Snyder v. United States

Decision Date23 December 1953
Docket NumberNo. 5615,5889,5871,6096-6099.,5615
Citation118 F. Supp. 585
PartiesSNYDER et al. v. UNITED STATES. GUYER et al. v. UNITED STATES. BAIR, Adm'r v. UNITED STATES. SNYDER, Adm'r v. UNITED STATES (two cases). SNYDER v. UNITED STATES (two cases).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore (Norwood B. Orrick & Richard W. Emory, Baltimore, Md.) for plaintiffs in Nos. 5871 and 5889.

Piper & Marbury, Baltimore (Jesse Slingluff, Jr., and Frank T. Gray, Baltimore, Md.,) for plaintiffs, in No. 5615.

John Geyer Tausig, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs in Nos. 6096, 6097, 6098 and 6099.

George Cochran Doub, U. S. Atty., and James B. Murphy, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for the United States.

WILLIAM C. COLEMAN, Chief Judge.

These seven suits involve claims against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (b), and arise out of a tragic accident which occurred on the afternoon of April 8, 1951, at Morningside, near Andrews Field, in Prince George's County, Maryland, resulting in the death of three persons and serious injuries to three others.

The accident was the result of the abandonment of a B-25 Bomber plane of the United States Government, stationed at Andrews Field. The plane was being given a test flight with respect to the operation of its landing gear, with a pilot, co-pilot and engineer aboard. Difficulty was found with respect to the retracting and release of the landing gear. All of the customary procedures were tried with a view to overcoming the difficulties but without success. The pilot was in almost constant radio contact with the tower at Andrews Field. A crash landing was determined not to be feasible, since, due to the condition of the landing gear, such would have been extremely dangerous, if not fatal, to all three occupants of the plane. After the plane had been in flight several hours and was near Annapolis, about thirty miles distant from Andrews Field, the gas supply running low and with little hope of repairing the landing gear, the pilot decided to return to Andrews Field for further instructions. On nearing the field, the pilot reported that he planned to abandon the plane and requested instructions from the tower as to a proper heading so that he would miss the populated area. The tower replied, as a result of consultation between six superior officers of the Air Force who had assembled in the tower, that if still unsuccessful in getting the landing gear to operate properly, then the plane should be flown directly over the field, the co-pilot and engineer to bail out on the first pass and the pilot to do the same on the second pass over the field on a heading of 120°. These directions were followed and both pilots and engineer landed safely with only minor injuries. The object in setting the course of the abandoned plane as was done, was that it would proceed in a general southeasterly direction towards the Chesapeake Bay, about 15 miles distant and which would be reached in normal flight in 7 or 8 minutes. Simultaneously, the tower gave orders for two Jet planes to pursue the abandoned B-25 and to shoot it down over the Bay. However, the unexpected happened. The plane proceeded only a very short distance on the course as set; then began to circle to the left and finally crashed about 200 feet from the home of Samuel and Dorothea Snyder, at Morningside, struck the house with great force, set it on fire and completely destroyed it. At the time, Irvin N. Guyer and his wife, Violet S. Guyer, sister of Mr. Snyder, were paying a visit in the Snyder home. Irvin N. Guyer was pinned in the wreckage and died of suffocation after efforts at rescue failed. His wife was seriously injured, as were also Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, whose two minor children were killed. The pilot was indicted, and tried for manslaughter, and was found not guilty. No. 22145 Criminal Action, in this Court.

All of the seven claims of the various plaintiffs have been brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b). The United States Government admits liability in the first five cases (Nos. 5615, 5871, 5889, 6096 and 6097). In No. 6098 in which Dorothea Snyder is plaintiff, Government counsel first asserted that any right of recovery that she or her husband might have for property damage was exclusively under the Military Personnel Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 222c. But this defense was declared unavailable to the Government because not seasonably asserted, and primarily because that Act is not by its express terms applicable to the present case, since the house which was destroyed, together with personal property, was not quarters "assigned" to Mrs. Snyder's husband incident to his military service. See Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, D.C., 111 F.Supp. 899. Thus, this Court held that Mrs. Snyder was not barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act as respects both property damage and personal injuries. This Court made a similar ruling, also at the beginning of this proceeding, with respect to the suit (No. 6099) of the husband, Master Sergeant Samuel R. Snyder. However, as respects his claim for personal injuries, the Government denies he has any right of recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act because, as claimed, he was on military duty at the time he was injured. In these two suits, the Government also contests the amount of damages claimed. In the other five cases, the amount of damages is the sole issue.

