Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Company, Civ. A. No. 12064.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 12064.
• Citation: 302 F. Supp. 119
• Parties: Nettie Lee Fontenot SOILEAU, Ind. and as Natural Tutrix of minors Donald Ray, James Randall, Romona Cynthia Marie, Patrick and Charles Soileau v. NICKLOS DRILLING COMPANY et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

302 F. Supp. 119

Nettie Lee Fontenot SOILEAU, Ind. and as Natural Tutrix of minors Donald Ray, James Randall, Romona Cynthia Marie, Patrick and Charles Soileau v. NICKLOS DRILLING COMPANY et al.

Civ. A. No. 12064.

United States District Court W. D. Louisiana, Opelousas Division.

March 28, 1969.

DeVillier & Ardoin, J. Winston Ardoin, and Jacque B. Pucheu, Eunice, La., for plaintiffs.

Adams & Reese, Sam A. LeBlanc III, New Orleans, La., for Nicklos Drilling Co. and Union Oil Co., cross-claimant.

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Boris F. Navratil, Baton Rouge, La., for Unit Crane & Shovel Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PUTNAM, District Judge.

On January 17, 1966, Lanson Soileau, husband and father of the petitioners, was killed when a crane manufactured by Unit Crane and Shovel Company (Unit), mounted on a pedestal on a fixed oil well drilling platform, toppled from its base and fell into the Gulf of Mexico. The platform was located on the outer continental shelf, off the Louisiana coast.

Plaintiffs sued Union Oil Company of California (Union), owner and operator of the platform, Nicklos Drilling Company (Nicklos), Boehck Engineering Company, Inc., distributor and Nicklos' immediate vendor, and Unit. The suit against Nicklos (Under the Jones Act) was dismissed when it was determined that Soileau was employed by that defendant, and that plaintiffs' original belief that the structure in question was a submersible drilling barge was erroneous. Boehck Engineering Company, Inc. was also dismissed by agreement of the parties.

Trial proceeded under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 et seq., and Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which is the wrongful death statute of this State.

Nicklos cross-claimed in maritime tort against Unit for the value of the crane and certain drilling supplies, lost when the crane fell into the gulf. Union cross-claimed against Nicklos under an indemnity provision of its drilling contract, as well as against defendant Unit. Nicklos assumed Union's defense, and the litigation finally resolved itself into a suit between Mrs. Soileau and her six minor children and Nicklos, on the one hand, and Unit on the other.

Prior to the trial the Soileau claims under Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code were dismissed, following the decisions in Dore v. Link Belt Company, 391 F.2d 671 (5 Cir. 1968), and Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 F.2d 216 (5 Cir. 1968). Since writs were issued by the Supreme Court in these cases, 393 U.S. 932, 89 S.Ct. 295, 21 L.Ed.2d 268 (1968), the court reinstated these demands to avoid the necessity of an additional trial in the event they are overruled. We have, accordingly, made separate determinations of plaintiffs' damages for loss of love and affection under Article 2315, in addition to pecuniary losses under the Death on the High Seas Act.

The evidence preponderates to the effect that at the time of the accident Soileau was unloading heavy crates of drilling supplies from the M/V Florida, a supply vessel alongisde the platform. He was using a No. 1525-U crane manufactured by Unit, with a sixty-three-foot boom. It was put into service in April, 1964. During its working life on the platform it was regularly maintained by the crane operators and other Nicklos personnel. It was manufactured and sold for use in the offshore oil industry. There is no evidence in the record showing that it was not satisfactory for this work, except for the accident in question.

Soileau had gone on duty only fifteen or twenty minutes before the tragedy occurred. He was an experienced crane operator, familiar with this crane, having been so employed for approximately fifteen months. The cargo he attempted to lift was a rack of one-inch "spaghetti" pipe, of a stipulated weight of 20591 pounds.

The deckhand (Valentine) who attached the load on the supply boat to the hook did not have a clear recollection of events that morning. He testified that the boom angle was "between one and two o'clock" when the crane fell. Another deckhand (Ortego) said the boom was "almost straight up". The lift was smooth, and the pipe was approximately 70 feet in the air at the time. The Florida had pulled away and was forty feet off the platform. The crane hit the water approximately twenty feet from the boat. Another witness, K. C. Simmons, was on the platform handling a tag line attached to the rack of pipe to prevent it from twisting. He does not know the angle of the boom or the position of the boat when the lift was made, but he stated he was leaning over the platform railing from four to six feet from the crane pedestal, and the load was directly below him when the failure occurred.

