Sochor v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 71407,71407
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. S273 Dennis SOCHOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 285

619 So.2d 285

18 Fla. L. Week. S273

Dennis SOCHOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71407.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 6, 1993.

Rehearing Denied June 14, 1993.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Gary Caldwell, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Celia A. Terenzio, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Dennis Sochor appeals his convictions of kidnapping and first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the convictions and the death sentence.

Testimony at trial established that, on December 31, 1981, the victim, an eighteen-year-old female, and a friend went to a lounge located in Broward county to celebrate New Year's Eve. During the course of the evening the friend became ill. Sochor and his brother, Gary, helped the victim escort her friend outside to her car. Promising her that she would return soon, the victim returned to the lounge.

Early the next morning the friend awoke in the car, discovered the victim missing, and called the police. The police obtained a photograph taken that night which showed an unidentified man sitting at the bar near the victim. The photograph was shown on television, and, several days later, that man was identified as Sochor. The police talked with Sochor's roommates who said that he had left suddenly when he saw his picture on television. They also told police that Sochor's brother, Gary, had been visiting him and had recently returned to Michigan. The police interviewed Gary who implicated his brother in the victim's disappearance and voluntarily returned to Florida to attempt to locate her body. In May 1986 authorities arrested Sochor in Georgia on an unrelated offense and extradited him to Florida where a grand jury indicted him on charges of first-degree murder and kidnapping. The victim's body has never been recovered.

At trial Gary gave the following testimony. He went to the lounge on New Year's Eve with his brother who spent the evening talking with the victim and her friend. When it came time to leave, the victim and his brother were kissing in the lounge parking lot while Gary waited in the truck. Several minutes later, she agreed to go to breakfast with them. They left the parking lot with Sochor driving his employer's truck, Gary in the passenger seat, and the victim seated between them. Sochor drove to a secluded spot nearby and stopped the truck. Gary remembered the victim screaming for help and seeing Sochor on top of her with her hands pinned down on the ground. He yelled at him and threw a rock over his head. In response Sochor stopped assaulting the victim, turned and looked at Gary like a man "possessed," angrily told him to get back in the truck, and resumed his assault. A while later Sochor got in the truck with Gary and drove home. The next morning Gary found a woman's shoe and sweater and a set of keys in the truck. He hid the keys. Later he noticed that the truck had been cleaned and the articles removed. When told about the keys, Sochor became upset and demanded their return, which Gary did. A few days later Gary returned to Michigan.

The state also introduced Sochor's three taped confessions which it played to the jury. In these statements Sochor said that he met the victim that night at the bar and spent the evening talking with her. He remembered kissing her in the lounge parking lot and wanting to have sex. When she refused, they argued and he grabbed her. When she hit him, he became angry and choked her. He thought that he killed her and drove to a secluded area where he disposed of the body. He said that Gary was not with him when this happened. When he awoke the next morning, he remembered feeling that something terrible had happened. He thought he had raped "another girl." He also stated that he found several woman's articles in the truck which he put in the trash. When he saw his picture on television, he took his employer's truck and drove to Tampa. ¹ From there he went to New Orleans where he stayed for some time before moving to Atlanta where he was arrested.

The jury convicted Sochor of both kidnapping and first-degree murder and, by a vote of ten to two, recommended the death penalty. The trial judge sentenced Sochor to death, finding four aggravating, ² and no mitigating, circumstances. Sochor now appeals, claiming errors in both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial.

Sochor raises numerous claims of error in the guilt phase. His first claim is that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either premeditated or felony murder. ³ Assuming that there are sufficient facts to present the issue to the jury, whether the evidence shows premeditation is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939 (Fla.1984). As this Court has previously stated:

Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred includes such matters as the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted. It must exist for such time before the homicide as will enable the accused to be conscious of the nature of the deed he is about to commit and the probable result to flow from it in so far as the life of his victim is concerned. No definite length of time for it to exist has been set and indeed could not be.

Larry v. State, 104 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla.1958). Accord Preston; Sireci v. State, 399 So.2d 964 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2257, 72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982).

After examining the record, we find sufficient evidence to present the issue of premeditation to the jury and from which the jury could have found premeditation. In addition to the circumstances of the crime, Gary testified that, while the victim screamed for help, he interrupted Sochor who stopped assaulting her long enough to turn, look at Gary, and shout at him to get back in the truck. Sochor then resumed his attack. Thus, he had a sufficient period of reflection to contemplate the nature of his act. He could have stopped his assault at that point but chose to continue. We find Sochor's claim that the offense was a heat-of-passion type homicide insufficient to preclude a finding of premeditation.

We also find sufficient evidence of kidnapping to support Sochor's conviction on a felony-murder theory. ⁴ The evidence adduced at trial shows that, although the victim may have entered the truck voluntarily, at some point she was held unwillingly. Her removal from the lounge parking lot to a secluded area facilitated Sochor's acts, avoided detection, and was not merely incidental to, or inherent in, the crime. Thus, the evidence supports the underlying felony of kidnapping as well as Sochor's separate conviction of kidnapping. See Carron v. State, 427 So.2d 192 (Fla.1983); Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983); Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla.1982). ⁵

Sochor next claims that the trial court improperly admitted his confessions because the state did not independently prove the corpus delicti of the homicide. An individual's confession to a crime is insufficient evidence of a criminal act where no independent evidence exists to substantiate the occurrence of the crime. State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823 (Fla.1976). Because the victim's body has never been found, Sochor contends that the state has no evidence, other than his confession, that she is dead. In proving corpus delicti, however, circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Buenoano v. State, 527 So.2d 194 (Fla.1988). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary. Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Bassett v. State, 449 So.2d 803 (Fla.1984). The victim disappeared New Year's Eve and has not been seen since that night. It was uncharacteristic for her not to come home. She had a good relationship with her family and her boyfriend and kept in touch. None of her belongings were missing from her apartment. Gary testified that when he last saw the victim she was screaming for help with his brother on top of her. We find sufficient evidence that the victim is indeed dead and that her death was due to the criminal agency of Dennis Sochor. Moreover, Sochor, in closing argument, did not contest the fact that she was dead. Rather, counsel based the defense strategy on the theories of voluntary intoxication or mistaken identity, i.e., that Gary actually committed the crime. ⁶

Sochor next complains of various errors which, taken as a whole, led to an unfair trial. He acknowledges that counsel did not object at trial to any of the complained-of errors and, pursuant to the contemporaneous objection rule, they are not preserved for review. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984). Despite the lack of objections, Sochor contends that (1) the trial was so unfair that fundamental error occurred and (2) the contemporaneous objection rule has less force in a capital case. This Court has previously rejected the second argument. Rose v. State, 461 So.2d 84 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143, 105 S.Ct. 2689, 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985); see Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987); Jones v. Wainwright, 473 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1985).

As to the first argument, fundamental error occurs in cases "where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application." Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956, 960 (Fla.1981). The error must amount to a denial of due process. Ray; Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978). After carefully...