Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. French, SOCONY-VACUUM
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
| Writing for the Court | ANDREWS; PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 143 A.2d 318,88 R.I. 6 |
| Parties | OIL COMPANY, Incorporated, v. Harold V. FRENCH, Tax Assessor. Ex. |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1958 |
| Docket Number | SOCONY-VACUUM,No. 9744 |
Page 318
v.
Harold V. FRENCH, Tax Assessor.
On Show Cause Aug. 4, 1958.
Page 319
[88 R.I. 17] Francis I. McCanna, Francis A. Kelleher, Providence, for petitioner.
Stephen F. Mullen, Sp. Counsel, Providence, for respondent.
[88 R.I. 8] ANDREWS, Justice.
This is a petition brought under what is now General Laws 1956, § 44-5-26, on the ground that the petitioner's real estate in the town of East Providence was assessed as of December 31, 1952 at 12 o'clock noon, the time appointed for the assessment of taxes, at a valuation in excess of its full
Page 320
and fair cash value and in excess of the valuation at which it was assessed on the last preceding assessment day.The case was tried in the superior court before a justice thereof who rendered a decision for petitioner for $40,441.32 which represents an excessive taxation of $36,132.15 plus interest. Both parties excepted to the decision and these exceptions together with numerous others taken to rulings in the course of the trial constitute their bills of exceptions.
Each party has briefed the other party's exceptions taken in the course of the trial, but save in one instance neither party has briefed or argued, at least in an identifiable way, its own such exceptions. The respondent did brief his exception[88 R.I. 9] to the refusal of the trial justice to nonsuit petitioner and we will now dispose of that exception. It is well settled here that a defendant has no exception to the denial of his motion for a nonsuit. Plainfield Realty Co. v. Salway, 72 R.I. 503, 505, 53 A.2d 496. It is equally well settled that exceptions which are neither briefed nor argued are deemed to be waived. Marley v. Providence Journal Company, R.I., 134 A.2d 180.
This leaves only the exception of each party to the decision. Each party has unnecessarily broken up its single exception into several exceptions for which there is no statutory warrant. See Blake v. Atlantic National Bank, 33 R.I. 109, 80 A. 181; Dunn Worsted Mills v. Allendale Worsted Mills, 33 R.I. 115, 80 A. 591, and Vaill v. McPhail, 34 R.I. 361, 375, 83 A. 1075. However, this court has consistently held that under an exception to the decision the excepting party may bring before it any error that inheres in that decision. Memorial Hospital v. Woolf, R.I., 134 A.2d 397, 399, and cases therein cited.
The petitioner owns and operates in the town of East Providence a large oil refining plant. Its property crosses the town from Narragansett Bay to the Massachusetts line and consists of 884.68 acres, approximately one tenth of the land area of the town. It is in one parcel. Besides its refinery, tank farms, office building, warehouses and the like, petitioner has docking facilities to receive and transport raw materials and finished products to all parts of the world. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad also crosses its property near the bay and petitioner has a spur track connecting with this railroad which gives it rail access to the whole North American continent. Pawtucket avenue, a four-lane public highway, passes through the property. There are several easements on the property but there is no evidence that they have lessened its value appreciably.
[88 R.I. 10] At the beginning of the trial petitioner stated that it was confining its attack to six lots, namely, those numbered 1, 3, 4 and 6 on assessor's plat No. 47, and lots 1 and 2 on assessor's plat No. 67. The first four lots are to the east of Pawtucket avenue and the other two are between that avenue and the bay. They are contiguous and constitute about two thirds of the property.
The petitioner filed a sworn return and also paid the tax under protest. As was stated by the trial justice in his decision: 'It will be useful at this stage to set forth a comparison of the values claimed in the return and the values assessed.
Claimed values: Assessed values:
Land Imp's Total Land Imp's Total
Plat 47 Lot 1 .... ..... $81,957 $117,330 $303,500 $420,830
Lot 3 .... ..... 19,312 29,770 80,690 110,460
Lot 4 .... ..... 114,067 133,935 412,435 546,370
Lot 6 $975 ..... 975 4,390 .......... 4,390
Plat 67 Lot 1 .... ..... 117,940 120,600 265,530 386,130
Lot 2 .... ..... 1,262,262 157,320 4,615,670 4,772,990
Totals $975 $1,596,513 $563,345 $5,677,825 $6,241,170'
Page 321
The petitioner's own experts placed a total value upon these lots (land, buildings and improvements) of $3,354,870--over twice the value given in the sworn return--which led the trial justice to remark that the return was 'so much an understatement of value as to throw doubt upon the petitioner's whole case.' We cannot say that he was clearly wrong in not accepting the evidence of the witness who swore to this return.
The petitioner's expert witnesses as to land values were John B. Carpenter and Arthur W. Drew. The former is sometimes referred to as the dean of real estate experts in this state and the latter is almost as well known. The total of Mr. Carpenter's values for the six lots, land only, was $630,080 and that of Mr. Drew was $591,930. The total assessment was only $563,345. One might think that petitioner would not complain of this result, but at the trial it contended that because respondent assessed at, only 80 per [88 R.I. 11] cent of the full and fair cash value, its figures not only should have been accepted but that the assessment should have been only 80 per cent of such amounts. In this way it built up its claim for a refund in the sum of $66,848.84.
There were a few old dwellings on the land in question but their value was relatively insignificant. The trial justice very properly rejected evidence of sales of similar property in the area saying: 'The very existence of this industry on this area is, for dwelling house purposes, a value depressing factor. Were the industrial feature removed, certainly many of the sales of neighborhood property would have been at higher prices than were had in the presence of the depressing factor.'
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Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public Works, 10860
...evidence offered by the state's witnesses was without probative force. To the same effect see Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. French, 88 R.I. 6, 143 A.2d 318, Assembly of God Church of Pawtucket, R.I. v. Vallone, 89 R.I. 1, 150 A.2d 11, McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 47 S.Ct. 14......
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Whittemore v. Thompson, 2014–157–Appeal
...Corp., 626 A.2d at 215–16 (quoting Kargman v. Jacobs, 122 R.I. 720, 735, 411 A.2d 1326, 1334 (1980) and Socony–Vacuum Oil Co. v. French, 88 R.I. 6, 11–12, 143 A.2d 318, 321 (1958) ). Therefore, it is our opinion that the burden of proof on a plaintiff contesting a tax assessment requires th......
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Whittemore v. Thompson, 2014-157-Appeal.
...Corp., 626 A.2d at 215-16 (quoting Kargman v. Jacobs, 122 R.I. 720, 735, 411 A.2d 1326, 1334 (1980) and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. French, 88 R.I. 6, 11-12, 143 A.2d 318, 321 (1958)). Therefore, it is our opinion that the burden of proof on a plaintiff contesting a tax assessment requires tha......
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Whittemore v. Thompson, 2014-157-Appeal.
...Corp., 626 A.2d at 215-16 (quoting Kargman v. Jacobs, 122 R.I. 720, 735, 411 A.2d 1326, 1334 (1980) and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. French, 88 R.I. 6, 11-12, 143 A.2d 318, 321 (1958)). Therefore, it is our opinion that the burden of proof on a plaintiff contesting a tax assessment requires tha......