Earlier that morning the Florida had been tied up to the platform port side to, using the port stern line. During the operation this line parted. The line fouled the port screw and thereafter the skipper maneuvered the ship into position by using the starboard engine and circling the platform. The deceased lowered the block and cable to a point some 30 to 35 feet above the water. When the vessel was in position the boom cable was brought down, the load secured, then taken up. The captain's testimony is not clear as to the angle of the crane boom when the accident occurred. He stated that the port side of the vessel was from 6 to 8 feet off the legs of the platform, and that the pipe rack was to be lifted from the port side of the after deck. By proceeding forward on the starboard engine the bow of the vessel would have a tendency to swing to port, into the platform. By backing down to check her and hold her in position, even using the rudders, there would be a tendency to swing the bow to starboard away from the platform, and the stern in. Reference to the photograph of the platform marked "Unit 2" shows that the crane pedestal actually extends over the water and out from the edge of the platform several feet.

From the foregoing and other evidence in the record, we conclude that the lift was made from a distance of not more than fifteen feet from the center line of rotation of the crane, with a boom angle of approximately 82-½°. (See Exhibit P-9) The rated lifting capacity of this crane with the load fifteen feet from the center line of rotation is 31,450 pounds, with a safety factor of 15%. Even at twenty feet with a boom angle of approximately 74°, the rated capacity is 20,050 pounds, and with the 15% safety factor it is 23,057 pounds. The testimony of the deckhand Ortego, who saw the lift made after the hook was secured to the rack of pipe, is the most reliable and convinces us that the boom was, in fact, "almost straight up" when the accident occurred. According to exhibit P-9 when the boom is straight up (at 85°, or 5° off vertical) the hook will hang ten feet from the center line of rotation. With the skin of the ship six to eight feet from the platform (actually beneath the crane pedestal) considering that she had a 32-foot beam and the cargo being lifted was on her inboard side, the load distance could not have been greatly in excess of fifteen feet. The weight of the load then, was well within the crane's rated capacity.

Placing the cart before the horse, we must reject Unit's contention that its machine was subjected to a gross overload at time of failure, and with it the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.

The crane was recovered from the bottom of the Gulf. It was apparent that the right rear hook roller link had broken, causing it to topple over into the water. There was considerable expert testimony as to why this link failed, which we will not discuss in detail. It was manufactured of grade 87-C steel, cast by Crucible Steel Corporation to specifications of Unit, and according to literature from this foundry it should have had a minimum yield point of 91,000 pounds, p.s.i., and a tensile strength of 120,000 pounds p.s.i. It was a critical part of the crane assembly. Due to an imperfect casting and poor welding at the foundry, the strength of the link in question was greatly reduced. As a result of the foundry welding processes, cracks in the cast link were not fully repaired and actually aggravated the imperfect condition of the link. The evidence further preponderates to the effect that Crucible Steel used an acetylene or gas welding process, made an incomplete weld, and did not properly heat treat the metal after welding, resulting in increased brittleness and less ductility. Stresses in the metal were concentrated at those points where the cracks were not fully repaired. The fracture was a brittle fracture, propagating almost instantaneously. As we observed at the conclusion of the trial, the court is unable to pinpoint any one circumstance or combination of circumstances, that existed on the day in question that immediately caused the failure, but fail it did, because of these defects. There is not, in our opinion, sufficient evidence from which we can reasonably conclude that the design of the link or of the hook roller assembly was defective or improper. The imperfect casting was the sole defect.

In this connection, the advertising brochure of Crucible Steel, Exhibit P-22, is replete with representations of the high quality of its steel castings, and the radiography, X-ray, and magnetic particle inspection techniques exercised by it to detect defects and maintain quality control. It is emphasized that: "Attention is specifically given to high-quality castings which require special heat treatment and redesign work." These hook roller link assemblies were critical parts in the Unit Crane for which they were intended. The question of Unit's negligence is admittedly a close one. Unit exercised practically no quality control over these castings, relying upon Crucible Steel in this respect. There is no showing in the record that Unit's reliance upon its supplier was contrary to good industrial practices, or that it had any reason to believe that the castings...