martin Snyder, instituted this action in March 1954 to recover for personal injuries sustained as the result of the defendants' negligence. The accident occurred on the night of April 6, 1953 at the defendants' factory building in Newark. Principally because of improper lighting in a passageway leading to a loading platform, plaintiff stepped off the walking area into an unguarded 'trench' or opening, over three feet deep, thereby sustaining the injuries for which recovery is sought. This is an appeal from the entry of a dismissal by the trial judge of the Law Division at the end of the entire case.

The defendant I. Jay Realty Company is the owner and landlord of the premises at 39 Fourth Street, Newark. The defendants Arnold Sachs, Isidore Sachs, and J. Milton Sachs are partners trading as the New Jersey Knitwear Company, which occupies only the third floor of the building as a tenant. The New Jersey Knit Wear Company, a corporation of New Jersey (an entity apart from the Knitwear Company partnership), was also named as a party defendant.

On April 6, 1953, sometime between 7:00 and 8:30 P.M., plaintiff met one Frank Sellick, a truckdriver employed by the Knitwear Company, in New York. Sellick had then been employed by the tenant-defendant for about eight or nine months. The employee invited plaintiff to his employer's place of business on a purely social visit. Snyder accompanied him to the Newark building, intending to go with Sellick on a personal errand thereafter. Upon arrival at the premises, Sellick parked his truck at the loading platform at the rear of the building, and the two men then walked to the front and ascended the steps to the third floor.

Plaintiff browsed around, had a 'coke,' and watched the other employees of Knitwear who were working that night. In the meantime, Sellick and Morgan Batten, the acting night foreman, proceeded to load some cartons of sweaters onto a freight elevator in the rear of the building. After about 20 minutes on the third floor, during which time plaintiff had been introduced to several of the employees, Sellick advised him 'we are ready to leave.' The three men--foreman Batten, Sellick, and Snyder--thereupon entered the freight elevator and descended to the ground floor. Batten then picked up a carton and carried it from the elevator. Sellick did likewise, as did plaintiff, who followed the first two as they walked toward a loading platform outside the building where the truck had been parked.

It was now dark outside, and the dim light from the elevator illuminated only the immediate area. After a 5 to 12-foot walk from the elevator, the passageway and loading platform were 'pitch black.' The passageway then made a turn; at that point plaintiff could see only the back of the person he was following. Guided only by the moving form ahead of him, plaintiff suddenly fell from the passageway into the unguarded trench. Sellick testified that when he returned to find his friend, Snyder was 'in terrible pain and delirious.'

The elevator, passageway, and loading platform were for the use of all the tenants and were under the control of the landlord. Although there was another 'light socket' on the wall adjacent to the platform, it had not been functioning during Sellick's entire employment. On a previous occasion Sellick himself had fallen into the trench and had requested one of his employers, Arnold Sachs, to have the light repaired. He testified that two months before Snyder's fall Sachs had, in his presence, called the landlord and complained about the absence of a light.

Milton Sachs, manager of the knitting mill, was the only one of the three partners of the Knitwear Company to testify. He said that he had never authorized his employees to bring guests onto the premises, never knew of his employees doing so, and did not know that plaintiff was in the building on the night of the mishap. He was not asked whether the employees had been forbidden to bring their social guests on the premises. Sachs further testified that he did not know precisely which of his employees would use the elevator and passageway or that the area was dark or that the light did not function.

When the case was first tried the trial judge granted an involuntary dismissal on plaintiff's opening statement. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, 46 N.J.Super. 323, 134 A.2d 749 (1957). The Supreme Court denied certification, 25 N.J. 316, 136 A.2d 78 (1957). The case was tried again before the Superior Court, Law Division.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case defendants moved to dismiss for the plaintiff's failure to prove a Prima facie case. The trial judge ruled:

'From a reading of the opinion of the Appellate Division upon the appeal already had in this case, it appears that there is enough in that opinion to prevent this Court from dismissing, as a matter of law, the case for insufficiency of plaintiff's proof.'

