Soglin v. Kauffman

• Decision Date: 13 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 67-C-141.,67-C-141.
• Citation: 295 F. Supp. 978
• Parties: Paul R. SOGLIN, Henry W. Haslach, David L. Goldman, William T. Kaplan, Richard J. Scheidenhelm, Robert Swacker, James McFadden, Daniel Bernstein, Robert S. Cohen, William G. Simons, Students for a Democratic Society (Madison Chapter), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph F. KAUFFMAN, individually and as Dean of Student Affairs at the University of Wisconsin (Madison Campus); Ralph Hanson, individually and as Chief of the University of Wisconsin (Madison Campus) Department of Protection and Security, and as a representative of a class known as police officers of the University of Wisconsin; the Regents of the University of Wisconsin; Wilbur Emery, individually and as Chief of Police of the City of Madison, Wisconsin, and as a representative of a class known as police officers of the City of Madison; James Boll, individually and as District Attorney of Dane County, Wisconsin; Bronson C. La Follette, individually and as Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin; their Agents, Assistants, Successors, Employees, Attorneys and all those acting in concert with them or at their direction, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

295 F. Supp. 978

Paul R. SOGLIN, Henry W. Haslach, David L. Goldman, William T. Kaplan, Richard J. Scheidenhelm, Robert Swacker, James McFadden, Daniel Bernstein, Robert S. Cohen, William G. Simons, Students for a Democratic Society (Madison Chapter), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph F. KAUFFMAN, individually and as Dean of Student Affairs at the University of Wisconsin (Madison Campus); Ralph Hanson, individually and as Chief of the University of Wisconsin (Madison Campus) Department of Protection and Security, and as a representative of a class known as police officers of the University of Wisconsin; the Regents of the University of Wisconsin; Wilbur Emery, individually and as Chief of Police of the City of Madison, Wisconsin, and as a representative of a class known as police officers of the City of Madison; James Boll, individually and as District Attorney of Dane County, Wisconsin; Bronson C. La Follette, individually and as Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin; their Agents, Assistants, Successors, Employees, Attorneys and all those acting in concert with them or at their direction, Defendants.

No. 67-C-141.

United States District Court W. D. Wisconsin.

December 13, 1968.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Percy L. Julian, Jr., Michael A. Reiter, Madison, Wis., William M. Kunstler, Arthur Kinoy, New York City, Dennis Roberts, Harriet Van Tassel, Morton Stavis, Newark, N. J., for plaintiffs.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen. of Wis., Arlen C. Christenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Lockyear, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants, Kauffman, Hanson, and Board of Regents.

John P. Koberstein, Madison, Wis., for defendant, Boll.

William A. Jansen, Asst. City Atty., Madison, Wis., for defendant, Emery.

JAMES E. DOYLE, District Judge.

This opinion deals with that branch of this action in which plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Chapter 11.02 of the Laws and Regulations of the University of Wisconsin, and with respect to disciplinary proceedings based upon alleged "misconduct" rather than upon alleged violations of any express regulation or statute.

Plaintiffs are alleged to be ten students at the Madison campus of the University of Wisconsin, and an unincorporated association known as Students for a Democratic Society (Madison chapter). They undertake to sue on behalf of others similarly situated, as well as for themselves. Several of the defendants are alleged to be officials of the University of Wisconsin, having duties with respect to discipline.

The complaint alleges that on October 18, 1967, plaintiffs and members of their classes engaged in a demonstration on the Madison campus. The ensuing events, pertinent to this opinion, as alleged in the complaint were as follows:

By letter dated October 19, 1967, certain of the plaintiffs were advised by the defendant Dean Kauffman that their conduct on October 18 had violated Chapter 11.02 of the Laws and Regulations of the University, which was quoted in full; that they were being charged with disrupting the operations of the University; and that they were suspended from the University pending a hearing before the Administrative Division of the Committee on Student Conduct and Appeals.

By letter dated October 21, 1967, certain of the plaintiffs were advised by the chairman of the said Administrative Division that they were authorized to attend classes and write examinations pending the disciplinary proceedings; and that

"* * * it is charged that by committing the following acts you have disrupted the operation of the University in violation of Chapter 11.02:

"failing to leave the Commerce Building after being ordered to do so by University of Wisconsin Police Chief Ralph Hanson, who had previously declared an unlawful assembly. Your action thereby disrupted the operations of the Commerce School."

