Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp.

Decision Date30 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 15,Docket No. 96170,15
Citation523 N.W.2d 454,447 Mich. 1
PartiesMark SOBOTKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee (After Remand). Calendar
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
OPINION AFTER REMAND

BOYLE, Justice.

In the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, 1 the Legislature codifies public policy applicable to, and reflective of, the political give and take of an ongoing economic struggle. Not infrequently, the forum then shifts to the judicial arena. Typically, courts are asked to construe newly enacted legislation and to supply missing pieces of the puzzle that inevitably affect the future direction of the political process. The instant case, however, involves a variation on the usual theme whose seven-year gestation period reflects the significance of the issue to interested parties other than the plaintiff and defendant. In this case we are asked to rediscover in venerable precedent a neglected piece of the puzzle and accordingly limit compensation to partially disabled workers.

In Michigan, disability is wage loss. 2 Thus, a worker whose disability is total is one who has lost his wages because of his injury. We acknowledge at the outset, that our approach to the issue presented here is influenced by a strong disinclination to embark on the process of rolling a rock up a hill the Legislature has only recently decided to climb. In this situation the aphorism that what the Legislature has not supplied the Court will not furnish is not only apt but compelling.

The issue is what amount of compensation is due an employee whose "incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is partial," M.C.L. § 418.361(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(361)(1), 3 where the statute provides that the "weekly loss in wages ... shall consist of the percentage of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee ... as fairly represents the proportionate extent of the impairment of the employee's earning capacity in the employment[ ] ... in which the employee was working at the time of the personal injury." M.C.L. § 418.371(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(371)(1). 4 Specifically, we must determine whether the WCAB correctly awarded maximum benefits to the plaintiff, whose disability has been found to be partial, and who has not secured employment since being laid off by defendant several months after injury. We would affirm the award.

Where, on account of an injury, an employee is, in fact, unemployed, the employee is entitled to the maximum benefit allowable under § 361(1), 5 because the employee is not "able to earn" wages postinjury. The Court of Appeals reduced the maximum benefit amount by estimating the employee's remaining earning capacity. In directing the agency to apportion benefits, the Court misinterpreted and misapplied the law, and invaded the province of the finder of fact. We would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the WCAB.

I

Plaintiff, Mark Sobotka, began working for defendant, Chrysler Corporation, in September, 1972, and continued as a Chrysler employee until January, 1979. Defendant employed plaintiff as an inspector in its Hamtramck assembly plant. To perform the inspector's job, plaintiff was required to bend repeatedly, stand constantly, perform overhead work from a pit underneath a vehicle body, and inspect the underside of vehicle bodies from a kneeling position. In May, 1978, Sobotka was inspecting one vehicle body when another vehicle body moved down the line and pinned him between the two. As a result, he suffered injuries to his back and legs.

Plaintiff's petition for hearing alleged that he sustained a personal injury to his back and lower extremities that resulted in disability. The petition also alleged a psychiatric occupational disease as a result of the personal injury. The hearing referee found that plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proving either that the work-related injury "continued to disable him beyond the period he was paid weekly compensation benefits," or that any possibly disabling psychiatric condition arose out of or in the course of his employment.

On review, the Worker's Compensation Appeal Board found that plaintiff's work-related injury continued to disable him beyond the date that defendant had stopped paying benefits. It ordered defendant to pay benefits for partial disability pursuant to § 361 of the act "not to exceed $153.00 a week until further order of the Bureau." 6

The ensuing history of the case includes three appeals by defendant of orders of the WCAB, three orders of remand from the Court of Appeals, one order of remand from this Court, and two opinions of the Court of Appeals before this Court's order granting leave. Much of that time, as detailed next, was consumed by a protracted disagreement of interpretation between the Court of Appeals and the Bureau of Worker's Disability Compensation, 7 whose provenance is, in all events, unclear. Although reluctant to burden the opinion with such detail, the significance of the issue requires inclusion of the tortuous course of this litigation.

A

Defendant's first appeal challenged, among other things, the clarity of the WCAB's order to pay compensation "not to exceed $153.00." Plaintiff did not respond. Defendant argued that once the right to compensation had been determined, "the Board's legal obligation [was] to compute in dollars and cents the amount of partial disability benefits [the employee] is to receive." Citing Thayer v. Britz, 234 Mich. 645, 209 N.W. 50 (1926), and Barrett v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co., 69 Mich.App. 636, 641, 245 N.W.2d 147 (1976), the Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case to the WCAB to "modify its award to specify the extent to which plaintiff's earning capacity has been impaired, and fix the amount, in dollars and cents, of the weekly benefits due accordingly." Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 23, 1986 (Docket No. 95053). The WCAB again awarded the maximum benefit allowable under § 361(1).

