Solanki v. Ervin

Decision Date27 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 2008-CA-01083-SCT.,2008-CA-01083-SCT.
Citation21 So.3d 552
PartiesSidharth SOLANKI, Individually, and as Wrongful Death Beneficiary; Devesha S. Solanki and Avani S. Solanki, Minors by and through their Father and Natural Guardian, Sidharth Solanki, and Neha Solanki, Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Nilima Solanki, Deceased, and all other Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Nilima Solanki, Deceased v. Melvin Tyrone ERVIN and the Merchants Company.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Don H. Evans, Harry Merritt McCumber, Christie Evans Ogden, Jackson, attorneys for appellants.

Roy H. Liddell, Ridgeland, Joseph Spencer Young, Jr., attorneys for appellees.

Before GRAVES, P.J., RANDOLPH and PIERCE, JJ.

GRAVES, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. This case arises out of a two-vehicle accident that took place on Interstate 220 in Hinds County, Mississippi, on March 29, 2007. As a result of the accident, one of the drivers died. Her husband and wrongful-death beneficiaries filed suit against the other driver and his employer, alleging negligence. After a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

FACTS

¶ 2. On March 29, 2007, Nilima Solanki was driving southwest1 on I-220 in Hinds County, Mississippi, when her car, a Toyota Camry, broke down. It is not known exactly what happened to the car, but, ultimately, it stopped in the left lane of I-220, near the yellow line. The portion of I-220 in question did not have a shoulder lane on the left side, although there is a grassy median between the westbound lanes and eastbound lanes of the highway. Melvin Tyrone Ervin (Ervin) was also driving southwest on I-220 on March 29, 2007. He was driving an eighteen-wheeler tractor-trailer to deliver groceries for his employer, The Merchants Company (Merchants). Although Ervin was initially driving in the right lane of I-220, at some point, he moved into the left lane.

¶ 3. The facts regarding the exact chain of events leading up to the collision between Ervin's truck and Nilima Solanki's car are unclear and are disputed by the parties. It is undisputed, however, that Ervin's truck collided with Nilima Solanki's car on March 29, 2007. After the accident, Nilima Solanki's car came to a rest in the right lane of I-220. Ervin's tractor-trailer slid down the highway on its side before coming to rest predominantly in the left lane of the highway. As a result of the accident, Nilima Solanki suffered brain trauma and died in the hospital nine days later. Additional facts will be provided in the analysis below.

¶ 4. On April 10, 2007, Nilima Solanki's husband, Sidharth Solanki (Solanki), and Nilima Solanki's oldest daughter, Neha Solanki2 (together, the Solankis), filed a complaint in Hinds County Circuit Court against Ervin, Merchants, ten John Doe Person(s), and ten John Doe Entity(ies). The Solankis alleged negligence and sought compensatory and punitive damages. On May 8, 2007, Merchants filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim. On the same day, Ervin filed an answer and affirmative defenses. On May 24, 2007, the Solankis filed an answer and defenses to Merchants' counterclaim.

¶ 5. On January 15, 2008, Merchants and Ervin (together, the Defendants) filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing for judgment as a matter of law with regard to the Solankis' claim for punitive damages. On January 24, 2008, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the Solankis' claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. On the same day, Defendants also filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding the Solankis' negligence-per-se claim. On January 29, 2008, the Solankis responded to Merchants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to punitive damages. On February 11, 2008, the Solankis responded to the two remaining partial summary judgment motions. After a hearing on February 15, 2008, the trial court granted partial summary judgment as to the Solankis' claims for punitive damages and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but denied partial summary judgment as to their negligence-per-se claim.

¶ 6. On April 8, 2008, the matter proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The verdict of the jury stated: "We, the jury, find for the Defendants, The Merchants Company and Melvin Tyrone Ervin." Accordingly, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants on April 11, 2008. On April 21, 2008, the Solankis timely filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. Defendants filed a response on April 30, 2008. On May 2, 2008, the trial court denied the Solankis' motion. On May 30, 2008, the Solankis timely appealed to this Court.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7. The Solankis raise three issues on appeal, which have been restated and reordered in the analysis below.

I. Whether the Trial Court Properly Denied the Solankis' Motion for Directed Verdict and their Request for a Peremptory Instruction.

¶ 8. This Court reviews a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for directed verdict de novo. See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook, 992 So.2d 612, 616 (Miss.2008); Pace v. Fin. Sec. Life, 608 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Miss.1992). A motion for directed verdict tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. Bankston v. Pass Rd. Tire Ctr., Inc., 611 So.2d 998, 1003 (Miss.1992). This Court has stated that

[i]n deciding whether a directed verdict ... should be granted, the trial judge is to look solely to the testimony on behalf of the party against whom a directed verdict is requested. He will take such testimony as true along with all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from that testimony which is favorable to that party, and, if it could support a verdict for that party, the directed verdict should not be given. If reasonable minds might differ as to this question, it becomes a jury issue.

