Snyder v. Sumner

• Decision Date: 03 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-16335,90-16335
• Citation: 960 F.2d 1448
• Parties: Ronney Lee SNYDER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. George SUMNER, et al., Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1448

960 F.2d 1448

Ronney Lee SNYDER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. George SUMNER, et al., Respondent-Appellee.

No. 90-16335.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 9, 1991.

Decided April 3, 1992.

James E. Mayberry, Las Vegas, Nev., for petitioner-appellant.

Robert Wieland, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, Nev., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Before: TANG and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, ^* District Judge.

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Pursuant to a detainer filed under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IADA"), 18 U.S.C. app. II, § 1 et seq. (1988); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 178.620 (1991) [all following cites will be to the United States Code only], Ronnie Lee Snyder ("Snyder") was released from an Iowa prison to Nevada to stand trial on criminal charges. He was held in Nevada for 426 days before his trial began. In this appeal from a denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Snyder asserts his right under the IADA to have been brought to trial within 120 days of his arrival in Nevada. Nevada claims--as it did successfully in district court--that because Snyder was formally paroled by Iowa on the 120th day after his arrival in Nevada, the IADA requirements do not apply. In the alternative, the state argues that even if the IADA rules did apply, only 112 days of Snyder's 426 day incarceration in Nevada pending trial would be attributable to the state; thus bringing him to trial within the statutory limit. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1988), and we reverse and remand.

I Facts and Procedure

Based on pending felony charges, Nevada filed a notice of detainer against Snyder while he was imprisoned in Iowa. Pursuant to that detainer, and Snyder's response, he was transferred to Nevada on December 3, 1984 to stand trial on charges of burglary, larceny, and grand larceny auto. One hundred twenty days after Snyder arrived in Nevada, and while he was still awaiting trial, Iowa formally placed him on parole. Snyder's trial began on February 3, 1986, 426 days after his arrival, over his objection that he had not been brought to trial within 120 days. Snyder was convicted and sentenced to 10 years for burglary, 15 years for robbery, a consecutive term of 15 years for use of a deadly weapon, and a consecutive term of 10 years for grand larceny of an automobile.

When Snyder appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, he raised four claims of error, two of which he raises in this petition: (1) that the state violated his right to be brought to trial within 120 days as required by the IADA; (2) that the state denied his right to an effective appeal because necessary parts of the record had been lost.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Snyder v. State, 103 Nev. 275, 738 P.2d 1303 (1987). The court found that there had been seven separate delays, six of which were attributable to Snyder, and held that 112 days (consisting of two 56 day periods) were caused by the state. It concluded that the 120-day limit established by the IADA had not been exceeded or violated.

The period of time between Snyder's arrival in Nevada and his trial can be outlined as follows: First, 56 days passed prior to the first date set for trial. These 56 days are attributable to the state and are not contested. Thereafter, Snyder's time before trial can be parsed into seven periods of delay caused by various continuances.

(1) Snyder filed a state writ of habeas corpus on January 16, 1985. On January 23, 1985, at the request of the public defender, the case was continued to February 4, 1985 (a seven-day delay from the original trial date of January 28, 1985). On February 4, 1985, the court continued the ruling on the habeas writ until February 11, 1985 (a second seven-day delay). On February 11, 1985, Snyder filed a pro se motion for a new attorney--a two-day delay. On February 13, 1985, the habeas writ was scheduled to be heard, and the motion for a new attorney was held in abeyance. Trial was then set for April 22, 1985 (a 68-day delay). The total delay to this point was 84 days. The district court held that this entire delay was caused by Snyder and did not count against the 120-day limit. Snyder contests this holding.

(2) A 36-day delay, caused by the prosecution's involvement with a murder trial, was agreed to by Snyder, and thus does not count against the 120-day limit. The district court so held and this holding is not contested.

