Snyder v. State

• Decision Date: 20 March 2013
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2010.,No. 2225,2225
• Parties: Mark Aaron SNYDER v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

210 Md.App. 370

63 A.3d 128

Mark Aaron SNYDER

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 2225, Sept. Term, 2010.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 20, 2013.

Erin Murphy (Silverman, Thompson, Slutkin & White, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Carrie J. Williams (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.

Panel: MATRICCIANI, KEHOE and IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

RAKER, J.

Mark Snyder, appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Harford County in two separate trials arising from two separate incidents occurring on April 26, 2009. In Case No. 872, appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault, fourth-degree burglary, malicious destruction of property, four counts of reckless endangerment, and illegal possession of a firearm. In Case No. 871, appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault, malicious destruction of property, and illegal possession of a firearm.

Appellant presents three questions for our review:

1. Was the evidence sufficient to find appellant guilty of first and second-degree assault against Randy and Mary Ray in Case No. 872?

2. Did the trial court err in admitting other crimes evidence in Case No. 871?

[210 Md.App. 376]3. Was appellant properly convicted of illegal possession of a firearm in Case No. 871?

We shall hold that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we shall affirm.

I.

This appeal arises out of two separate indictments returned by the Grand Jury for Harford County. In case number 872, appellant was indicted for thirty-seven counts, including murder, first and second-degree assault, burglary and handgun violations arising from shootings which took place on the properties of appellant's former neighbors.¹ For ease of following the case, we shall refer to Case No. 872 as the “Neighbor Case.” In Case No. 871, appellant was charged with violations similar to those in the Neighbor Case and which arose from a shooting that occurred on the property of appellant's former employers, Richard and Janette Crouse.² We shall refer to Case No. 871 as the “Crouse Case.” The Neighbor event and the Crouse event occurred on the same evening. The cases proceeded in separate jury trials in the Circuit Court for Harford County.

We turn first to the Neighbor Case. In the Neighbor Case, appellant challenges on appeal only his conviction of first and second-degree assault of Randy and Mary Ray. Accordingly, we set out the facts relevant to the assault incident only. The State's evidence showed that appellant went to the Ray's neighborhood and that at approximately 2:30 a.m., a neighbor, Ronald Testerman, saw appellant's pick up truck parked adjacent to the Ray's house and that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the Ray's home. Mr. Testerman observed appellant exiting the Ray's house holding firearms. He observed appellant fire three gunshots at the Ray's house and then leave.

Randy Ray testified that he had been away from home at the time of the incident, but, when he arrived home, he found that his windows were shot out, the front door was off, and police were in his driveway. Mr. Ray testified that while he and his wife were away, he left lights on in the living room and bedroom. The Rays also left their dogs at home.

Appellant proceeded to a trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The jury convicted him of first and second-degree assault of Randy Ray; first-degree and second-degree assault of Mary Ray; fourth-degree burglary; malicious destruction of property; four counts of reckless endangerment (one count each against Ronald Testerman, Sherry Testerman, Gary Babb, and Lisa Babb), illegal possession of a firearm; and wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun. Appellant was found not guilty on all other charges.

The event at the Crouse home occurred on the same evening as the Neighbor event. Janette Crouse testified that at 3:00 a.m. on April 26, 2009 she observed appellant's truck outside her home and heard a half dozen gunshots. A window over her doorway was damaged. Her husband, Richard Crouse, testified that he recognized appellant's voice yelling at him. Mr. Crouse then called police.

Detective Golden executed a search warrant at appellant's home, where he found a shotgun, a 9mm handgun, and, in a safe, ammunition for both guns. Appellant objected to any testimony referring to any handguns or ammunition found in his home. The jury in the Crouse Case found appellant guilty of first and second-degree assault of John and Janette Crouse; malicious destruction of property; illegal possession of a firearm; and wearing, carrying or transportation of a handgun. Appellant was found not guilty on all other charges.

