Soleimanzadeh v. Montgomery Cnty.

Decision Date26 November 2012
Docket NumberSept. Term, 2010.,No. 1433,1433
Citation56 A.3d 349,208 Md.App. 107
PartiesKhana SOLEIMANZADEH, et al. v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jeffrey S. Larson, Greenbelt, MD, for Appellant.

Robert J. Birenbaum (Marc P. Hansen, Co. Atty., Edward B. Lattner, Chief, Eric C. Willis, on the brief), Rockville, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: WOODWARD, WATTS and J. FREDERICK SHARER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

WOODWARD, J.

The instant appeal arises from a condemnation action brought by appellee, Montgomery County, Maryland (“the County”), to take a portion of the real property owned by appellants, Khana and Joseph Soleimanzadeh (“the Soleimanzadehs”). Following the Soleimanzadehs' failure to comply with certain discovery requests, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County imposed sanctions prohibiting them from introducing any evidence in support of their claim for just compensation and damages (“just compensation”).1 On May 3, 2010, the County filed a motion for summary judgment as to the issue of just compensation, reasoning that the Soleimanzadehs' inability to introduce any evidencein support of their claim on this issue resulted in a lack of any genuine dispute of material fact. The Soleimanzadehs filed an opposition to this motion on May 14, 2010. Following a motions hearing on July 19, 2010, the court granted the County's motion for summary judgment. On July 21, 2010, the court entered a judgment in favor of the County that determined the just compensation due to the Soleimanzadehs to be $35,000, which was based solely on the County's appraisal of the property subject to condemnation.

On appeal, the Soleimanzadehs present three questions for our review, which we have slightly re-phrased:

I. Did the trial court err in denying the Soleimanzadehs a jury trial on the issue of just compensation in a condemnation proceeding?

II. Was it improper for the trial court to grant judgment without any testimony as to damages?

III. Did the Soleimanzadehs have a right to cross-examine the witnesses of the County as to compensation?

For the reasons set forth herein, we answer the first question in the affirmative and therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In light of our decision, we need not address the remaining questions presented.

BACKGROUND

On April 10, 2009, the County filed a Complaint for Condemnation in the circuit court seeking to acquire 975 square feet in fee simple and 1,300 square feet of revertible slope easement from the real property owned by the Soleimanzadehs and located at 13923 Travilah Road, Rockville, Maryland, in furtherance of the County's Travilah Road improvement project.2 After filing an amended complaint on September 10, [208 Md.App. 111]2009, the County served the Soleimanzadehs on October 5, 2009, with interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and the Soleimanzadehs' responses were due on November 7, 2009. SeeMd. Rule 2–421(b), 2–422(c). On November 6, 2009, counsel for the Soleimanzadehs sent a letter to the County notifying the County that the interrogatories and requests for production of documents were misplaced and were discovered on November 5, 2009. Counsel for the Soleimanzadehs asked for a 45–day extension within which to comply with discovery, and the County had no objection to the request. On December 14, 2009, however, counsel for the Soleimanzadehs advised the County that they “would not file any responses to the discovery requests served by the County,” and that the County “should go to the Court.”

On December 23, 2009, after the expiration of the 45–day extension, the County filed a Motion to Compel and/or for Sanctions. The Soleimanzadehs filed no opposition to this motion. On January 19, 2010, the circuit court granted the County's motion and entered an order on January 21, 2010, directing the Soleimanzadehs to provide the requested discovery to the County within 10 days of the entry of the order. The order also provided that, if the Soleimanzadehsfailed to produce the requested discovery within said 10 days, the Soleimanzadehs would be precluded from introducing “any evidence in support of their claims for just compensation and damages.” The Soleimanzadehs did not produce any interrogatory responses or documents within 10 days of the entry of the order, and accordingly, the aforesaid sanctions were imposed. 3

While the County's Motion to Compel and/or for Sanctions was pending, the County filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 15, 2010. The County sought summary judgment with respect to the following issues: (1) the public purpose and necessity of the taking of the property, (2) the amount of area taken by the County, and (3) the County's right to condemn the Soleimanzadehs' property and the legality of the condemnation proceeding. The County did not move for summary judgment on the issue of just compensation, requesting instead that “the Court submit the issue of just compensation to be awarded to the [Soleimanzadehs] for the property rights taken to the jury.” On February 25, 2010, the trial court granted the County's motion for partial summary judgment.4

