Soderstrom v. Country Homes Of Norwalk Inc.

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.
• Citation: Soderstrom v. Country Homes Of Norwalk Inc., 132 Conn. 381, 44 A.2d 698 (Conn. 1945)
• Decision Date: 08 November 1945
• Parties: SODERSTROM v. COUNTRY HOMES OF NORWALK, Inc.

132 Conn. 381

44 A.2d 698

SODERSTROM

v.COUNTRY HOMES OF NORWALK, Inc.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 8, 1945.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Inglis, Judge.

Action by Oscar G. Soderstrom against Country Homes of Norwalk, Inc., to recover for services rendered. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

No error.

Sidney Vogel, of South Norwalk, for appellant (defendant).

Frank J. Culhane, of Danbury (John Keogh, of South Norwalk, on the brief), for appellee (plaintiff).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

BROWN, Judge.

The plaintiff's cause of action, as submitted to the jury for determination, is one to recover salary accrued pursuant to his express agreement with the defendant, and also compensation for managerial or other services rendered, upon quantum meruit. In August, 1941, the defendant was incorporated for the purpose of developing and dealing in real estate, with Edward C. Sterling, Harold A. Karlsen and the plaintiff as the incorporators. On August 14, 1941, they were chosen directors and elected Karlsen president, Sterling treasurer, and the plaintiff secretary. These facts are admitted.

The complaint in substance makes these further allegations: The plaintiff prior to August 7, 1941, had been engaged in the real estate and insurance business in Norwalk; shortly after that date the management of the defendant corporation was turned over to him by agreement of the officers and directors; for the ensuing period of about nineteen months he devoted almost his full time thereto; the officers and directors, acting for the defendant, agreed that he was to be reasonably recompensed; subsequently the directors voted him a salary of $100 per month, but with the understanding that he was to receive as compensation reasonable amounts in addition to this salary; a total of $1825 as salary is due and unpaid; and, in addition to salary and commissions on the defendant's real estate sold, there is due to the plaintiff $3220 plus interest for services performed by him in the management of the defendant corporation. The plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved these allegations, which are denied by the defendant's answer.

Of the four special defenses contained in the answer, the first only, alleging $650 due to the defendant from the plaintiff as the unpaid balance on his ten shares of stock, is admitted. The second alleged that the directors passed a vote which fixed the officers' salaries, that of the plaintiff being put at $100 per month, and prescribed that they were not to be paid until all other outstanding and unpaid indebtedness of the corporation had been met or provided for, and also a vote that the salaries then accrued, including that of the plaintiff in the amount of $450, should be evidenced by notes payable according to this vote and bearing interest at 3 per cent per annum; and the pleading went on to state that the plaintiff, unknown to the defendant, falsely and in violation of his duty wrote the minutes of the meeting and prepared the notes without mention of the condition. The third set forth that the plaintiff, in violation of his duty to the defendant under his agreement to act as exclusive broker to sell its real estate and with intent to profit at its expense, informed other brokers of a rate of commission which would be allowed them for selling property of the defendant in cooperation with the plaintiff, this rate being lower than that voted by the directors, and thereby decreased the defendant's sales, to its damage. The fourth alleged various respects in which the plaintiff had failed to fulfill his duties and had violated his trust, to the defendant's damage. These special defenses were made counts respectively of the cross-complaint of the defendant, in which it claimed reformation of the minutes and notes referred to in the second special defense and $10,000 damages. The jury rendered a verdict of $2004.33 for the plaintiff and the defendant has appealed from the judgment.

Error is assigned in the court's refusal to charge and in the charge as given relative to the plaintiff's testimony concerning the value of his services. The defendant requested an instruction that the plaintiff's own testimony was the only evidence of the value of his services, and that, since he was not qualified to give such testimony, this afforded no basis upon which to compute the reasonable value of the services and the verdict must be for the defendant. The court told the jury that the plaintiff had testified that his services were worth $3220 and were comparable to those rendered by an estate trustee, who is usually allowed 2 per cent of the gross estate in his hands, but the court stated: ‘You are not bound by this estimate of value of his services. You should follow it only in so far as it seems reasonable to you.’ And the court added that the defendant's claim was that the services were worthless. It then continued: ‘And within those limits, that is, from nothing up to $3220, it is open to you to place whatever value on the services you believe to be the true value as it has been proved to you what the true value is.’

The defendant claims that the court erred, first, in refusing its requests, because the plaintiff's testimony was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the value of his services, and second, in the charge as given, because it failed to afford instructions adequate to a proper appraisal of the value of the services by the jury and, more particularly, permitted them to fix the amount, as stated...