Appellant proceeded to sentencing on both cases on October 18, 2010.³ This timely appeal followed.

II.

We address first appellant's argument in the Neighbor Case. Before this Court, appellant presents one argument: that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first and second-degree assault of Randy and Mary Ray. He argues that “it is physically impossible for [him] to have committed the crime of first or second-degree assault as [he] did not have the apparent present ability to inflict serious physical injury or inflict offensive or harmful physical contact on the alleged victims who were not in the State at the time that the incident occurred.” In other words, appellant argues that, because the Rays were not home at the time he shot into their home, he did not have the apparent present ability to inflict serious physical injury upon them.

The State argues that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find appellant guilty of first-degree assault. The State contends that to convict appellant of the attempted battery variety of assault, it need show only that (1) appellant tried to cause immediate physical harm to Randy and Mary Ray; (2) appellant intended to cause physical harm to Randy and Mary Ray; (3) appellant's actions were not consented to by Randy and Mary Ray; and (4) appellant used a firearm to commit the assault or that appellant intended to cause serious physical injury in the commission of the assault. Moreover, the State contends that it is not required to prove that it was actually possible for appellant to consummate his attempted battery in order to sustain the conviction for attempted battery variety of assault.

III.

First, we address appellant's claim that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of first and second-degree assaults of Randy and Mary Ray. When reviewing a convictionfor sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must be satisfied that, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Mayers, 417 Md. 449, 466, 10 A.3d 782, 790 (2010). We give due deference to the factfinder's determination of fact and rational inferences made in reaching its decision. See State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 557, 823 A.2d 664, 682 (2003).

In Maryland, first and second-degree assault are statutory crimes. See Maryland Code (2002, Repl.Vol.2012) §§ 3–202, 3–203 of the Criminal Law Article.⁴ To convict appellant of first-degree assault, the State must prove all the elements of assault in the second-degree, and, to elevate the offense to first-degree, at least one of the statutory aggravating factors. Statutory second-degree assault encompasses three types of common law assault and battery: (1) the “intent to frighten” assault, (2) attempted battery and (3) battery. To prove the attempted battery variety of second-degree assault, the State must prove that (1) appellant actually tried to cause physical harm to Randy and Mary Ray; (2) that he intended to bring about physical harm to the Rays, and (3) that his actions were not consented to by the Rays. To prove first-degree assault, in addition to proving the elements of second-degree assault, the State must prove also that appellant either used a firearm to commit an assault, or that he intended to cause serious physical injury in the commission of the assault. § 3–203.

The evidence presented at trial showed appellant fired gun shots into the Ray's home at approximately 2:00 a.m., while the lights were on in the house. When the Rays returned home, they found that the windows had been shot out and broken and that the front door was off its hinges. There were new bullet holes in the kitchen cabinets, sheet rock, range hood, refrigerator, a recliner chair in the living room and the race car parked in the garage. Appellant argues that because the Rays were not at home, he could not be convicted of assault. Appellant reasons that “it is physically impossible for [him] to have committed the crime of first or second degree assault as [he] did not have the apparent present ability to inflict serious physical injury or inflict offensive or harmful physical contact on the alleged victims who were not in the State at the time that the incident occurred.”

Appellant is incorrect in his analysis. In order to understand why appellant is incorrect, it is important to understand more fully the crimes of assault, attempt and battery, and the history of the statutory crime of assault in Maryland. For a full and more thorough scholarly explanation of the crimes of assault and attempt, as well as the relationship between the tort concept of assault and the criminal assault, see Lamb v. State, 93 Md.App. 422, 613 A.2d 402 (1992) by Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., for the Court of Special Appeals, keeping in mind Judge Moylan's observation that “[c]ommon law assault, then, is a chameleon concept that no one should attempt to describe too precisely.” Id. at 441, 613 A.2d 402, 411.

Until 1996, when the General Assembly codified the crimes of...