Snyder v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 12 May 1892
• Citation: Snyder v. Snyder , 142 Ill. 60, 31 N.E. 303 (Ill. 1892)
• Parties: SNYDER v. SNYDER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

142 Ill. 60

31 N.E. 303

SNYDER

v.SNYDER et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 12, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, second district.

Petition by Edward M. Snyder, Mary L. Westgate, and Mrs. T. A. McGinnis for the appointment of a conservator for the defendant, Mary T. Snyder, upon the allegation that she was a distracted person. Defendant was adjudged a distracted person in the probate court, but no conservator was appointed. Defendant appealed, and in the circuit court was adjudged a distracted person, and a conservator was appointed. Upon defendant's appeal to the appellate court that judgment was reversed as to the appointment of a conservator, but affirmed in other respects. Defendant appeals. Reversed.McDougall & Chapman, Brewer & Strawn, and D. B. Snow, for appellant.

Snyder & Stead and Mayo & Widmer, for appellees.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by Craig, J.:

Edward M. Snyder, son, and Mary L. Westgate and Mrs. T. A. McGinnis, married daughters, of Mrs. Mary T. Snyder, filed their petition in the probate court of La Salle county on the 10th day of May, 1889, in which they alleged that Mary T. Snyder was a distracted person, and a person of feeble mind. That she owned real and personal estate consisting chiefly of a homestead dower, and widow's award, and a distributive share in the personal estate of Levi Snyder, her deceased husband. The whole estate was estimated to be worth about eight or nine thousand dollars. That she, the said Mary T. Snyder, was unfit to properly manage or control her property,-and praying for some other fit person to be conservator of the said Mary T. Snyder. The inquiry in the probate court resulted in a verdict of the jury sustaining the allegations of the petition, which verdict was ordered by the court to be entered of record, and judgment entered thereon, and from which verdict an appeal was taken by Mary T. Snyder to the circuit court of La Salle county, and allowed, without the probate court having first appointed a conservator. At the January term, 1891, of the circuit court, a trial of said cause was had, which resulted in a verdict finding that Mary T. Snyder was a ‘distracted person,’ and a person of ‘feeble mind,’ and that by reason thereof she was not capable of caring for her estate. A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and judgment was thereupon entered on the verdict, adjudging that Mary T. Suyder was a distracted person, and that a conservator be appointed for her; and one Samuel M. Heslet was then and there appointed conservator of the person and estate of Mary T. Snyder, and required to file a bond in the penal sum of $16,000, with security to be approved by the probate court; and the cause was thereupon remanded to the probate court for further proceedings, etc. From the judgment of the circuit court, Mary T. Snyder appealed to the appellate court, where the judgment was reversed as to the appointment of a conservator, and in all other respects it was affirmed; and the cause was remanded with directions to remand to the probate court for the appointment of a conservator and further proceedings.

CRAIG, J., ( after stating the facts.)

This appeal is brought by Mary T. Snyder to reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and the principal part of the argument of appellant's counsel is devoted to a discussion of the question whether the circuit court has original or concurrent jurisdiction with the probate court to appoint a conservator for a distracted person. Whether the circuit court has original jurisdiction to entertain a petition or bill in chancery for the appointment of a conservator for a distracted person is a question not presented by this record, and consequently one we are not called upon to decide. Section 5, Act 1877, (Laws 1877, p. 80,) an act to establish probate courts in certain counties, provides ‘that probate courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, the settlement of estates of deceased persons, the appointment of guardians and conservators, and settlement of their accounts.’ Rev. St. 1891, c. 37, § 220. The section further provides that as soon as the court is organized in any county the county court of such county shall turn over to the probate court all of its probate records, and all books and papers relating to probate matters in such county, and all records, files, and papers in matters of guardianship and conservators. Under this section of the act, it is manifest that in all counties where a probate court shall be established the jurisdiction of all probate matters, and all matters in relation to appointmentof guardians and conservators, and the settlement of their estates, was transferred from the county to the probate court. Section 11 of the act (Rev. St. 1891, c. 37, § 226,) provides: ‘Appeals may be taken from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the probate court to the circuit court in all matters except in proceedings on the application for the sale of real estate, * * * and upon such appeal the case shall be tried de novo.’ Section 1, c. 86, Rev. St. 1874, provides: ‘Whenever any idiot, lunatic, or distracted person has any estate, real or personal, * * * the county court in which such person lives shall on application of any relative or creditor, etc., order a jury to be summoned to ascertain whether such person be idiot, lunatic, or distracted * * *; and if the jury return in their verdict that such person is idiot, lunatic, or distracted, * * * it shall be the duty of the court to appoint some fit person to be the conservator of such person.’ Here a proper petition was presented to the probate court of La Salle county, which had acquired the jurisdiction of the county court in relation to the appointment of conservators, a trial was had, and the jury returned a verdict that Mary T. Snyder was a distracted person. The court entered judgment on the verdict, but for some reason, which does not appear, failed to appoint a conservator, as it was the duty of the court to do upon the return of the verdict. An appeal was taken by Mary T. Snyder to the circuit court. Section 12, art. 6, of the constitution, provides: ‘Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all cases in law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as is or may be provided by law.’ Without stopping to consider what original jurisdiction the circuit court might possess under the broad language of the constitution here, it is manifest that the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction of the proceeding, as the statute expressly requires the case to go to the circuit court by appeal; and it is also apparent that the circuit court exercisedthat appellate jurisdiction in the trial of the proceeding and in the appointment of the conservator.

It only remains to be determined what power the circuit court possessed on the trial of the appeal. As said before, the statute required the appeal to be taken to the circuit court, and also required the cause on appeal to be tried de novo. On a trial de novo the circuit court stood in the shoes of the probate court. It had the same jurisdiction on the trial de novo, and was clothed with the same powers, as the probate court. The same rule is observed in a case of this kind as occurs where an appeal is taken from a justice of the peace to the circuit court on a trial of an appeal of that character. The circuit court exercises the same jurisdiction which was conferred by law on the justice, and on the trial of the appeal is clothed with the same powers. As has been seen, upon a return of the verdict that the person is distracted, the statute required the probate court to appoint a conservator. On trial of the appeal, in the circuit court, as the trial was required to be de novo upon the return of the verdict that Mary T. Snyder was distracted, it was the duty of the circuit court to appoint a conservator, which it did.

It is said, however, that the supposed error of the circuit court in the appointment of a conservator was confessed in the appellate court, and hence the decision of that question is not now before the court. This is a misapprehension of the record. The record fails to show that any error was confessed. Something was said in appellees' argument to the effect that it was conceded that the circuit court was not authorized to make the appointment, but that cannot be regarded as a confession of error. If the appellees desired to confess any error assigned, they could only do so by appearing in open court in person or by counsel, and there confessing any error which they desired. Then an order to that effect would be entered of record, and a judgment would be entered on the confession of errors. Nothing of that kind was done.

It is also claimed that the court erred in its rulings on the admission of evidence, and in the instructions to the jury. Much evidence was introduced on the trial by both parties in reference to the mental condition of the appellant; and while it may be true that the rulings of the court on questions of evidence may not have been technically accurate, in every instance, yet we find no such departure from the established rules of evidence as would authorize a...