The defendants then presented Milton Sachs, whose testimony we have already summarized. Upon the conclusion of his testimony, defendants again moved for a dismissal. After an extended colloquy between counsel and the court on the effect and meaning of the appellate decision, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion after stating that his earlier dismissal had been reversed

'* * * upon presuppositions of proof that have not materialized in the evidence adduced at the present trial. * * * The connotations of what plaintiff in this connection claims to be the law are startling. If it is within the province of employees to bring strangers within the working plant with resulting legal relationship claimed, the consequence would be chaos in that branch of the law.'

He therefore held that

'* * * the proofs show without contradiction that plaintiff was a trespasser. * * *' Once more plaintiff appeals from the trial court's refusal to permit his case to go to the jury. To justify the result below defendants assert that (1) plaintiff's legal status on defendants' premises was that of a trespasser and hence the only duty owed to him was to refrain from acts wilfully injurious; (2) plaintiff failed to prove a Prima facie case of negligence or nuisance in that he failed to prove improper construction, faulty repair or unsafe condition; and (3) plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or assumption of risk.

Before considering the basic issue raised by this appeal, viz., the proper status-classification of a social guest of an employee while on the premises of the employer, we deem it appropriate to set forth the duties owed by the defendants in their respective capacities as landlord and tenant.

As to the defendant-landlord, we have the benefit of Judge Clapp's earlier opinion in this case, 46 N.J.Super. 323, 134 A.2d 749, 751, where the rule as to the liability of a lessor to the lessee's licensee was stated to be that

'* * * the landlord owed the tenants' licensee the full duty of reasonable care with respect to those common entryways and passageways, appurtenant to their leasehold, which the tenants were entitled to use and which the licensee might reasonably be expected to traverse.'

So long as the landlord might, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, have foreseen that plaintiff or one of his class would use the passageway in question and would thereby be subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm as a result of a condition such as improper lighting, the landlord is answerable to this plaintiff, as he is to all those 'lawfully upon the land with the consent of the lessee.' Restatement, Torts, § 360; Annotation, 26 A.L.R.2d 468, 477 (1952); Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 277, 278, 104 A.2d 689 (1954); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 461, 126 A.2d 313 (1956). In view of the testimony relating to Sellick's having fallen into the trench on a prior occasion, Sachs' having notified the landlord of the condition, and the use of this passageway and loading platform by all the tenants in the building, plaintiff's case properly and clearly raised a jury question as to the lessor's liability, assuming, of course, that the failure to have the passageway properly lighted did create an unreasonable risk of injury and that the plaintiff was indeed the tenant's licensee.

In determining the liability of the tenant to his own licensees the predominant consideration is again the tenant's knowledge of or ability to foresee any unreasonable risk of harm to his licensees resulting from the lessor's failure to maintain the common approaches or exit-ways. Given knowledge or foreseeability of such a dangerous condition, the tenant, as any other possessor of land, must exercise reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe or to warn the licensee of the risk. Restatement, Torts, §§ 342 and 360, comment (a). Cf. Mistretta v. Alessi, 45...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Hill Manor Apartments v. Brome
    • United States
    • New Jersey District Court
    • November 6, 1978
    ...1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).34 See Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 53 N.J.Super. 336, 347, 147 A.2d 572 (App.Div.1958), rev'd in part 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959).35 See Cahayla v. Saikevich, 119 N.J.Super. 116, 118, 290 A.......
  • Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., s. A--120
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • June 30, 1959
    ...The Appellate Division reversed as to both defendants holding that all issues should have been submitted to the jury. 53 N.J.Super. 336, 147 A.2d 572 (1958). We granted the defendants' petitions for certification. 29 N.J. 355, 149 A.2d 303 Plaintiff was a friend of Frank Selleck, a truck dr......
  • Ginnelly v. Continental Paper Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • October 26, 1959
    ...personnel, or that anyone in authority at the storeroom had ever given bulbs to the guards. Compare Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 53 N.J.Super. 336, 347, 147 A.2d 572 (App.Div.1958), reversed in part 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959), where we considered the extent to which an employer would be......
  • Krieger v. Ownership Corporation
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • August 11, 1959
    ...on that issue in Colligan v. 680 Newark Ave. Realty Corp., 1944, 131 N.J.L. 520, 37 A.2d 206". In Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 1958, 53 N.J.Super. 336, 147 A.2d 572, at page 577, in a situation inapposite here, the Court made this observation in discussing an action for damages by a third p......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT