Snyder v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1902
• Citation: 91 N.W. 643,131 Mich. 418
• Parties: SNYDER v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

91 N.W. 643

131 Mich. 418

SNYDER v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

September 17, 1902

Error to circuit court, Kalamazoo county; John W. Adams, Judge.

Action by Gardiner F. Snyder, as administrator of the estate of Leo R. Snyder, deceased, against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company. There was judgment for plaintiff for a part of the damages claimed, his motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of damages was overruled, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Howard Roos & Howard, for appellant.

Dallas Boundeman, for appellee.

MOORE J.

In May 1901, Leo R. Snyder, plaintiff's intestate, was killed on a railroad crossing. Suit was brought, and a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff for $250. Plaintiff moved for a new trial. His motion was overruled. The case is brought here by the plaintiff by writ of error.

Two questions are involved: First. Did the judge err in his instructions to the jury in relation to the measure of damages? Second. Did the judge err in refusing to grant a new trial because the amount of the verdict was inadequate? Before answering these questions, a brief statement of facts is necessary. At the time of his death Leo R. Snyder was 11 years and 5 months old. He was a boy of intelligence, who was attending graded school, and who drove cows to pasture for his neighbors, and, when he had leisure, sold popcorn and peanuts. The father testified no plans had been made as to whether the boy should complete a course in the public schools. The testimony of his father was that he earned enough to pay for his own clothes, though it was not shown what the clothes cost. It was the claim of the plaintiff that his son had unusual aptitude for drawing and woodcarving that he had some instruction from a relative, who was an engraver and designer; and that this boy, if he pursued that line of study, would make a skillful engraver and designer. None of his work was shown in evidence, and it was not shown he had ever earned anything as an engraver and designer. Against the objection of defendant, testimony was introduced of the following character: 'Q. With this boy's aptitude for the business as you saw it, with proper instructions that you gave him, about how long would it be before he would, in your judgment, become proficient enough to earn money at the business? A. I think it would have taken him not over a year, and, if he had kept on at the way he was going at the time of his death until he was fifteen years old,--he was twelve at the time of his death,--he could have earned easily from $12 to $15 a week. Any one could with the talent that he had.' On the part of the defendant there was testimony introduced as to the earning capacity of boys some of whom had been instructed in drawing, and others of whom had no instruction. It was the judgment of some of these witnesses that boys of the age of the deceased would not earn anything over and above the expense of their board, clothing, and education. The plaintiff offered the following request: 'You are instructed that, if you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case, the measure of his damages will be the value of the service of his son during his minority, less the probable cost of his support and maintenance, as shown by the testimony in the case, taking into consideration the probability of the deceased living until twenty-one years of age, and also the probability of the father and mother of the deceased living until the deceased reached the age of twenty-one years.' This was not given, unless in was covered by the general charge, which was as follows: 'In this case, if the verdict of the jury is for the plaintiff, it can only be for an amount that the boy Leo Snyder's services would have been worth over and above the expenses of taking care of him, clothing him, and educating him from the time of his injury up to the time he was 21 years of age. In considering the question of how much the services of the said Leo Snyder would probably have been worth from the time of his injury up to the time that he was 21 years of age, over and above the expense of taking care of and clothing him and educating him in a manner which was probable that he would have been educated, the jury are entitled to take into consideration what the services of a boy, such as the testimony describes him to have been, would have fairly been worth ordinarily. While there has been testimony allowed in this case as to what wages have sometimes been paid boys for services in particular lines of business, this is not of itself conclusive as to what the services of this boy would have been worth. There has been evidence introduced on the part of the defendant on the question of the value of services of a boy of the age that this one was at the time of his injury and from that time up to the time he was 21 years of age, and the jury must make up their minds on this subject based upon facts, not upon any fancies which they may have in their minds, what would be the value, ordinarily, of the services of such a boy, over and above his expense as above set forth, as shown by the evidence. The jury has been allowed to hear the testimony of witnesses in different kinds of business, and in somewhat different stations or kinds of business life, giving their judgment as to what the value of the services of a boy would ordinarily be from the age of Leo Snyder up to the time that he was 21 years of age, over and above the cost and expense of raising him, and his cost and expense of living; and the jury are entitled to take this testimony into consideration with any other that may be in the case for the purpose of determining this question. The jury is instructed that the fact, if it be a fact, that the boy Leo Snyder was in the habit of making pictures or drawings, or was interested in that line of work, would not by any means establish as a fact in this case that he would at some future time be able, through any such work, to earn any large sums of money. You may consider that testimony, however, as bearing upon his possible earning power and ability had he lived. While this testimony was allowed to go in before the jury, it does not follow that the jury would be justified in determining that his services in the future would be worth what those of somebody else may have been in the line of business that was mentioned by the witnesses. It is not alone what a boy would probably earn from the time he was 11 1/2 years old until he was 21, but the jury should consider also the amount of probable expense of raising, educating, clothing, and feeding such boy, and the payment of such other ordinary expenses as would naturally be expected to be paid for him during the years mentioned. In considering the question of the value of services, the jury have a right to consider from the testimony there is in the case what would probably be the number of years that the boy would attend school for the purpose of obtaining an education to fit himself for any particular line of work; and if, during a certain number of years of his life, he was not able to earn any money, or any great amount of money, but during such years, whether it would or would not be probable that money would have to be paid out for his care, keeping, and clothing, then as the grew older he would be able to earn more money, but still be obliged to pay for his keeping and clothing and ordinary necessary expenses,--all these things should be considered by the jury in determining what the net value of his services would be, if anything, for the whole period of time from his accident up to the time he was 21 years of age; and if, in considering all these facts, the jury...