Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Citation: 713 F. Supp. 1219
• Decision Date: 23 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88 C 9938.,88 C 9938.
• Parties: Jeffrey L. SOFFERIN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, D.J. Nelson and H.K. Tourtellot, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

713 F. Supp. 1219

Jeffrey L. SOFFERIN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, D.J. Nelson and H.K. Tourtellot, Defendants.

No. 88 C 9938.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

May 23, 1989.

Gregory A. Stayart, James A. Romanyak, Lawrence T. Miller, and Raymond E. Belstner, Romanyak & Miller, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Mark E. Furlane and Deborah J. Leonard, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

Margaret L. Paris, Cotsirilos, Crowley, Stephenson, Tighe & Streicker, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for Henry H. Fong.

ORDER

NORGLE, District Judge.

On November 23, 1988 plaintiff, Jeffrey L. Sofferin, filed this action against defendants, American Airlines, Inc. and two of American's employees, D.J. Nelson and H.K. Tourtellott, alleging that he was discriminated against because of his race, national origin or religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Sofferin is Jewish. Before the court is defendants' motion, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(b) for summary judgment or partial summary judgment on Count I on the grounds that plaintiff failed to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, as is required by § 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); that plaintiff seeks damages for humiliation, mental anguish and other consequential damages which are not recoverable under Title VII; and that defendants Nelson and Tourtellott are not proper defendants, because they were not named in the charge filed with the EEOC. Also before the court is plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Count I. For the following reasons, the court concludes that plaintiff did not timely file his charge with the EEOC and grants summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I. As a result, the court need not address defendants' other arguments.

DISCUSSION

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations of a claim without any significant probative evidence which supports his complaint. Id.; see First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, the nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id.

In addition to the requirements of Rule 56, the parties must comply with Local General Rule 12. The defendants have complied with Local General Rule 12 by submitting a separate, appropriately captioned, statement of material facts as to which they contend there is no genuine issue and upon which they allege entitlement to judgment. Specific references are made to the record to support their assertion as to each material fact. See Abrams v. City of Chicago, 635 F.Supp. 169, 171-72 (N.D.Ill.1986). Plaintiff, as is required by Local General Rule 12, has responded to the facts as stated by defendants, in substance admitting them. To the extent plaintiff disagrees, his disagreements are not material. Plaintiff has also stated additional facts, which are either immaterial, such as plaintiff's residence and American's knowledge thereof during certain time periods, or legal conclusions, such as which agency is proper for filing an employment discrimination charge.

The following are the undisputed material facts submitted by the parties, renumbered and edited to remove immaterial portions, redundant submissions, legal conclusions and minor points of contention.

1. Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Sofferin is an individual who is Jewish. (Complaint ¶ 1).

2. Defendant American Airlines, Inc. is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of Delaware, maintaining its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. American Airlines does business and maintains offices within the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. (Complaint, ¶ 2).

3. Defendants D.J. Nelson and H.K. Tourtellott are individuals who reside in New York and at all relevant times were employed by American Airlines as pilots and captains based in Chicago. (Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 5, and 6).

4. Plaintiff was hired by American Airlines on February 17, 1986, as a probationary pilot based in Chicago, Illinois. He was to be in this probationary status for one year. (Complaint ¶¶ 3, 14).

5. During plaintiff's probationary period he served first as a flight engineer and then as a co-pilot for American Airlines. (Complaint, ¶ 15).

6. On February 20, 1987, plaintiff's performance over the prior twelve months was reviewed by American Airlines to determine whether plaintiff had satisfactorily completed his probationary period. (Complaint, ¶ 27).

7. As part of this probationary review process, plaintiff was present at an oral review board held by American Airlines management personnel in Chicago, Illinois, on February 20, 1987. (Complaint, ¶ 28).

8. At that oral review board, plaintiff was advised by American Airlines management personnel that he had not successfully completed his probationary period and that he was being terminated. (Complaint, ¶ 29).

9. Plaintiff alleges that "Venue lies in this District because all of the unlawful employment practices were committed here". (Complaint, ¶ 8).

10. Count I seeks damages for a violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., based on his discharge which was proximately caused by alleged discrimination by defendants because of plaintiff's religion, race, national origin, which is Jewish. (Complaint, ¶¶ 33-36).

11. On December 16, 1987, plaintiff went to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") office in Detroit, Michigan and there prepared a charge of discrimination, No. XXXXXXXXX. (Complaint, ¶ 9; Sofferin Deposition Transcript, pp. 42-43, and Exhibit 8).

12. Plaintiff may have called the Detroit EEOC office by telephone on December 15, 1987, the day before, to ask them about the procedure. (Sofferin Dep. Tr. p. 43). But he had not previously been to the EEOC.

13. Plaintiff did not go to any Michigan employment discrimination agency with respect to the matters in the charge of discrimination or in the Complaint. (Sofferin Dep. Tr. p. 43).

14. Prior to December 16, 1987, plaintiff consulted an attorney. Plaintiff described his case to that attorney, who then advised him to go to the EEOC and to file a charge of discrimination. (Sofferin Dep. Tr. p. 47). Plaintiff advised the EEOC he had been referred there by an attorney. (Exhibit 8 to Sofferin Dep.).

15. The attorney was aware that plaintiff was based in Chicago, that his employment was terminated in Chicago (Sofferin Dep. Tr. pp. 48-49), and that plaintiff was a resident of Michigan during his employment. (Affidavit of Jeffrey Sofferin).

16. Being "based in Chicago" meant that plaintiff was listed in the Chicago roster of American Airlines, and that he was assigned flights that originate and depart in Chicago. Plaintiff could live anywhere he wanted. (Sofferin Dep. Tr. p. 49).

17. On December 16, 1987, plaintiff was advised by the intake person at the Detroit EEOC office that his charge would have to be referred to the Chicago EEOC office for processing. (Sofferin Dep. Tr. pp. 48-49).

18. Plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimination with any state agency. (Sofferin Dep. Tr. p. 48).

19. The Chicago office of the EEOC has a work-sharing agreement ("WSA") with the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR"). Under the WSA, the agency by which the charge of discrimination was initially received would process the charge. (Affidavit of Mitchell Edison).

20. In the case of charges received pursuant to Title VII, under the WSA the EEOC forwards a copy of the charge to the IDHR together with a transmittal form, EEOC form 212-A. (Affidavit of Mitchell Edison).

21. Upon receipt of that transmittal form and the charge of discrimination, the authorized IDHR official acknowledges receipt of the charge and indicates the IDHR's intention to dismiss, close, or not docket the charge per the WSA. (Affidavit of Mitchell Edison).

22. A true and correct copy of the EEOC form 212-A used in plaintiff's case is attached as an exhibit to Mr. Edison's affidavit. (Affidavit of Mitchell Edison).

23. The charge referred only to plaintiff's religion as a basis for discrimination. Nothing in plaintiff's charge of discrimination referred to the individual defendants. (Exhibit 11 to Sofferin Dep.).

24. The transmittal form (EEOC Form 212-A) and plaintiff's charge No. XXXXXXXXX were forwarded to the IDHR by the EEOC, received by the IDHR, and returned to the EEOC by the IDHR, all on the same day, December 24, 1987. (Affidavit of Mitchell Edison).

25. Plaintiff's charge of discrimination was received by the Detroit office of the EEOC on the 298th day after his notice of discharge from American Airlines. (1987 Calendar).

26. Plaintiff's charge of discrimination was not deferred to the IDHR until the 307th day after plaintiff received notice of his discharge from American Airlines. (1987 Calendar).

27. Plaintiff sta

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