The suits will be taken up in chronological order, according to their docket numbers, and the first is case No. 5615, brought by the Snyders to the use of the Travelers Fire Insurance Company, which insured their home in the amount of $7,000.00. The damage to the Snyder home was, we find, by the weight of the credible evidence, considerably in excess of the total amount of the coverage which was paid by the Travelers Insurance Company. Thus, it is entitled to recover the full amount of the policy that it paid, namely, $7,000.00. The insurance company's right of subrogation under the established facts is clear. See Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, supra. In order to retain the chronological sequence in considering these various cases, the damages to be allowed the Snyders for the destruction of their home, in addition to recovery on this subrogation claim allowed the insurance company, will be considered in due course under cases numbered 6098 and 6099.

We next turn in sequence to case number 5871, namely, the suit brought by Mrs. Guyer under Sections 1-6 incl. of Article 67 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1951, for the use of herself and her three infant children, by reason of the wrongful death of her husband, Irvin N. Guyer. In this same suit there have been included claims for (1) personal injuries suffered by Mrs. Guyer; and (2) medical expenses which she incurred and her personal property loss.

Considering first the pecuniary loss to Mrs. Guyer and the three minor children as the result of her husband's death, the material and undisputed facts bearing upon this phase of the case are the following: Guyer was 37 years, 6 months and 10 days old, and his wife 36 years, 4 months old, when he was killed; they were married on May 18, 1939, and their three children, the equitable plaintiffs, were of the following ages at the time their father was killed: Joyce Elaine Guyer, 9 years, 8 months; Frederick Irvin Guyer, 7 years, 7 months: and Roslyn Marie Guyer, 5 years, 4 months. Both parents and all of the children enjoyed, up to the time of their father's death, good health, with normal life expectancies. The father had been approved for life insurance as recently as January, 1951. The Guyer's married life had been continuously harmonious. He had proved a good husband, father and provider for his family. He had been successful in his business as an automobile dealer. His earnings from January 1, 1947, to the date of his death were approximately as follows: 1947 $16,000; 1948 $9,500; 1949 $10,500; 1950 $10,200; 1951 (3 months) $17,000. He had no invested income. Mrs. Guyer testified that her husband, during the above period, expended out of his earnings from $600 to $700 a month for the support of herself and the three children.

It is appropriate in cases of this kind, for the purpose of establishing the measure of damages, to rely upon established mortality tables to prove the joint life expectancy of the survivors entitled to be compensated for the wrongful death. Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A.2d 117. Such tables were introduced in the present case, being the United States Life Tables and Actuarial Tables, 1939-41, used by the Government for computing the value of life and remainder interests for the purpose of Federal estate and gift taxes. Testimony was also given by an actuary based on these tables, which showed that the joint life expectancy of Mr. and Mrs. Guyer was 26.84 years at the time of his death. The further testimony of the actuary was undisputed that $18.50 invested at 3% is required to yield $1.00 a year for 26.84 years, and that the amount of money required to reimburse Mrs. Guyer and the three minor children for the loss of support and maintenance of her husband and their father, during the 26.84 years of joint life expectancy, is, if considered on the basis of approximately $600.00 monthly support by the father, $138,750.00, and if considered on the basis of approximately $700.00 monthly support, $157,250.00. In other words, it was testified that if $138,750.00 is invested at 3%, it will produce $7500.00 a year for 26.84 years, and if $157,250 is similarly invested, it will produce $8500.00 a year for 26.84 years, provided in each case the principal is consumed in the process so that at the end of the period, there is nothing left.

Breaking down the above figure of $138,750.00 which is computed on the basis of an annual expectancy...

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