On or about November 1, 1967, certain of the plaintiffs, and others, received a copy of a document described as "Amended Charges" and signed by the chairman of the Administrative Division. The amended charges were that the named students:

"I. Intentionally, denied to others their right to interview for jobs with the Dow Chemical Corporation and to carry out that purpose did:

"a. Intentionally, physically obstruct and block the hall and doorways of the first floor of the Commerce Building;

"b. Intentionally deny to persons who desired to interview with Dow Chemical Corporation their right to do so;

"c. Intentionally deny to others their right of ingress and egress through the hallway;

"d. Intentionally deny to other University students and other members of the University community their right to attend and conduct classes;

"e. Intentionally deny to other University students and other members of the University community their right to carry on University operations in offices of the Commerce Building.

"II. Intentionally incited and counselled others to deny to others their right to interview for jobs with the Dow Chemical Corporation and to carry out that purpose did intentionally incite and counsel others to:

"a. Physically obstruct and block the hall and doorways of the first floor of the Commerce Building;

"b. Intentionally deny persons who desired to interview with Dow Chemical Corporation their right to do so "c. Intentionally deny to others their right of ingress and egress through the hallway;

"d. Intentionally deny to other University students and other members of the University community their right to attend and conduct classes;

"e. Intentionally deny to other University students and other members of the University community their right to carry on University operations in Administrative offices of the Commerce Building.

"III. Intentionally refused repeated requests to move and to unblock the hall and doorways of the first floor of the Commerce Building for the purpose of denying to others their right to interview for jobs with the Dow Chemical Corporation with the result that:

"a. Other University students were denied their right to interview with Dow Chemical Corporation;

"b. Other University students and members of the University community were denied their right to ingress and egress through the hallway;

"c. Other University students and members of the University community were denied their right to attend and conduct classes;

"d. Other University students and members of the University community were denied their right to carry on University operations in the offices of the Commerce Building.

"All of the foregoing constituting:

"1. Misconduct, as well as

"2. A violation of Chapter 11.02, and 11.15 of the University Policies on Use of Facilities and Outside Speakers."¹

The complaint alleges that the defendants, or some of them, have in fact expelled two of the plaintiffs and "another member of plaintiffs' classes * * * by application of the doctrine of `misconduct', and are threatening suspension, expulsion or other denial of matriculation * * * to other members of plaintiffs' classes for alleged violation of the doctrine of `misconduct' and by reason of the application of the doctrine of `misconduct'".²

So far as the present action is concerned, then, the defendants assert authority to discipline students: (1) for "misconduct"; and (2) for violations of Chapter 11.02 of the Laws and Regulations of the University, which provides:

"Scope of Student Freedom. Students have the right, accorded to all persons by the Constitution, to freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, petition and association. Students and student organizations may examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, and express opinions publicly as well as privately. They may support causes by lawful means which do not disrupt the operations of the University, or organizations accorded the use of University facilities."³

Plaintiffs contend that the term "misconduct", as a standard for disciplinary action by the University, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States because of its vagueness and overbreadth. Plaintiffs also contend that Chapter 11.02 as written violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because of its vagueness and overbreadth. Pursuant to pretrial order, defendants have filed a partial answer to these two contentions, each of which has been denied. With respect to these two contentions, the relief sought is a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief consistent with the declaration. This opinion and the order entered pursuant to it reach only these two contentions and the relief sought with respect to them.⁴

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of the action with respect to the term "misconduct" as a standard for discipline and with respect to Chapter 11.02, is claimed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (3) and 1343(4), among other statutes. Jurisdiction is present. The complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants, or some of them, under color of a regulation or custom or usage of the State of Wisconsin, have subjected and threaten to subject the plaintiffs to the deprivation of rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution of the United States. Defendants have contended that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies made available to them by the state. Such exhaustion is not required as a condition to the exercise of jurisdiction in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967).

"Misconduct" as a Standard

The amended charges of November 1, 1967, set forth in full above, allege rather specific behavior on the part of the named students and conclude with the following:

"All of the foregoing constituting:

"1. Misconduct, as well as

"2. A violation of Chapter 11.02. * * *"

If the term "misconduct", without more, may serve as a standard for disciplinary...