Soil v. Superior Court, B109267
Citation | 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 319,55 Cal.App.4th 872 |
Decision Date | 10 June 1997 |
Docket Number | No. B109267,B109267 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4426, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7317 Donald Roosevelt SOIL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. |
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Albert J. Menaster, James R. Bendat and Mark G. Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Gil Garcetti, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, and George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner, Donald Roosevelt Soil, seeks a writ of mandate directing the superior court to set aside its order denying his motion to transfer his second motion to suppress evidence to the same judge who granted his first suppression motion.
Petitioner was the defendant in a felony criminal case. He was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of a controlled substance in a jail, and with having multiple prior convictions.
Petitioner was arraigned in superior court. About a month later, he filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. 1 Later, the matter was transferred for hearing before Judge Judith Abrams. Judge Abrams granted petitioner's suppression motion. The People announced they could not proceed, and the case was dismissed.
The People refiled the case. Although the second complaint contained a second count of possession of cocaine, the case is identical to the first case. Petitioner was held to answer at a preliminary hearing, and an information was filed in superior court. Petitioner once again filed a motion to suppress evidence, and the matter was before respondent calendar court (the municipal court sitting as the superior court) for assignment to another superior court department for hearing. Relying on section 1538.5, subdivisions (j) and (p), petitioner asked that the matter be transferred so that the suppression motion could be heard by Judge Abrams, the judge who heard and granted the first suppression motion.
The People took the position that the ruling by Judge Abrams suppressing the evidence was wrong, and requested that the matter be assigned to "any other magistrate [sic, court] in the county." 2 The People argued that since this was to be the second hearing, section 1538.5, subdivision (p) did not require that Judge Abrams hear the motion, and that it would be inappropriate and illogical to assign the case to her. The motion to transfer the case to Judge Abrams was denied, and this petition for writ of mandate followed.
Petitioner contends that the denial of his motion to transfer the second suppression motion to Judge Abrams, the judge who granted the first suppression motion, was error since it was the intent of the Legislature, in amending section 1538.5 that the act not be used by a party as a means to forum shop.
The People contend that the plain language of section 1538.5, subdivisions (j) and (p) does not require relitigation of a second suppression motion before the same judge who heard the first motion, and legislative history does not reveal an intent that the same judge hear all suppression motions. 3
Statutory interpretation requires a three-step process. First, a court should examine the actual language of the statute, giving the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday meaning. (Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298.) If the meaning is without ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty, then the language controls, and there is nothing to "interpret" or "construe." (Id. at p. 1239, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298.) It is only when the meaning of the words is not clear that courts are required to take a second step and refer to the legislative history. (Ibid.) The final step--which is required to be taken only when the first two steps have failed to reveal clear meaning--is to apply reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand. If possible, the words should be interpreted to make them workable and reasonable, in accord with common sense and justice, and to avoid an absurd result. (Ibid.)
Under section 1538.5, a defendant has a number of opportunities to move to suppress evidence. In felony cases initiated by complaints, the motion may be made in the municipal court at the preliminary hearing, or in the superior court upon the filing of the information. (§ 1538.5, subd. (f).)
Prior to 1993, prosecutors were limited in their ability to relitigate suppression issues. If a motion to suppress was made and granted at the preliminary hearing and the case was dismissed by the magistrate or by the prosecution on its own motion, the prosecution was allowed to refile the case and start all over again. The ruling at the first motion to suppress was not binding on the refiled case. If the motion to suppress was granted at the preliminary hearing, but the defendant was nevertheless held to answer for trial, the prosecution was allowed to relitigate the suppression motion de novo at a special hearing in the superior court. Again, the ruling at the first motion to suppress was not binding at the subsequent hearing. If the motion to suppress was not made by the defendant at the preliminary hearing, but was made for the first time in the superior court, and was granted, the remedies available to the prosecution were as follows: (1) if the prosecution had additional evidence not presented at the motion to suppress and could show good cause why such evidence was not presented, the prosecution was allowed to present that evidence and seek to have the prior ruling overturned; and (2) the prosecution could seek appellate review. The prosecution could not, however, simply refile and relitigate the motion to suppress of a case dismissed as a result of an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress in the superior court. (Schlick v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 310, 316, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 841 P.2d 926 (Schlick ).) The ruling on the motion to suppress in the superior court would be binding on the refiled case. (Ibid.)
In 1993, the Legislature moved to correct the anomaly in the law caused by the Schlick decision by amending section 1538.5 to authorize the prosecution to have two opportunities to show that a challenged search was legal regardless of whether the challenge to the search is first brought in the municipal court or the superior court.
Section 1538.5, subdivision (j) now provides that (Emphasis added.)
Section 1538.5, subdivision (p) provides:
What is at issue here is the meaning and intent of the last sentence of subdivision (p).
The People contend that the trial court correctly interpreted the last sentence in section 1538.5, subdivision (p) as allowing the second suppression motion to be heard by a judge other than the one who heard the first motion. The People note that "[t]he first sentence of subdivision (p) provides for a third hearing only if new evidence justifies it," and conclude that "[t]he next sentence, which provides for 'relitigation' to be heard by the same judge who heard the 'first' motion, because of its location, modifies the first sentence, i.e., applies only to the third hearing."
Petitioner urges us to ignore the placement of the final sentence of section 1538.5, subdivision (p), and to focus, instead, upon the word "relitigation," construing it to mean that relitigation of a second motion (or third motion should one become necessary) is to be heard by the same judge who heard the first motion, if that judge is available.
Although the location of the language suggests the construction urged by the People, we are mindful of the interrelationship between section 1538.5, subdivisions (j) and (p), and of the fact that the statute provides for "relitigation" under a number of different circumstances. We conclude, therefore, that the language is not as plain as the People contend, and that we are thus required to review the legislative history of the statute as well as the historical circumstances of its enactment in order to determine the intent of the Legislature. (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, ...
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