Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock

• Decision Date: 11 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 20595,20595
• Parties: , 14 Media L. Rep. 1737 SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, UTAH CHAPTER, and KUTV, Inc., Petitioners, v. Honorable J. Robert BULLOCK, District Judge, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1166

743 P.2d 1166

74 A.L.R.4th 445, 14 Media L. Rep. 1737

SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, UTAH CHAPTER, and KUTV Inc., Petitioners, v. Honorable J. Robert BULLOCK, District Judge, Respondent.

No. 20595.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 11, 1987.

Spencer E. Austin, Alan L. Sullivan, and Patrick A. Shea, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.

David L. Wilkinson and Stephen Mikita, Salt Lake City, and Wayne B. Watson and Richard B. Johnson, Provo, for respondent.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

This case is before the Court on a petition for an extraordinary writ filed pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ¹ The Utah Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists petitions this Court to overturn an order of the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District denying the public access to pretrial proceedings held to determine Ronald Watson Lafferty's competence to stand trial. The Society challenges the district court's orders closing the competency proceedings and its subsequent orders sealing both the transcripts of the proceedings and the memorandum decision explaining why it found Lafferty competent to stand trial.

After the Society filed its petition for a writ with this Court, KUTV, Inc., and three individual journalists filed a motion asking leave to be joined as petitioners. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the motion as to KUTV and deny it as to the individual journalists.

On the merits, we agree with petitioners that the district court abused its discretion, both by denying the public access to the competency proceedings without first holding hearings on the appropriateness of closure and by closing the proceedings and sealing the transcripts and memorandum decision without issuing supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. To correct this abuse of discretion, the writ is granted. The district court is directed to reconsider its order sealing the transcripts and the memorandum decision. To effect this reconsideration, the district court is directed to hold a hearing on the issue presented by the request to close and seal and to support any resulting decision with detailed findings and conclusions. Lafferty should be represented at such a hearing.

Ronald Lafferty was charged with two counts of capital homicide arising out of the 1984 murder of his sister-in-law and her child in Utah County. Lafferty claimed that he had committed the murders to fulfill a divine revelation. The case understandably generated substantial public interest.

Over a period of six months, the district court held three proceedings to determine whether Lafferty was competent to stand trial. The record is not clear, but it appears that the court did not hold hearings concerning whether to close the first two competency proceedings to the public. However, the district court did conduct a closure hearing prior to the third competency proceeding, as evidenced by a minute entry dated April 2, 1985. In any event each competency proceeding was closed to the public. Although the transcript of the first competency proceeding was released, the district court sealed the transcripts of the latter two. On April 8, 1985, six days after the third competency proceeding, the district court filed and sealed a memorandum decision finding Lafferty competent to stand trial. The court issued no written findings or conclusions explaining its decision to close the third competency proceeding, and it refused to release either the transcripts of the latter two proceedings or its memorandum decision.

Immediately following the April 8th decision, petitioners sought a writ from this Court. They challenged both the propriety of the closure order and the court's subsequent refusal to release the transcripts and the memorandum decision on the ground that the court failed to issue supporting findings and conclusions. Since the filing of that petition, Lafferty has been convicted of two counts of first degree murder and has been sentenced to death.

Before addressing the merits of the petition, we address, sua sponte, two preliminary matters. The first is whether this case should be dismissed as moot. The second is the standing of the various petitioners to challenge the rulings below. The mootness question presents itself because the competency hearings have been concluded, Lafferty has been tried and convicted, the public's interest in the case has waned, and the transcripts and memorandum decision have lost the copy value they had prior to trial. It might be argued that all these factors justify a finding that the request for the writ is moot. However, the transcripts and the court's memorandum decision are still concealed from public view; therefore, the primary evil complained of persists. The matter is not moot, and a justiciable issue regarding the release of those documents presently exists. In addition, we note that in cases involving access to pretrial proceedings, there seldom will be sufficient time for an appellate court to intervene before the proceeding is concluded. That fact alone would justify an exception to the mootness doctrine because otherwise, the important public issue of access to pretrial proceedings is likely to evade review. See, e.g., Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984); KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1983); Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1981).

The second preliminary issue which the parties did not raise but which we choose to consider is whether the Society and the parties who seek to be joined as petitioners have standing to challenge the district court's actions. See, e.g., Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1, 964 (Utah 1986); Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986); Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Utah 1985); Heath Tecna Corp. v. Sound Systems International, Inc., 588 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1978). It was only after this Court raised, sua sponte, the question of whether the Society had standing that John Edwards, Ernest J. Ford, Michael Youngren, and KUTV, Inc., sought to be joined as petitioners. According to the memorandum in support of their petition to join, KUTV and the above-named individual journalists are all members of the Society. They seek to join solely to demonstrate an identity of interest between themselves and the Society. Their intent is to buttress the Society's claim that it, as an association of professional news organizations and individual members of the press in Utah, has standing to represent the interests of its members. Before analyzing the standing of the Society, KUTV, and the individuals, a rather detailed recitation of the relevant facts that can be drawn from the sparse record below is necessary.

Sometime after the second competency proceeding was completed on January 28, 1985, an attorney representing the Society sought a transcript of that proceeding. The district court denied the request.

On April 2, 1985, the date of the third competency proceeding, the Society's attorney appeared and protested the closure of the proceeding at a hearing held just before the proceeding was scheduled to begin. This protest was unavailing, as previously noted, and the district court ordered the hearing closed. ²

On the same date, and after the judge had ordered the proceeding closed to the public, the attorney representing the Society moved the district court for an order allowing the press access to the transcripts of the second and third competency proceedings. In addition to the Society, the attorney also represented KUTV and other parties not present here in moving for the release of the transcripts. The district court took the motion under advisement and proceeded to hold the third and final closed competency hearing. Sometime after the district court issued its memorandum decision respecting Lafferty's competence to stand trial and its order sealing that memorandum decision, the judge orally represented to the attorney for the Society and KUTV that the sealed decision denied his clients' joint motion to release the transcripts.

Consideration of the standing of the various parties to this proceeding is a rather complex matter. Therefore, we proceed by steps. First, we describe our traditional standing requirements for litigating an action. Second, we discuss additional requirements applicable when a party files a writ seeking appellate-type review of a tribunal's rulings. Next, we determine each petitioner's standing under these rules.

Our generally stated standing rule is that a plaintiff must have suffered "some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." ³ Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983); accord Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d at 1162; Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); see Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978). The need for such a personal stake frequently is described as a requirement that the plaintiff's injury be "particularized." The traditional standing requirement is generally justified on grounds that in the absence of a requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal stake in the outcome" or a "particularized injury," the courts might permit themselves to be drawn into disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to "generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state government." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149; see Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d at 798-99; Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978). ⁴

Anyone bringing an original proceeding--a dispute that is being presented to the courts for the first time--must satisfy the traditional standing test. And this test applies whether the proceeding is initiated in a...