Soby v. People

• Decision Date: 12 June 1890
• Citation: 25 N.E. 109,134 Ill. 66
• Parties: SOBY v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

134 Ill. 66

25 N.E. 109

SOBY

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 12, 1890.

Error to appellate court, third district.

Indictment of William Soby for keeping a bucket-shop. The first and second counts of the indictment charged a violation of the first section of the act recited in the opinion, and the sixth count charged a violation of the second section of said act. The other counts were quashed. Defendant was convicted, and the judgment was affirmed by the appellate court. He brings error.

Edward L. McDonald, (Francis A. Riddle, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

Chas. A. Barnes, for defendant in error.

BAKER, J.

The plaintiff in error, William Soby, was indicted and convicted in the Morgan circuit court for violation of the act of the legislature, entitled ‘An act to suppress bucket-shops, and gambling in stocks, bonds, petroleum, cotton, grain, provisions, and other produce,’ in force July 1, 1887, (3 Starr & C. Ann. St. 165; Rev. St. 1889, c. 38, §§ 137 a-137 d.) The first and second sections of the act are as follows: ‘1. That it shall be unlawful for any corporation, association, copartnership, or person to keep or cause to be kept within this state any bucket-shop, office, store, or other place wherein is conducted or permitted the pretended buying or selling of the shares of stocks or bonds of any corporation, or petroleum, cotton, grain, provisions, or other produce, either on margins or otherwise, without any intention of receiving and paying for the property so bought, or of delivering the property so sold; or wherein is conducted or permitted the pretended buying or selling of such property on margins; or when the party buying any such property, or offering to buy the same, does not intend actually to receive the same if purchased, or to deliver the same if sold; and the keeping of all such places is hereby prohibited. And any corporation or person, whether acting individually, or as a member, or as an officer, agent, or employe, of any corporation, association, or copartnership, who shall be guilty of violating this section, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than $200, and not more than $500; and any person or persons who shall be guilty of a second offense under this statute, in addition to the penalty above prescribed, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in the county jail for the period of six months, and, if a corporation, shall be liable to forfeiture of its charter. And the continuance of such establishment after first conviction shall be deemed a second offense. [134 Ill. 69]2. It shall not be necessary, in order to commit the offense defined in section 1 of this act, that both the buyer and seller shall agree to do any of the acts therein prohibited, but the said crime shall be complete against any corporation, association, copartnership, or person thus pretending or offering to sell, or thus pretending or offering to buy, whether the offer to buy or sell is accepted or not; and any corporation, association, copartnership, or person who shall communicate, receive, exhibit, or display in any manner any such offer to so buy or sell, or any statements or quotations of the prices of any such property, with a view to any such transaction as aforesaid, shall be deemed an accessory, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined and punished the same as the principal, and as provided in section 1 of this act.’ The fourth section of the act is as follows: ‘Whoever knowingly permits any of the illegal acts aforesaid in his building, house, or in any outhouse, booth, arbor, or erection of which he has the care or possession, shall be fined not less than $500, nor more than $1,000; and any penalty so adjudged shall be a lien upon the premises on or in which such unlawful acts are carried on or permitted. It is the intention of this act to prevent, punish, and prohibit within this state the business now engaged in and conducted in places commonly known and designated as ‘bucket-shops,’ and also to include the practice now commonly known as ‘bucket-shopping,’ by persons, corporations, associations, or copartnerships, who ostensibly carry on the business or occupation of commission merchants or brokers, in grain, provisions, petroleum, stocks, and bonds. And it shall be the duty, under this act, of all the judges of the several circuit courts * * * at every regular term thereof, to charge all regularly impaneled grand juries to make due investigation, and report upon all violations of the provisions of this act.'

It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff in error had an office in Jacksonville, in this state, where he transacted what he called a grain-commission business, as agent of Robert Lindbloom & Co., members of the board of trade of Chicago. He received daily, by telegraph, from 9:30 A. M. to 1 P. M., and from 2 to 3 o'clock P. M., quotations from the Chicago, New York, St. Louis, and Liverpool markets, on wheat, corn, oats, pork, lard, etc., which he displayed, as received, upon a blackboard for public inspection. He professed to buy and sell such products on the Chicago market, receiving from his customers a margin of two cents per bushel on wheat and corn, unless the customer wanted to limit his ‘loss,’ when a margin of one cent was required. In the latter case ‘the deal would be closed out if the market declined one cent.’ With a two-cent margin, if wheat declined, he ‘would collect more margins.’ There was to be no ‘delivery unless the option matured.’ The defendant says: ‘I kept an office where we were buying and selling on the Chicago market. Bought and sold on margins. The object of my displaying quotations on the blackboard was to show the people what the market was. They could buy if they wished to do so. I kept them there with a view of buying or selling on margins. My business will average 10,000 bushels a day.’ He also says: ‘I have not bought or sold a bushel of wheat since I have been in Jackson ville. I never asked the intention of customers. Customers would have grain delivered to them if they wished.’ It appears from the evidence that Charles James bought 5,000 bushels of wheat, and 5,000 bushels of corn, and put up with the defendant two cents margin per bushel. He bought in October for May delivery, and closed the deal in a few days at an advance on his margins. He says: ‘My intention was to make money out of it by buying and selling it on the fluctuations of the market.’ He neither got nor delivered any grain when he bought or sold. He says: ‘I was to pay nothing but the margin of two cents until May, unless necessary. Would have had to put up more margins if the first had been absorbed by the price going down. If I did not do this the grain would have been sold out. Did not get grain for actual use but to make money out of it.’

In construing a statute the primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intention. In order to accomplish this object the court should look at the whole act, and seek to ascertain such intention by an examination and comparison of its various provisions. Mason v. Finch, 2 Scam. 223;People v. Commissioners, 3 Scam. 153;Perteet v. People, 65 Ill. 230. The court may also consider other and prior acts relating to the same general subject, and thus ascertain what mischiefs the later legislation was designed to remedy, and the true spirit and import of such legislation. Stribling v. Prettyman, 57 Ill. 371. By the Revised Criminal Code of 1874, it was made a criminal offense to contract to have or give the option to sell or buy, at a future time, any grain or other commodity, etc., and it was provided that all contracts made in violation of such law should be considered gambling contracts, and should be void. It was held under that statute that even though a contract purported upon its face to be an absolute contract for the sale or purchase of grain or other commodity for future delivery, yet the transaction would be a gambling contract within the prohibition of the statute if the real intention of both parties at the time of making the contract was to deal only in options, and make future settlement upon the basis of the differences in the market price, without the actual delivery of the grain or other commodity sold or purchased. But it was also held under the same statute in numerous cases that if either party contracted in good faith, the contract was a valid and binding contract, no matter what might have been the secret intention of the other party. It is manifest that the object of the statute was to suppress and prevent gambling in grain and other commodities. But so great was the difficulty of establishing the unlawful intent of the parties making illegal contracts, so many were the shifts and devices resorted to for the purpose of concealing the true character of the gambling transactions entered into, that the statute was found to be ineffectual to...