Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, No. 04-12758.

CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
Writing for the CourtMarcus
Citation410 F.3d 1250
PartiesSOLANTIC, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEPTUNE BEACH, a municipality, Enforcement Board of the City of Neptune Beach, its local administrative governmental body, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket NumberNo. 04-12758.
Decision Date31 May 2005
410 F.3d 1250
SOLANTIC, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, Plaintiff-Appellant,
CITY OF NEPTUNE BEACH, a municipality, Enforcement Board of the City of Neptune Beach, its local administrative governmental body, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 04-12758.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
May 31, 2005.

Page 1251

Cynthia L. Hain, Lawrence Hamilton, II, Michael G. Tanner, Holland & Knight, Jacksonville, FL, Stephen H. Grimes, Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ernest H. Kohlmyer, III, Bell, Leeper & Roper, PA, Orlando, FL, Christopher A. White, Ponte Vedra, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before MARCUS, FAY and SILER*, Circuit Judges.

Page 1252

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the City of Neptune Beach's sign code. Appellant Solantic, LLC ("Solantic") argues that the sign code violates the First Amendment in at least two ways: first, it exempts from regulation certain categories of signs based on their content, without compelling justification for the disparate treatment; and second, it contains no time limits for permitting decisions. We agree with Solantic, and hold the sign code unconstitutional on both grounds.


Solantic is a business operating emergency medical care facilities in various locations, including the City of Neptune Beach ("the City" or "Neptune Beach"). In April 2003, Solantic installed in front of its Neptune Beach facility a large "Electronic Variable Message Center" (EVMC) sign. A videotape showing the sign was viewed by the district court and is part of the record. The district court describes the EVMC sign as sitting in the middle of a pole, approximately 10 to 12 feet above the ground, and situated below a larger blue sign displaying Solantic's business name.

Solantic states that the EVMC sign "was used for, and is intended to be used for, commercial messages, i.e. to identify Solantic's business and to convey information about its products and services, and for noncommercial messages, i.e. to promote social and health ideas and causes." Br. at 4. As the City describes it, Solantic's EVMC sign conveyed "electronically lit messages that flashed, blinked and scrolled across the surface of the sign." Br. at 1.

Prior to erecting the sign, Solantic obtained an electrical permit from the City to operate the sign. Solantic did not, however, submit to the City a sign application, despite the sign code's1 general requirement that no sign be erected without first obtaining a permit.

Consequently, on April 28, 2003, the City sent Solantic a notice of violations of various sections of the sign code, including § 27-579 (requiring a permit to erect a sign); § 27-581(4) (prohibiting signs with any "visible movement achieved by electrical, electronic or mechanical means, except for traditional barber poles"); § 27-581(5) (prohibiting signs "with the optical illusion of movement by means of a design that presents a pattern capable of giving the illusion of motion or changing of copy"); and § 27-581(6) (prohibiting signs "with lights or illuminations that flash, move, rotate, scintillate, blink, flicker, or vary intensity or color except for time-temperature-date signs"). The notice also informed Solantic that violations of the sign code are punishable by fines of up to $250 a day, or $500 a day for repeat violations.

The City's Code Enforcement Board ("the Board") conducted a hearing on June 11, 2003, and determined that Solantic's sign violated the sign code. The Board subsequently directed Solantic, in an undated order, to cure the violation by taking four steps: (1) obtaining a sign permit; (2) modifying the sign to change copy no more than once a day; (3) modifying the sign so that its copy would not blink, flash, or scroll, but rather would permanently glow; and (4) controlling the sign only from the premises on which it was located.

Following the Board's June decision, Solantic applied for a sign permit. The district court concluded, however, that Solantic

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appeared to have continued to operate its sign without modifying it in accordance with the City's order.

Thus, on September 24, 2003, the City sent Solantic another notice of alleged violation of the same sections of the sign code. The Board held another hearing on October 8, 2003, after which it issued another undated order reiterating that Solantic was in violation of the sign code in three ways: by allowing the sign to change copy more than once a day; by allowing the sign to blink, flash, or scroll alternating messages; and by not controlling the sign solely from the property on which it was located. The Board thus ordered that Solantic be assessed fines totaling $75 per day ($25 for each of the three violations), running from September 3, 2003 ("the date of discovery or verification or violation(s)") until all violations were cured.

On October 28, 2003, Solantic filed an application for appeal from both the June and the October decisions of the Board. The City denied the appeal on November 3, 2003. Solantic then brought suit in the Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Duval County, Florida, on January 5, 2004. Soon thereafter, the City removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

In its second amended complaint (the operative pleading for purposes of this appeal), filed March 9, 2004, Solantic argued that the sign code violated the First Amendment in a variety of ways, including as a content-based regulation of speech and as an unlawful prior restraint.2 Solantic sought declaratory relief, in the form of a judgment declaring the City's sign code to be unconstitutional and unenforceable against Solantic, and absolving Solantic of any liability for accrued fines based on alleged violations of the sign code. In addition, Solantic sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of the sign code.

On March 10, 2004, Solantic moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court held a provisional hearing on April 2, 2004, and ruled on May 3, 2004. The district court denied the preliminary injunction solely on the ground that Solantic had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, without reaching the other relevant factors.3 The court reasoned that although the sign code's permit requirement was a prior restraint on speech, it was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that did not place excessive discretion in the hands of licensing officials, and was therefore constitutional.

It is from this order that Solantic took an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).


The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction "is within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be

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disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir.2002); see also, e.g., Horton, 272 F.3d at 1326; Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1178 (11th Cir.2000). We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, and its application of the law de novo, "premised on the understanding that `[a]pplication of an improper legal standard ... is never within a district court's discretion.'" Johnson & Johnson, 299 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1997)); see also Horton, 272 F.3d at 1326.4

Solantic argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief, since Neptune Beach's sign code violates the First Amendment in three ways: first, the enumerated exemptions from its regulations render it an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech; second, its permit requirement is an unlawful prior restraint; and third, it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Solantic. Because we agree with Solantic as to the first two issues, we need not and do not reach the third.

In determining whether the district court correctly concluded that Solantic was unlikely to succeed on the merits, we review the relevant provisions of the Neptune Beach sign code in some detail. The sign code regulates all signs erected within the City, other than those that are explicitly exempted from its regulations. See § 27-572 ("This article exempts certain signs from these regulations. . . ."); § 27-573 ("This article applies to all signs, and other advertising devices, that are constructed, erected, operated, used, maintained, enlarged, illuminated or substantially altered within the city."); § 27-580 (enumerating exempt signs).

At the outset, the sign code contains a number of findings of fact, pertaining to the safety and aesthetic harms that signs may cause. These findings state:

(1) The manner of the erection, location and maintenance of signs affects the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people of this community.

(2) The safety of motorists, cyclists, pedestrians, [and] other users of the public streets is affected by the number, size, location, lighting and movement of signs that divert the attention of drivers.

(3) The size and location of signs may, if uncontrolled, constitute an obstacle to effective fire-fighting techniques.

(4) The construction, erection and maintenance of large signs suspended from or placed on the tops of buildings, walls or other structures may constitute a direct danger to pedestrian and vehicular traffic below, especially during periods of strong winds.

(5) Uncontrolled and unlimited signs may degrade the aesthetic attractiveness of the natural and manmade attributes of the community and thereby undermine the economic value

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of tourism, visitation and permanent economic growth.

§ 27-574.

In light of these findings of fact, the sign code lays out the "intentions and purposes of the city council" in enacting it:

(1) To create a...

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