(3) On May 28, 1985, the court granted a continuance ostensibly for plea bargaining negotiations. Status checks were held on July 1, 1985 (a 34-day delay), and July 3 1985 (a two-day delay). The court was then told that the plea negotiations had fallen through, and a continuance was granted until July 8, 1985 (a five-day delay). At this hearing, the trial was set for August 26, 1985 (a 49-day delay). The total delay in this third period was 90 days. The district court attributed the entire delay to Snyder and held that these days did not count against the 120-day limit. This holding is contested by Snyder.

(4) The trial was reset for September 9, 1985, due to a scheduling conflict of Snyder's counsel. This 14-day delay was attributable to Snyder and does not count against the 120-day limit. Snyder does not contest this holding.

(5) A continuance was granted to November 4, 1985, to allow Snyder's counsel to respond to the state's pre-trial motions and a habitual criminal allegation. This 56-day delay was attributable to the state. It counts against the 120-day limit and is not contested.

(6) A continuance of 49 days was granted due to defense counsel's illness. This delay was attributable to Snyder and is not contested.

(7) A final continuance to February 3, 1986, was granted to allow defense counsel to locate witnesses. This 42-day delay was attributed to Snyder and is not contested.

Snyder filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, alleging that he was denied his right under the IADA to trial within 120 days of arrival in the receiving state (Nevada).

In their opening and answering briefs before the district court, both Snyder and the state addressed only the question of proper attribution for each of the seven delays. However, in the Respondent's Reply to the Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Vacate Evidentiary Hearing, the state for the first time argued that the IADA was not violated because Snyder had been paroled from his Iowa sentence on April 2, 1985--exactly 120 days after his arrival in Nevada.

The magistrate agreed with the state and held that because Iowa had put Snyder on parole exactly 120 days after his arrival in Nevada, the 120-day limit was no longer applicable. The parole in effect voided the IADA requirements. The magistrate then vacated his order granting a scheduled evidentiary hearing on the writ.

Although the magistrate held that the parole issue was dispositive, he also ruled that the entire 56-day delay caused by Snyder's filing of the state habeas corpus petition was attributable to him. The magistrate did not decide the issue of who caused the plea negotiation delays. The district court adopted in full the findings of the magistrate.

The transcripts of the hearings concerning the plea negotiations held on May 15, May 28, July 1, and July 3, 1985, are missing. However, the magistrate agreed with the Nevada Supreme Court that the minutes for those hearings were sufficient to determine that the entire 90-day delay during this period was attributable to Snyder.

II Federal Statutory Framework

The IADA is an agreement among 48 states--including Iowa and Nevada--whose purpose is to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [criminal] charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." 18 U.S.C. app. II, § 2, art. I. "A detainer is simply a document notifying one state (the sending state) that another state (the receiving state) wants to prosecute a prisoner that the sending state is holding." Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir.1984), vacated as moot sub nom., Hijar v. Burrus, 474 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 562, 88 L.Ed.2d 548 (1985); see also Hopper v. United States Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir.1982) ("In the legislative history of the IADA, 'detainer' is defined as a 'notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.' ") (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), and S.Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 4864).

"Prior to the Agreement's development, a prisoner had neither the means to learn of the lodging of a detainer nor the concomitant right to effect speedy disposition of the out-of-state charges underlying the detainer." Christopher D. Cerf, Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: The Cognizability of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 975, 978 (1983) [hereinafter, Nonconstitutional Errors ] (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit has opined on the several deleterious effects of detainers:

First, it may make the prisoner ineligible for desirable work or educational assignments. If the prisoner is constantly shuttled from one facility to another, prison officials may be reluctant to permit him to participate in rehabilitation programs. Second, a detainer reduces the prisoner's incentive to participate in work, education, and other programs that help rehabilitate him and improve his chances for early parole.... Third, a detainer tells the prisoner that he may have to stand trial elsewhere, but does not provide him with a vehicle for going there immediately to secure witnesses and take other steps to preserve his defense.

Burrus, 743 F.2d...