Solano County Employees' Assn. v. County of Solano

• Decision Date: 31 August 1982
• Citation: 186 Cal.Rptr. 147,136 Cal.App.3d 256
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SOLANO COUNTY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SOLANO, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 51780.

Page 147

186 Cal.Rptr. 147

136 Cal.App.3d 256

SOLANO COUNTY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SOLANO, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 51780.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Aug. 31, 1982.

Milton Goldfinger, County Counsel, Billy B. Burton, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Fairfield, for defendants and appellants

John Plotz, Mocine & Plotz, Oakland, for plaintiff and respondent.

FEINBERG, Associate Justice.

Solano County (County) appeals from a Memorandum of Decision ¹ granting a writ of mandate requiring the County to meet and confer with respondent Solano County Employees' Union (Union) regarding a rule prohibiting county employees from driving motorcycles on county business. The County argues that this rule is not subject to the meet and confer requirement of Government Code section 3505 because: (1) the rule has only an insignificant impact on the conditions of employment; and (2) it is a managerial decision falling within the "merits, necessity, or organization" exception to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov.Code, §§ 3500-3510). For the reasons discussed below, the writ of mandate was properly granted.

FACTS

Undisputed Facts

Both parties agree on the following events. On August 10, 1979, the Solano County Administrator issued a memorandum to all county departments, which read in pertinent part: "To preclude any question of whether a vehicle is authorized to be driven on County business in the future, the following policy will apply in all cases.... [N]o vehicles other than a 4-wheel passenger type vehicle which the employee has insured ... will be authorized to be driven on County business. Permission to operate ... motorcycles ... on County business must be requested in writing to the County Administrator [and be granted]."

Ray Villanueva, a county employee, sought permission on August 27, 1979, to use his motorcycle on county business. The County refused permission on December 19, 1979. On January 24, 1980, the County refused to process Villanueva's timely grievance on the grounds that it did not constitute a grievance under the County's grievance procedure. Respondent Union, Villanueva's representative, asked the County on January 28, 1980, to meet and confer on the matter. On February 1, 1980, the County refused to meet and confer, claiming that the rule was exempt under the "merits, necessity, or organization" exception (Gov.Code, § 3504) to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The Union filed its petition with the superior court on February 21, 1980.

Disputed Allegations

The Union contends that the rule set forth in the August 10 memorandum is a new rule, and has filed the declarations of several county employees that they were unaware of any rule and had openly used their motorcycles on county business without objection for several years. The County responds with its own affidavit that the rule has been in force for at least 15 years, and that the August memorandum was merely a reminder of the policy.

Following an order to show cause, the trial court issued its Memorandum of Decision granting the writ of mandate, without express findings of fact or law.

SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION

The scope of bargaining provision in section 10a of Solano County's regulations is identical for practical purposes with Government Code section 3504, which reads: "The scope of representation shall include all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment Federal labor legislation has frequently been the model for California labor law, and it is well settled that California courts will look to federal law for guidance in interpreting state statutes whose language parallels that of the federal statutes. (Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Department (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382, 391, 113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453.) The scope of representation language of Government Code section 3504 is taken directly from the federal Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and while California's exception for "merits, necessity, or organization" has no direct analogue in the NLRA, the federal courts have incorporated its meaning into their interpretation of "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment." (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 617-618, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971.) Consequently, federal precedents provide persuasive, though not limiting, authority in the present case. (Ibid.; Social Workers' Union, Local 535, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 391, 113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453.)

                except, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order."   Therefore, interpretation of the Code language necessarily bears upon the meaning of the County rule
                

SAFETY RULES AND MATERIALITY

The Union contends that the rule prohibiting use of motorcycles on county business is purely a safety rule. The County admits that "[t]he decision to preclude use of motorcycles obviously contains an aspect of safety ...." In common usage, when the word "safety" is used as an adjective it denotes "contribution to or insuring safety; protective" (American Heritage Dictionary, 1971). In the context of the California Occupational Safety & Health Act, Labor Code section 6306, subdivision (a) states that the term " 'safety' ... as applied to an employment or place of employment mean[s] such freedom from danger to the life, safety, or health of employees as the nature of the employment reasonably permits." Section 6306, subdivision (b) requires that the terms "safety device" and "safeguard" be given "a broad interpretation so as to include any practicable method of mitigating or preventing a specific danger ...." Our Supreme Court has made it clear that section 6306 is "to be given a liberal interpretation for the purpose of achieving a safe working environment." (Bendix Forest Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Safety & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 470, 158 Cal.Rptr. 882, 600 P.2d 1339.) In light of these definitions of the term "safety" and the extensive background material presented by the County regarding the relative seriousness of motorcycle injuries and their resulting costs, we can only conclude that the County's rule prohibiting use of motorcycles on the job was intended to be, and is, a safety rule.

The Union further argues that safety rules are a mandatory subject of bargaining, since they concern the terms and conditions of employment. The County admits that "it is recognized that safety practices considered alone may be a subject of meet and confer." Indeed, the cases have uniformly held that safety rules are a mandatory subject of bargaining. (See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Marshall (D.C.Cir.1980) 647 F.2d 1189, 1236, cert. den., 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3148, 69 L.Ed.2d 997; Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d 608, 620, 623, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971; N. L. R. B. v. Miller Brewing Co. (9th Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 12, 14; N. L. R. B. v. Gulf Power Co. (5th Cir. 1967) 384 F.2d 822, 824-825; Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (1964) 379 U.S. 203, 222, 85 S.Ct. 398, 409, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.).)

However, the County argues that to be a subject of mandatory bargaining, the rule must have more than a "remote, indirect, or incidental impact on work conditions." (See, e.g., N. L. R. B. v. Ladish Co. (7th Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 1267, 1270.) The County cites several holdings from the long line of cases requiring that a rule must "materially" Yet the County has not cited, and we have not found, any case applying the materiality analysis to a safety rule. ⁵ To the contrary, the cases have implied that all safety rules are subject to collective bargaining. ⁶ We believe it is the inherent nature of safety rules that has excluded them from the materiality analysis of the courts. It is a truism that even small precautions can prevent major mishaps, and it follows that any safety rule, no matter how apparently trivial, could have an important impact on the conditions of employment. Moreover, where human health and safety are involved, a rule should not be slighted simply because it will affect only a few employees. We see no reason to depart from the apparent intent of the cases that all safety issues, regardless of their purported "materiality" or "significance," are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, or as in this case, of meet and confer.

                or "significantly" affect the terms or conditions of employment, 2 and must affect more than a small number of employees. 3  The County argues that since its rule will have only a minor impact on the very small number of its employees who wish to ride motorcycles on the job, it does not meet the materiality test and therefore is not a meet and confer item.  The Union's contention that Ford Motor Company v. N. L. R. B.  (1979) 441 U.S. 488, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 60 L.Ed.2d 420, "effectively overrules" this line of cases and the materiality analysis is not supported by a reading of Ford. 4
                

Finally, the County suggests that a rule in the best interests of its employees should not be subject to meet and confer. We note that just because the traditional role of union and management may be reversed in this case (i.e., the Union expressing concern over the County's implementation of a safety rule), the mandatory nature of meet and confer is not changed. Whether a change is beneficial or detrimental to the employees is a decision reserved to the employees as represented by their union. (American Oil Co. v. N. L. R. B. (8th Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 184, 187, fn. 3.) Moreover, it is settled that the good faith of the employer does not exempt it from bargaining. (See, e.g., Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (9th...