Snyder v. State

• Decision Date: 06 February 1922
• Docket Number: 137
• Citation: Snyder v. State, 237 S.W. 87, 151 Ark. 601 (Ark. 1922)
• Parties: SNYDER v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

237 S.W. 87

151 Ark. 601

SNYDER v. STATE

No. 137

Supreme Court of Arkansas

February 6, 1922

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division, John W. Wade Judge; reversed.

Judgment reversed.

J A. Weas and Lewis Rhoton, for appellant.

The court erred in holding jurors Holt and Riff to be qualified.

J S. Utley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and W. T. Hammock, Assistants.

Holt stated his opinion was formed from reading newspaper reports of the case, but stated he could try the case on the evidence. He was therefore qualified. 72 Ark. 613; 79 Ark. 127; 80 Ark. 113; 85 Ark. 64; 101 Ark. 443; 103 Ark. 21; 109 Ark. 450; 114 Ark. 472. Appellant cannot complain of Holt, as he entered only a general challenge to this juror. Standard Enc. of Proc., vol. 17, pages 146-149.

Juror Riff was not challenged for cause, and appellant can not now complain of him. Standard Enc. of Proc., vol. 17, pages 119-123; 100 Ark. 437; 74 Ark. 286.

The finding of the court that the jurors were competent has the same sanctity as a verdict of a jury upon a question of fact. West v. State, 150 Ark. 555.

If appellant was not satisfied with the correctness of the bill of exceptions as approved by the judge, with certain indorsements thereon, he had a remedy under § 1322, C. & M. Digest, to have the recitals corrected.

OPINION

SMITH, J.

Appellant was indicted for murder in the second degree, and was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and has appealed.

The only error assigned for the reversal of the judgment is that the court erred in holding jurors Holt and Riff competent.

We think the court properly held juror Holt to be competent, as the opinion entertained by him was shown to have been based solely on rumor. But we think it equally clear that the juror Riff was disqualified, and that the court erred in holding him competent.

In response to the questions of the prosecuting attorney Riff answered that he knew the families of both the deceased and the defendant. He was asked if he could disregard any feeling or opinion he had and try the case according to the law and the evidence, and he answered, "I have a feeling that would influence me in arriving at a verdict." He was asked if he could lay that aside, and he answered, "No." He was asked if this feeling was based on facts or knowledge of the family, or both families, and answered, "I know too much about both families; I have a feeling that would influence me." He was then asked by the prosecuting attorney, "You don't think you could give a fair and impartial trial, regardless of the evidence?" He answered, "I don't believe I could." He was then asked by the court if he had talked with any of the witnesses, and answered that he had talked to witnesses on both sides, and that "I have discussed the case thoroughly both ways; both sides told me about the transaction." His examination thereafter was conducted by the court and is as follows: "Q. Did both sides tell the same thing about it? A. No. Q. Did you believe both sides? A. No. Q. Did you believe one side? A. I did at that time. Q. Have you got that belief yet? A. Yes. Q. Based on having talked with them? A. Yes. Q. Is that an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant? A. It would require a good deal of evidence to remove my opinion. Q. Do you think it is a fixed opinion? A. So far. Q. Could you try the case according to the law and the evidence? A. Yes; I would have to do that. Q. If selected as a juror would you disregard any impression or opinion you might have and try it according to the law and the evidence. A. Yes. Q. You would go into the jury box and try it fairly and impartially according to the law and the evidence as if you had never heard of it? A. Yes; I would have to do it. Q. Could you do it? Could you succeed in doing it? A. Yes; I would have to."

These last questions of the court were objected to as leading, and exceptions were saved thereto.

The court then held. Riff competent, to which ruling the defendant excepted and then challenged him, and before the jury was completed exhausted her challenges.

Thereafter, one Reynolds was sworn and examined touching his qualifications to serve as a juror, and there appears in the bill of exceptions the following finding of facts made by the court in regard to the selection of Reynolds to serve as a juror in the case:

"We had much difficulty in getting a jury in this case. Mr. Rogers interrogated on voir dire for State and Mr. Rhoton for defense. They were both unnecessarily tedious and repeated much. The record does not purport to show all the voir dire. The two panels of jurors were exhausted and the bystanders, and the court waited several times for the sheriff to go out and bring in special jurors into court. All the morning was thus consumed, and much of the afternoon, before defendant exhausted all her peremptory challenges. In doing so, Mr. Rhoton said to the court, I have excused good men in order to exhaust my challenges. I am now ready to accept most any bystander after making formal objection. Thereupon the sheriff called juror Reynolds, and Mr. Donham, of the prosecuting attorney's office, said to the court that the State does not want him and will excuse him. To which the judge replied, "If that is what you are going to do, accept him, and out of abundant caution I will reverse my ruling on the juror Riff and excuse him for cause and thereby give the defendant an opportunity to excuse Reynolds peremptorily." The juror Reynolds was then interrogated by both sides and accepted by the State, when Mr. Rhoton, to the surprise of the court and prosecutor, promptly accepted the juror. He never objected to him but accepted him. The court then and there in the presence and hearing of counsel commanded that the record show that the juror had been accepted by the defendant. Mr. Rogers inquired aloud what the court had said, whereupon the command was repeated. At no time did counsel for defendant object to or do or say anything about it. The court thereupon concluded that the juror Reynolds was acceptable to the defendant, and the court is of the opinion that the State could not excuse him after they accepted because defendant's peremptories were exhausted. The court still believes jurors Riff and Holt competent and qualified, but would have removed any possible doubt about it had not defendant accepted juror Reynolds under the circumstances just detailed."

Upon consideration of this record, we think the court should have held Riff disqualified. Notwithstanding his answer that, if he was accepted as a juror, he would have to try the case according to the law and the evidence, it clearly appears that he had a fixed opinion on the merits of the case, based upon a narrative of facts traceable to a definite source- -the witnesses in the case--on both sides of the case. Riff should therefore have been excused as disqualified. West v. State, 150 Ark. 555, 234 S.W. 997; Collins v. State, 102 Ark. 180, 143 S.W. 1075; Caldwell v. State, 69 Ark. 322, 63 S.W. 59.

It is insisted by the State that Riff was not first challenged for cause before being challenged...