Snyders v. Hale

• Decision Date: 16 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 2509,2509
• Citation: 1976 NMCA 110,557 P.2d 583,89 N.M. 734
• Parties: Cyril SNYDERS and Clarissa E. Snyders, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Kevin HALE, Administrator of the Estate of Larry Dean Woodard, Deceased, and Lawrence H. Woodard, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 583

557 P.2d 583

89 N.M. 734

Cyril SNYDERS and Clarissa E. Snyders Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Kevin HALE, Administrator of the Estate of Larry Dean Woodard, Deceased, and Lawrence H. Woodard Defendants-Appellants.

No. 2509.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 16, 1976.

Certiorari Denied Dec. 16, 1976.

[89 NM 734] Richard L. Gerding, Tansey, Rosebrough, Roberts & Gerding, Farmington, for defendants-appellants.

Felix Briones, Jr., Briones & Harrell, Farmington, for plaintiffs-appellees.

OPINION

HERNANDEZ, Judge.

The principal issue in this appeal involves the interpretation of a stipulation. This was a non-jury trial and judgment was entered in favor of both plaintiffs and against both defendants.

Only such facts as are necessary to explain how the principal issue arose will be mentioned. Larry Dean Woodard, son of Lawrence H. Woodard, was involved in an automobile accident with the plaintiffs which resulted in his death. Plaintiffs sued the son's estate and the father for negligence. At the opening of the trial, the plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Briones, made the following statement:

'The defendants have notified plaintiff (sic) that they will admit the liability, and I call upon Mr. Gerding to make his admission of liability at this time before continuing with my opening statement * * *.' (Emphasis ours.)

Mr. Gerding, defendants' attorney, then stated the following:

'The defendants Kevin Hale, administrative--I'm sorry, administrator of the Estate of Larry Dean Woodard, deceased does admit that that (sic) Larry Dean Woodard, as alleged in Paragraph Five of the first claim and Paragraph One as adopted in the second claim, do admit that the defendant was negligent in that the drove his vehicle in a careless manner, that he failed to keep a proper lookout, that he failed to keep his vehicle under control and that he negligently allowed his vehicle to enter into the wrong lane, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision between the parties. We have stipulated to liability to that extent, your honor.' (Emphasis ours.)

Mr. Briones then stated that plaintiffs would present evidence as to their injuries, medical bills and other damages. Mr. Gerding then made the following statement:

'Your honor, my opening statement needs to be very short. We do not, obviously, since the stipulation, dispute the liability in this claim. All we dispute is the amount of damages.' (Emphasis ours.)

During the direct examination of the police officer who had investigated the accident by Mr. Briones, Mr. Gerding objected to a question as to whether the defendant Lawrence H. Woodard acknowledged that he was the father of the deceased, Larry D. Woodard. In the colloquy between the court and the attorneys, Mr. Gerding made the following statement:

'The liability that I stipulated to this morning was against the decedent. Mr. Briones has sued the decedent and the decedent's parents and has alleged family purpose imputing liability. I did not stipulate to the family purpose, and for the same reasons, I have been objecting to officer Woodworth's testimony, on the grounds that it's hearsay. It does go to the truth of the matter asserted, that is, the relationship of the people, and this bears directly upon that phase of the question of liability.'

Mr. Briones stated that it was his understanding that defendants' attorney had stipulated as to the liability of both the defendants and that all they were going to dispute was the damages. The judge stated that that was his understanding too.

The defendants' first point of error is that 'the trial court erred in finding that the car driven by the deceased defendant was being driven for family purposes.' (Emphasis ours.) We believe that defendants intended to say that the trial court erred in 'concluding' that the car driven by Larry D. Woodard was being driven for family purposes. Most of their argument under this point is that the plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence and the trial court did not make a finding that the car that the deceased was driving was maintained by his father for the general use and convenience of the family, which is one of the necessary elements for invoking the family purpose doctrine. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that:

'8. The accident was the proximate result of the negligent driving of defendants' decedent, Larry Dean Woodard, which negligence is imputed to defendant Lawrence H. Woodard.

'9. Defendants are responsible, jointly and severally, to plaintiff Cyril Snyders, in the sum of $30,378.00, and to plaintiff, Clarissa E. Snyders in the sum of $15,266.00, and judgment should issue accordingly.'

The net effect of these conclusions is that the trial court imputed liability to the father on the basis of the stipulation.

This brings us to a discussion of the stipulation. We start with the general proposition that statements or admissions made by an attorney in open court, during the trial of a case, for the purpose of facilitating the trial by dispensing with procedural matters, technbicalities, and the like, or for the purpose of dispensing with certain testimony or proof of a certain fact or facts are binding on his client. Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830 (Mo.App.1952); Prince Georges Properties, Inc. v. Rogers, 275 Md. 582, 341 A.2d 804 (1975). As to interpretation of the stipulation:

'The general rule as to the construction of stipulations is well stated in 50 Am.Jur., Stipulations, sec. 8, p. 609: 'As a general rule, stipulations should receive a fair and liberal construction, in harmony with the apparent intention of the parties and the spirit of justice, and in the furtherance of fair trials upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one calculated to defeat the purposes of their execution. The terms of a stipulation should not, however, be so construed as to extend beyond that which a fair construction justifies. In all cases of doubt, that construction should be adopted which is favorable to the party in whose favor it is...