Defendant's second appeal contended that the WCAB had equated "able to earn" under § 361(1) with actual wages earned, and erroneously awarded maximum compensation benefits "payable as if he was totally disabled, ... despite the fact that the Board finds that the employee is only partially disabled." Again, the Court of Appeals agreed with defendant, and again the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the WCAB

for the purpose of calculating, in dollars and cents, the proportionate impairment in plaintiff's earning capacity attributable to his partial disability, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Trask v. Modern Pattern & Machin[e] Co., 222 Mich. 692, 697-699 (1923). Thayer v. Britz, 234 Mich. 645, 647 (1926). Plaintiff's post-injury earnings are merely one factor to be considered; the Appeal Board's opinion and order of July 31, 1987 treats those post-injury earnings as the sole factor of relevance, contrary to the analysis set forth in Trask, supra. [Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 25, 1988 (Docket No. 103031).]

The opinion of the WCAB at issue here is the opinion on second remand, which reached yet another panel of the WCAB. This panel, as had the two before it, also ordered that defendant was to "pay compensation at the rate of $153.00 per week ... until further order." Although not a model of clarity, the board's opinion states:

Based upon the fact that plaintiff has not been able to earn any wages after his January 17, 1979, layoff, the medical testimony of Dr. Larkin, Dr. Goldberg, and Dr. Weisman concerning the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, we find that plaintiff does suffer from a disability which severely limits his ability to engage postemployment. 8 We also find that plaintiff's proportionate impairment in earning capacity attributed to his partial disability is two-thirds of $283.30 or $153.00 per week for two dependents.

Therefore, defendant shall pay plaintiff compensation at the rate of $153.00 per week for two dependents based upon two-thirds of plaintiff's average weekly wage of $280.30 pursuant to MCL 418.361[ (1) ]; MSA 17.237(361)[ (1) ] from February 15, 1979, to March 27, 1981, the date of Closing of Proofs in this matter. Thereafter, defendant shall pay compensation at the rate of $153.00 per week pursuant to MCL 418.361[ (1) ]; MSA 17.237(361)(1) from March 28, 1981, until further order. Interest due and owing on these benefits shall be paid at the rate of 10% per annum. [1989 WCABO 126, 128-129.]

Defendant's third appeal resulted in another remand to the WCAB. This time the Court of Appeals stated it agreed with what it characterized as a "finding" by the WCAB that " 'plaintiff's proportionate impairment in earning capacity attributed to his partial disability is two-thirds of $283.30.' ... as supported by the requisite scintilla of evidence required by Const 1963, art 6, § 28 and § 861 of ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • Rakestraw v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 30 d3 Julho d3 2003
    ...N.W.2d 347 (1998); Derr v. Murphy Motors Freight Lines, 452 Mich. 375, 388, 550 N.W.2d 759 (1996); Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp. (After Remand), 447 Mich. 1, 20 n. 18, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994); (opinion by Boyle, J.) Paschke v. Retool Industries, 445 Mich. 502, 511, 519 N.W.2d 441 (1994); Bower v.......
  • Corl v. Huron Castings, Inc.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 1 d5 Março d5 1996
    ...463, 473-474, 381 N.W.2d 386 (1985), this Court held that Michigan law "only compensates for lost wages." See Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp., 447 Mich. 1, 6, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994), in which Justice Boyle stated that "[i]n Michigan, disability is wage loss."28 See California Compensation Ins. Co.......
  • Sington v. Chrysler Corporation
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 31 d3 Julho d3 2002
    ...basis of our longstanding interpretation of related precedent, most recently confirmed in Sobotka [ v. Chrysler Corp. (After Remand), 447 Mich. 1, 17, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994) (Boyle, J., lead opinion)], the employee must establish a reduction in earning With this conclusion, the definition of......
  • Hagerman v. Gencorp Automotive
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 16 d2 Junho d2 1998
    ...in nature, and must be "liberally construed to grant rather than deny benefits." Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp. (After Remand), 447 Mich. 1, 20, n. 18, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994) (Boyle, J., lead opinion); see, also, Gardner v. Van Buren Public Schools, 445 Mich. 23, 49, 517 N.W.2d 1 (1994). Second, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT