Sole v. Grand Jurors of NJ For Co. of Passaic & Bergen
Decision Date | 05 May 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-1446. |
Citation | 393 F. Supp. 1322 |
Parties | Alfred SOLE et al., Plaintiffs, v. GRAND JURORS OF the STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR the COUNTIES OF PASSAIC AND BERGEN, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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Rosenberg & Waldman by Richard K. Rosenberg, Glen Rock, N. J., for plaintiff Muskat.
Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender by George Tosi, First Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for plaintiff Rose.
William J. De Marco, Wayne, N. J., for plaintiff Pope.
Joseph D. J. Gourley, Passaic County Prosecutor by John Goceljak, Asst. Prosecutor, for defendants Grand Jurors, Gourley and Woodcock.
William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey by Solomon Rosengarten, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State of New Jersey and Governor of New Jersey.
Before GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, and BIUNNO and STERN, District Judges.
Plaintiffs Alfred Sole, Andrew Muskat, Katherine Victoria Pope and Joseph Rose filed this federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants 18 months after their indictment in the Superior Court of New Jersey for the crimes of fornication, private lewdness, carnal indecency and conspiracy.1 The defendants are Joseph D. J. Gourley, Passaic County Prosecutor; Joseph Woodcock, Bergen County Prosecutor; Brendan T. Byrne, Governor of New Jersey; the Grand Jurors of the State of New Jersey of the Counties of Passaic and Bergen, and the State of New Jersey.
The state indictments were based on plaintiffs' participation as the actors (Pope and Rose), the producer (Muskat), and the director (Sole) of the motion picture "Deep Sleep," a film which depicts acts of sexual intercourse in which Rose and Pope allegedly engaged for purposes of the filming. When the film was exhibited at a movie theater located in Passaic County, it was seized as evidence pursuant to a search warrant obtained in Superior Court by defendant Gourley, and the state prosecution for the state crimes ensued.
After the filing of these indictments on February 22, 1973, plaintiffs sought dismissal of the indictments in pretrial motions in Superior Court. These motions, brought in May of 1973 by all the federal plaintiffs, attacked the statutes prohibiting fornication and public lewdness as vague and overbroad, as unconstitutional on their face, and as unconstitutional as applied. In addition to alleging these defects in the statutes, plaintiffs also alleged in the state forum that the prosecution was itself constitutionally defective because the Passaic County Prosecutor had brought the indictments to suppress plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights. The heart of plaintiffs' motions in state court was that their prosecution under the statutes prohibiting fornication and lewdness was a sham, to which the prosecutor had resorted only because the United States Constitution precluded his use of the state obscenity statute to suppress the film itself.2
The Superior Court heard and denied all motions to dismiss the indictments.3 The Appellate Division of the Superior Court denied plaintiffs leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied review.4
It was only following all of this preliminary state court litigation that plaintiffs, 18 months after they were indicted and just several weeks before trial was to begin, commenced suit here on September 17, 1974, alleging the unconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2A:110-15 and 2A:115-16 on the grounds of vagueness, overbreadth, and unconstitutional application in the pending state criminal proceeding. These were the identical federal claims previously presented by plaintiffs to the state trial judge.
On November 25, 1974 this three-judge court was constituted by order of Chief Judge Seitz of the Court of Appeals for this Circuit. Discovery having been completed, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the claims for injunctive relief were consolidated with the trial on the merits. The motion to dismiss was taken under advisement by the Court on January 29, 1975.
It is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over this lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and the State does not dispute that issue. Of greater import is the question whether this Court should exercise that jurisdiction, or whether it should instead defer to the state judicial process for reasons of equity, comity and federalism.
Historically, the lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws. The state courts were the only forum in which a litigant could seek relief against the enforcement of a state statute which infringed on his federal constitutional rights.
The wave of nationalism following the Civil War brought with it congressional investiture of the federal judiciary with enormously increased power.
Frankfurther & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 65.
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247, 88 S.Ct. 391, 395, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). (Emphasis in original.)
The obligation of the state courts, under Article VI of the Constitution, to vindicate rights guaranteed by the federal constitution, laws and treaties, was not discharged by the acquisition of new power by the federal courts. State courts remain, as before, fully capable of determining issues arising under the federal constitution.
Our national judicial system thus consists of two co-equal structures:
". . . These courts do not belong to the same system, so far as their jurisdiction is concurrent; and although they co-exist in the same space, they are independent, and have no common superior." Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, 182, 4 S.Ct. 355, 28 L.Ed. 390 (1884).
Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 482 F.2d 1128, 1132 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025, 94 S.Ct. 450, 38 L.Ed.2d 316 (1973). Of course, to the extent that state courts construe the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, they share with the federal courts the obligation to follow authoritative federal construction of the supreme law of the land.
A litigant who alleges a case or controversy, within the purview of Article III, is therefore initially presented with the luxury of a choice of forum, federal or state, in which to present his constitutional claims for resolution.
A plaintiff's right to choose his forum is substantially diminished, however, when at the time he seeks redress in federal court he is also in the process of litigating the identical federal claims before a state tribunal. Where the federal plaintiff is enmeshed in a state-initiated proceeding, such as a state prosecution, and then seeks relief in federal court for violations of his federal constitutional rights by state agents or statutes, the federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds of the traditional principles of equity, comity and federalism. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1970).
This policy, that federal courts do not interfere with state criminal proceedings,7 flows not only from the basic doctrine of equitable jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law, but also from "an even more vital consideration," the notion of comity under our federal system of government:
. . . that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750.
This concept of federalism "does not mean blind deference to `States' Rights'," but rather a recognition of "the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, . . . in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id.
A state's enforcement of its criminal laws is a major vehicle for the effectuation of its substantive policies.8 Federal interference with a pending state judicial proceeding, whether by injunctive or declaratory relief,9 not only thwarts the state's efforts to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws, but results in duplicative proceedings and may be interpreted as distrust of the state court system's ability or willingness to enforce constitutional principles.10
This is not to say that the federal forum is absolutely unavailable to litigants in ongoing state prosecutions. The fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions may be outweighed by the federal litigant's demonstration of irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at state law, the traditional predicates for equitable relief. However, the litigant who seeks to establish this quasi-jurisdictional basis for federal equitable relief must meet the strict requirements of the narrow Younger exception:
. . . A federal plaintiff must show manifest bad faith and injury that is great, immediate, and irreparable, constituting harassment of the plaintiff in the exercise of his constitutional rights, and resulting in a deprivation of meaningful access to the state...
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