Sockwell v. State

• Citation: 675 So.2d 4
• Decision Date: 30 December 1993
• Docket Number: CR-89-225
• Parties: Michael Anthony SOCKWELL v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 4

675 So.2d 4

Michael Anthony SOCKWELL v. STATE.

CR-89-225.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 30, 1993.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1994.

David Flack, Montgomery, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Sandra Stewart and Robert Lusk, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

MONTIEL, Judge.

The appellant, Michael Anthony Sockwell, was indicted for the murder of Isaiah Harris, made capital because it was committed for pecuniary gain or for valuable consideration or pursuant to a contract or for hire. See § 13A-5-40(7), Code of Alabama 1975. The jury found the appellant guilty of capital murder. By a vote of seven to five, the jury recommended that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced the appellant to death by electrocution.

The facts adduced at trial tend to establish the following. In the late evening hours of March 10, 1988, Isaiah Harris, a deputy sheriff in Montgomery County, Alabama, was shot in the head while he was driving to work. Perry Bullard, a police officer with the Montgomery police department, testified that Harris's vehicle was found on the Troy Highway, at a point across from Cherry Hill Road.

Freddie Patterson testified that he knew the appellant, and the co-defendants Lorenzo (Bo Bo) McCarter and Alex Hood. Patterson testified that during the early part of the day on March 10, 1988, the appellant, Hood, and he drove around and drank beer and that later they went to Hood's house and drank and talked. According to Patterson, after 9:00 p.m. that night, he, the appellant, and Hood went to pick up McCarter at work. Patterson stated that when they arrived, McCarter was talking to someone in another vehicle. McCarter finished talking to the other person and then got into Hood's car. The four went to a store to buy more alcohol and then went to Hood's house for a while, according to Patterson.

Patterson stated that after 10:00 p.m. they left Hood's house and drove out to Troy Highway in Hood's vehicle, which McCarter was driving. Patterson stated that he and Hood rode in the backseat of the vehicle and that the appellant rode in the front seat. Patterson testified that they turned into the Regency Park subdivision and went around a block in that subdivision. According to Patterson, as they passed a certain house on the block with a car in the driveway, someone in the vehicle stated "that's the car." Patterson stated that at that time, the appellant got out of Hood's vehicle carrying a shotgun and some clothes. Patterson further stated that the three remaining in the vehicle drove across the street and parked at an auto parts store facing Cherry Hill Road. Patterson stated that in a few minutes, a pager that was in the car beeped and a voice transmitted over the pager said something to the effect of "He's leaving now." Patterson stated that he then heard a loud noise, after which they left the parking lot of the auto parts store and picked up the appellant, who got into the backseat with a gun and some clothes. Patterson further testified that after the appellant got back into the car, he stated that he "had to shoot him" and that "he was gonna ... get his money." Patterson testified that the four of them drove to a bridge and that the appellant threw the gun and the clothes over the railing of the bridge.

Bruce Huggins, an investigator with the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department testified that he had observed what appeared to be an abandoned vehicle near the scene of the murder and that he determined that the vehicle belonged to Lorenzo McCarter. He was informed that McCarter was having an affair with Isaiah Harris's wife. The State presented evidence that the wife, codefendant Louise Harris, could have received a substantial sum of money in insurance proceeds as a result of Isaiah Harris's death.

Kenneth Gilmore, a friend of the appellant, testified that he and the appellant had made arrangements to go fishing on March 11, 1988, the day after the shooting. Gilmore testified that when he met the appellant that the appellant was with codefendant Hood. He further stated that he went with the appellant and Hood to pick up some money at a house on Pineleaf Street. According to Gilmore, afterwards, the individuals went to a store, where they drank some beer. Gilmore said that, after they left the store and were riding in Hood's car, the appellant said that, "some nigger slapped him and he shot him and blowed half of his face off." The appellant was arrested that day.

I

The appellant contends that the statement he gave to Investigator Huggins was due to be suppressed because, he says, it was the fruit of an illegal arrest and because, he says, it was not voluntary.

A

Specifically, the appellant argues that the police had no probable cause to arrest him without a warrant and, therefore, any statement made by him after the illegal arrest was due to be suppressed. We disagree.

Section 15-10-3(3), Code of Alabama 1975, provides that an officer may arrest an individual without a warrant when a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe that the individual arrested committed the felony. "Reasonable cause is equated with probable cause." Daniels v. State, 534 So.2d 628, 651 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), aff'd, 534 So.2d 656 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1040, 107 S.Ct. 898, 93 L.Ed.2d 850 (1987); State v. Calhoun, 502 So.2d 795 (Ala.Crim.App.), rev'd in part, 502 So.2d 808 (Ala.1986). Probable cause is knowledge of circumstances that would lead a reasonable person of ordinary caution, acting impartially, to believe that the person arrested is guilty. Harrell v. State, 475 So.2d 650 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). In making the determination as to whether probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest, we must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Daniels, 534 So.2d at 651.

Investigator Huggins testified at a suppression hearing that at the time of the appellant's arrest he had the following information: that a deputy sheriff had been killed; that McCarter, a codefendant, was having an affair with the victim's wife; that during the months preceding the killing McCarter had been trying to hire someone to kill the victim; that the appellant and codefendant Hood were with McCarter at 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the murder; that the appellant, Hood, and McCarter were seen in Hood's automobile on the afternoon of the murder; that a shotgun was used to kill the victim; and that the appellant was known to own and was known to have carried a shotgun with him in Hood's automobile. The day after the murder, the appellant, Hood, and McCarter were seen in Hood's vehicle and Investigator Huggins stopped the vehicle and arrested the individuals in the vehicle.

The knowledge that Investigator Huggins had at the time of the appellant's arrest was sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that the appellant had participated in the murder. Therefore, the warrantless arrest was legal and the statement was not due to be suppressed on the basis that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.

B

The appellant further argues that his statement was due to be suppressed because, he says, it was not voluntarily given. The appellant acknowledges that he was read his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest. However, he argues that he was coerced into making a statement because, he says, after his arrest he was held at the Montgomery County jail for over six hours, during which time he was not given any food or water, his request for a blanket was denied, and he was threatened by jailers who were friends of the victim when he refused to make a statement. The appellant argues that after he had been held at the county jail for over six hours under these conditions, two investigators approached him and the appellant indicated that he was willing to make a statement. One of the investigators informed the appellant again of his Miranda rights, including his right to an attorney, but neglected to tell the appellant that if he could not afford an attorney, the State would appoint one for him. The appellant said to the investigator, "I shot him." The investigators did not ask him any questions, instructed the appellant not to say anything further, and took him to the investigative division so that the appellant could give his statement to Investigator Huggins.

At this time, Investigator Huggins said that he again advised the appellant of his Miranda rights and that the appellant signed a waiver of rights form. The appellant's statement was videotaped and audiotaped. Huggins testified that the appellant was not coerced or threatened into making the statement and that the appellant did not ask to speak to an attorney and did not request any food or a blanket.

The determination as to whether a statement is voluntary rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and that determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Uber v. State, 596 So.2d 608, 612 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). Whether a statement was voluntary is to be determined under the totality of the circumstances. Rogers v. State, 417 So.2d 241, 248 (Ala.Crim.App.1982) (citations omitted).

The investigators denied that the appellant was mistreated or coerced into making his statement. They also said that the appellant never asked for food or a blanket. Because of the conflicting evidence, we cannot hold that the trial court's determination that the statement was voluntary was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court's denying the appellant's motion to suppress the statement on the basis that the investigator at the jail failed to inform the appellant of his right to have an appointed attorney. The State correctly asserts in its brief that ...