As a result of the imposition of sanctions on the Soleimanzadehs, the County filed on May 3, 2010, a Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Judgment by Default, seeking judgment on the issue of just compensation. In its motion, the County argued that the circuit court should grant summary judgment because the Soleimanzadehs “waived their right to an adversarial proceeding to contest the County's claims,” and thus, “because of the sanctions imposed, there is no longer a controversy between the parties that presents a genuine dispute of material fact.” The Soleimanzadehs filed an opposition to this motion and asserted therein that [t]he issue of just compensation in this case is disputed and cannot be determined, absent an agreement between the parties, by summary judgment or default.”

On July 19, 2010, the circuit court held a motions hearing to consider, among other things, the County's motion for summary judgment. On the issue of just compensation, the court engaged in the following discussion with the Assistant County Attorney:

THE COURT: Why would [the issue of just compensation] not go to a jury?

[ASSISTANT COUNTY ATTORNEY]: It wouldn't go to a jury because there can no longer be and there is no ... genuine issue of material fact that's in dispute.

THE COURT: What if the jury disbelieved your expert? It happens.

* * *

THE COURT: ... [C]ouldn't the property owner generate ... an issue of material fact simply by getting on the witness stand and saying, “I think the property's worth X because,” and then the because is, “you know, I've lived there 100 years.” ... They can do that without an expert. Wouldn't that take it to a jury?

[ASSISTANT COUNTY ATTORNEY]: That's correct, but not in this case, Your Honor, because the sanctions preclude the defendant from taking the stand, because of the failures of discovery. So there is nothing to controvert—

* * *

... [T]he sanctions really preclude the defendants from presenting or contesting our evidence. And the defendants, if they want to contest the evidence of value, have a burden of production to do so, and the defendants, because of the sanction, are precluded from doing so. There's a case that does state that, Solko v. State Roads Commission, 82 Md.App. 137, at pages 147 to 149 .

* * *

... I'll be candid with the Court that the issue of summary judgment of just compensation is certainly a new area. I can't really find anything directly on point....

* * *

[Solko ], at pages 147 to 149 , does state that the property owner has specific burdens of production if they wish to contest evidence of value. And since the property owners cannot meet that burden in this case, and are precluded from doing so, the County is entitled to summary judgment.

At the conclusion of the motions hearing, the trial court made the following ruling:

[T]he County has demonstrated under Maryland Rule 2–501(f) that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the value of the property, they have supported their motion by competent evidence, meaning an affidavit under oath on personal knowledge, that is, that the testimony would be otherwise admissible at trial, and that they have set forth an expert opinion as to value.

And there being no evidence to the contrary and the defendants not having fulfilled their burden as set forth in Educational Testing v. Hildebrant, nor filed an affidavit under Maryland Rule 2–501(d), for all the reasons I've said, the motion for summary judgment is granted and the value is established.

And, unfortunately, what that means, folks, is there won't be a trial.

Accordingly, the circuit court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and on July 21, 2010, entered a Judgment and Inquisition that vested title to the subject property in the County and ordered the disbursement to the Soleimanzadehs as just compensation the sum of $35,000, which was based exclusively on the County's appraisal of the subject property.

The Soleimanzadehs filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on August 16, 2010. Additional facts will be set forth below as necessary to resolve the questions presented.

DISCUSSION
The Parties' Contentions

The Soleimanzadehs assert that condemnation actions are “special proceeding [s],” and “the trial of a condemnation case must satisfy the procedural requirements of Title 12, Chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules.” The Soleimanzadehs argue that, in granting the County's motion for summary judgment, the trial court in the instant case violated the plain language and intent of Md. Rule 12–207. According to the Soleimanzadehs, Rule 12–207(a) requires that an action for condemnation be tried by a jury unless all parties file a written election submitting the case to the court for determination. The...

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5 cases
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