Snyder v. Industrial Com'n of Colo.
| Decision Date | 16 February 1959 |
| Docket Number | 18710,Nos. 18709,s. 18709 |
| Citation | 335 P.2d 543 |
| Parties | Harley J. SNYDER, Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO, a Corporation, and Donato Lopez, Defendants in Error, and Harley J. SNYDER, Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO, a Corporation; Donato Lopez; Frank J. Dillie, and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Wormwood, O'Dell & Wolvington, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error Industrial Commission of Colo.
Harold Clark Thompson, Louis Schiff, Alious Rockett, Fred Boden Dudley, Denver, for defendants in error State Compensation Ins. Fund and Frank J. Dillie.
Donato Lopez filed his claim for workmen's compensation against Harley J. Synder and was awarded compensation for an injured back. Dissatisfied with the award, and having exhausted administrative process, Snyder filed his complaint in the Denver District Court. There, after a hearing, an order was entered directing that the claim be returned to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings.
In the course of further proceedings leave was granted Snyder to make Frank J. Dillie an additional respondent. At the conclusion of the evidence the Referee again entered the award first made against Snyder and dismissed the proceedings as to Dillie and his insurer, the State Compensation Insurance Fund. Once more Snyder pursued his administrative remedies to ultimate failure, whereupon he filed another suit in the District Court.
Consolidation of both suits was, on motion, ordered, and hearing had thereon. The award of the Commission was sustained by the trial court, and from this adverse judgment Snyder prosecutes his writ of error.
Snyder was a cement contractor, and Lopez was one of his employees. Snyder carried no workmen's compensation insurance, and at the time Lopez was injured Snyder was not licensed to build sidewalks in Denver. Dillie, who had a city license, was also a cement contractor. And he carried workmen's compensation insurance with the State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Snyder had entered into negotiations for the installation of sidewalks for a realty company in Denver, which eventuated in an agreement. Not having the necessary license, he agreed with Dillie, as was their wont on previous occasions, that they would do the work together, each using his employees, and after the payment of all labor and material bills, dividing the balance, if any, between them. Under this arrangement Dillie would and did obtain the permit required to install the sidewalk. The ordinance under which license and permit were obtained required Dillie to place his stamp upon the sidewalk as the contractor responsible for the job. By its terms the licensed contractor assumed the responsibility for workmanship and materials for a period of two years.
As the employee of Snyder, Lopez was directed where to work, was shifted from one job to another, and was remunerated by him for services rendered. The record indicates, however, that on the day in question Lopez received his injury while performing a task ordered to be done by Dillie.
Snyder contends that Lopez was an employee of Dillie by virtue of C.R.S. '53, 81-9-1, which provides:
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