White v. Thomason, 310 So.2d 914, 916-17 (Miss.1975) (citing Williams v. Weeks, 268 So.2d 340 (Miss.1972); Jones v. Phillips, 263 So.2d 759 (Miss.1972)). This Court has also held that "[i]n considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences, the court must determine whether the evidence is so overwhelmingly against [the nonmovant] that no reasonable juror could have found in her favor." Fox v. Smith, 594 So.2d 596, 603 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted). "[T]his Court considers `whether the evidence, as applied to the elements of a party's case, is either so indisputable, or so deficient, that the necessity of a trier of fact has been obviated.'" Spotlite Skating Rink, Inc. v. Barnes, 988 So.2d 364, 368 (Miss.2008) (quoting White v. Stewman, 932 So.2d 27, 32 (Miss.2006)). Accordingly, "[a] directed verdict pursuant to M.R.C.P. 50(a) is not an appropriate means for the disposition of a case so long as questions of fact are raised in the proof at trial." Id. (citing Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So.2d 1355, 1361 (Miss.1990)).

¶ 9. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) states that "[a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor." Miss. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The Solankis moved for directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence clearly showed that Ervin had changed lanes when it was not safe to do so, that he had changed lanes and had failed to keep a proper lookout, and that he had not kept his truck under reasonable and proper control. The Solankis argued that the trial court should direct the jury to find in their favor because Ervin had been negligent as a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 10. As for the Solankis' claim that the trial court should have granted a peremptory instruction, this Court applies the same standard of review as it applies when reviewing the denial of directed verdict or JNOV:

[T]his Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, we are required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. The above standards of review, however, are predicated on the fact that the trial judge applied the correct law.

Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Lee, 826 So.2d 1232, 1235-36 (2002) (quoting Steele v. Inn of Vicksburg, Inc., 697 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss.1997)).

¶ 11. The Solankis do not identify the specific instruction that they claim the trial court improperly refused. Based on the record, this Court believes that the peremptory instruction at issue may be instruction P-13. Defendants objected to this instruction, and the trial court refused it. However, the trial court also refused instruction P-104, stating that the "[o]bjection to P-28 — P-9 will be refused because the last sentence5 is almost peremptory," following which, the Solankis' counsel clarified that the trial court was actually referring to instruction P-10. Therefore, this Court assumes that the Solankis appeal from the trial court's refusal of both instructions P-1 and P-10.

¶ 12. On appeal, the Solankis argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict and in denying their request for a peremptory instruction on the issue of negligence. They rely on their argument regarding the trial court's denial of their motion for JNOV, which will be addressed more fully below, in Section III. Basically, the Solankis claim that Mississippi law regarding the responsibilities of drivers, the discrepancies in the testimony of Ervin and Defendants' expert, William Messerschmidt, and the fact that the jury was given...

To continue reading

Request your trial
57 cases
  • Hyundai Motor Am. v. Applewhite
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 11 Marzo 2021
    ...that Gilbert's impact speed must be unreliable was undermined. The jury determines the weight and credibility of witnesses. Solanki v. Ervin , 21 So. 3d 552, 568 (¶ 41) (Miss. 2009). Here, the jury had the right to evaluate and determine what portions of their testimony of any witness it wo......
  • Payne v. Gowdy
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 17 Julio 2012
    ...). “This Court applies the same standard of review as it applies when reviewing the denial of directed verdict or JNOV.” Solanki v. Ervin, 21 So.3d 552, 557 (Miss.2009). ¶ 64. The Paynes argue that Marie walked down the parking lane on the left (or driver's side) of Cleveland's truck before......
  • Graham v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 25 Febrero 2016
    ... ... 15. "This Court reviews a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict de novo. " Solanki v. Ervin, 21 So.3d 552, 556 ( 8) (Miss.2009). "Requests for a directed verdict and motions [for] JNOV implicate the sufficiency of the evidence." ... ...
  • Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Cook Timber Co.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 30 Junio 2016
    ...in the timber market.15 Forestall, Black's Law Dictionary 564 (abr. 9th ed.).16 Miss.Code Ann. § 75–21–1 (Rev.2009).17 Solanki v. Ervin, 21 So.3d 552, 556 (Miss.2009) (citing Pierce v. Cook, 992 So.2d 612, 616 (Miss.2008) ; Pace v. Fin. Sec. Life, 608 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Miss.1992) ).18 Solan......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT