Sofia v. Dodson
| Decision Date | 16 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 97854,SC 97854 |
| Citation | 601 S.W.3d 205 |
| Parties | Londa L. SOFIA, et al., Appellants, v. Robert W. DODSON, M.D., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
The decedent's daughters were represented by Patrick M. Martucci and Joshua G. Decker of Johnson, Vorhees & Martucci in Joplin, (417) 206-0100.
The hospital was represented by Timothy M. Aylward and Nicholas R. Snow of Horn, Aylward & Bandy LLC in Kansas City, (816) 421-0700.
Dodson and the clinic were represented by Brian Malkmus and Jared Robertson of Malkmus Law Firm LLC in Springfield, (417) 447-5000.
The plaintiffs in this wrongful death action appeal the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital Joplin due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. They concede the statute of limitations had run prior to filing their current claim against Mercy Hospital but nonetheless argue they were entitled to the benefit of the one-year savings statute that applies to nonsuits because they had taken a nonsuit against Mercy Hospital less than one year before filing their present petition.
The circuit court properly dismissed Mercy Hospital. A nonsuit is the termination of a particular suit or cause of action. The plaintiffs did not suffer a nonsuit against Mercy Hospital. Rather, with the court's permission, they substituted Mercy Clinic Joplin, LLC, in place of Mercy Hospital under Rule 55.33(c). They did so – and the circuit court allowed them to do so even though the limitations period already had expired – because they erroneously had identified Mercy Hospital as the defendant doctor's employer and just had discovered Mercy Clinic was the doctor's actual employer. The substitution of Mercy Clinic in place of Mercy Hospital, however, did not terminate the particular suit or cause of action. Indeed, the action continued against Mercy Clinic; the plaintiffs’ first amended petition was substantively identical to their original petition but for the substitution.
The plaintiffs chose substitution under Rule 55.33(c) because they were not permitted to add party defendants once the limitations period expired. They cannot get around that limitation now by seeking to add Mercy Hospital to the suit in a second amended petition. The circuit court's judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital is affirmed.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Gladys Walker died April 10, 2011, four days after undergoing a gallbladder removal surgery performed by Dr. Robert W. Dodson at Mercy Hospital. Londa L. Sofia, Gayla Woodcock, and Robin Frazier ("the plaintiffs") are Ms. Walker's daughters. On March 1, 2013, the plaintiffs timely filed their wrongful death action under section 537.080.1(1),1 naming only Mercy Hospital and Dr. Dodson as defendants. The original petition incorrectly stated Dr. Dodson was the agent and employee of Mercy Hospital.
Close to two years after the three-year statute of limitations expired on April 10, 2014,2 the plaintiffs realized through review of discovery responses that Mercy Clinic , not Mercy Hospital , employed Dr. Dodson and, in July 2016, filed a motion for leave to amend their petition under Rule 55.33(c) to substitute Mercy Clinic "in place and instead of" Mercy Hospital. Plaintiffs stated that, "but for the mistaken name of the Mercy entity that employed Defendant Dodson, the action would have been brought against Mercy Clinic" and, further, that "[t]he purpose of amending the petition is to substitute the correct name of the Mercy entity employing Defendant Dodson so that substantial justice can be done."
The circuit court sustained the plaintiffs’ motion, and the amended petition naming Mercy Clinic and Dr. Dodson was filed on July 11, 2014. As the motion for substitution had stated would be the case, the amended petition simply substituted the name of Mercy Clinic for the name of Mercy Hospital but was otherwise substantively identical to the original petition. Despite having substituted Mercy Clinic for Mercy Hospital so that Mercy Hospital was replaced and no longer in the case, three days later, plaintiffs filed a motion purporting to dismiss their cause of action against Mercy Hospital voluntarily, without prejudice. Mercy Hospital, of course, by then was no longer in the case, a new petition already having been filed substituting Mercy Clinic in its place.
Two months later, in September 2016, Mercy Clinic filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the action against it was time-barred because it was filed after the three-year limitations period expired. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, noting Mercy Clinic simply had been substituted for Mercy Hospital under Rule 55.33(c) due to a mistake in the identity of Dr. Dodson's employer; therefore, the action was not time-barred because an amendment substituting a party defendant will relate back under Rule 55.33(c) :
It is clear from the allegations of Paragraphs 26 and 28 of the original Petition that Plaintiffs intended to bring an action against Dr. Dodson's employer, and but for the mistaken belief that the correct Mercy entity that employed Dr. Dodson was Mercy Hospital [ ], would have brought the action against Mercy Clinic.
The plaintiffs further stated, "There is no prejudice to Mercy Clinic [ ] in that Dr. Dodson, the employee who is alleged to have bene [sic] negligent, has been represented at all stages of this case and his interests in defending the action are aligned with Mercy Clinic." The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, and the case proceeded against Mercy Clinic and Dr. Dodson.
In November 2016, four months after they were permitted to substitute Mercy Clinic for Mercy Hospital, the plaintiffs sought leave for a second time to amend their petition under Rule 55.33(c). This time, however, they did not seek to substitute a party based on a mistake in identity; rather, they moved "for leave to amend their Amended Petition in Damages pursuant to Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55.33(c), and add party Defendant Mercy Hospital." The plaintiffs thereby sought to add Mercy Hospital even though they previously had replaced it with Mercy Clinic based on their mistake regarding "the correct Mercy entity that employed Dr. Dodson."
The circuit court allowed the untimely addition of Mercy Hospital, and the second amended petition naming as defendants Dr. Dodson, Mercy Clinic, and Mercy Hospital was filed in January 2017. Mercy Hospital subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing the action against it was time-barred because it was added to the suit long after the statute of limitations had expired. The circuit court agreed and entered judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital. It certified the judgment as final under Rule 74.01(b), expressly finding no just reason for delay.3 The plaintiffs appealed. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10 .
This Court's review of summary judgment is essentially de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) . "[T]he Court will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered ... and accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record." Id. (internal citation omitted). The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are the same as those the circuit court employs to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. Id. Summary judgment is proper when "the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law." Id. ; Rule 74.04.
"Statutory interpretation is an issue of law this Court reviews de novo." State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 2017) . Likewise, when the relevant facts are not in dispute, whether a statute of limitations applies to bar an action is an issue of law this Court reviews de novo. Powel v. Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Mo. banc 2006) .
Whether the plaintiffs’ wrongful death suit is time-barred is governed by section 537.100. That section establishes a three-year statute of limitations and additionally provides, in relevant part, that if a wrongful death action:
shall have been commenced within the time prescribed in this section, and the plaintiff therein take or suffer a nonsuit ... such plaintiff may commence a new action from time to time within one year after such nonsuit suffered[.]
It is well-settled that McMillan v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 515 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (emphasis omitted). It permits a plaintiff "to commence a new wrongful death action within one year after a nonsuit." State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar, 543 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. banc 2018) .
The single issue before the Court on appeal is whether the plaintiffs took a nonsuit, entitling them to the benefit of the one-year savings provision. They agree that, four months prior to their November 2016 attempt to add Mercy Hospital as a party, they filed a motion to substitute Mercy Clinic in place of Mercy Hospital as a defendant pursuant to Rule 55.33(c). That rule provides:
Relation Back of Amendments . Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party and serving...
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