Solima v. City of Brentwood
| Decision Date | 28 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-00338 |
| Parties | DAVID SOLIMA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BRENTWOOD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Before the court is defendant City of Brentwood's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 39), seeking judgment in its favor on plaintiff David Solima's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine.'” Id.
“[A] fact is ‘material' within the meaning of Rule 56(a) if the dispute over it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law.” O'Donnell v. City of Cleveland, 838 F.3d 718, 725 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2018).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying and citing specific portions of the record-including, inter alia, depositions, documents affidavits, or declarations-that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). If the non-moving party asserts that a fact is genuinely disputed, it generally “must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Pittman, 901 F.3d at 628 . The court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pittman, 901 F.3d at 628. Credibility judgments and the weighing of evidence are improper. Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018).
In its Reply, the City argues that the plaintiff's failure to respond to its arguments regarding whether he has direct evidence of age discrimination or whether he can establish a substantive due process claim amounts to abandonment of these claims. (Doc. No. 53, at 3, 11.) Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 Fed.Appx. 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Hicks v. Concorde Career Coll., 449 Fed.Appx. 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011); Clark v. City of Dublin, 178 Fed.Appx. 522, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2006); Conner v. Hardee's Food Sys., 65 Fed.Appx. 19, 24-25 (6th Cir. 2003)). At the same time, however, in reported opinions, the Sixth Circuit has made it clear that a district court faced with a plaintiff's failure to respond, in whole or in part, to a motion for summary judgment “[may] not use that [failure] as a reason for granting summary judgment without first examining all the materials properly before it under Rule 56(c).” F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1979)). The district court retains this obligation, because “[a] party is never required to respond to a motion for summary judgment in order to prevail since the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a material factual dispute always rests with the movant.” Id. (quoting Smith, 600 F.2d at 64). Consequently, despite the plaintiff's silence in response to some of the defendant's arguments, the court “must review carefully the portions of the record submitted by the moving party to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists” before granting summary judgment on those particular claims. Id.
The City of Brentwood (“City”) is a municipality located within Williamson County, Tennessee. It has adopted the Commission-City Manager form of government. It owns and operates a Department of Public Works. (Doc. No. 41-1, Bednar Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5.) The City's Department of Public Works provides ongoing maintenance services necessary to protect the City's infrastructure. (Id. ¶ 9.) Todd Hoppenstedt is the City's Director of Public Works and held that position during the relevant time period. (Id. ¶ 10.)
The City has in place Personnel Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to Article IX of the Personnel Rules and Regulations, “[i]t is the policy of the City that all new employees in regular full-time, part-time and temporary positions will be placed on probationary status.” (Doc. No. 41-1, at 30.) With certain exceptions not relevant here, “all new employees in regular full-time, regular part-time and temporary positions shall be in a probationary status for six (6) months from the date of hire.” (Id.) Further, “[a]t any time during or upon the conclusion of the initial probationary period, an employee may be dismissed by the employee's respective department head with or without cause and with no right to appeal as provided for regular employees herein.” (Id.)
With respect to employees who are retained through the end of their probationary period, Article IX states that “[t]he supervisor shall evaluate the performance of the probationary employee . . . by no later than the end of the sixth month.” (Id.) Article IX further provides that, “upon completion of the probationary period, the department head shall review the evaluations and recommend to the Human Resources Director and to the City Manager whether regular fulltime or part-time status should be conferred, the probation extended for up to six (6) additional months, or the employee dismissed.”
On August 6, 2018, the City hired Solima as a maintenance worker in the Public Works Department. At the time, Solima was more than forty years old.[2] Once employed as a maintenance worker, Solima was often partnered with a fellow Public Works employee as a member of a “chipper crew.” Within a period of five months, Todd Hoppenstedt assigned Solima to work with four different partners on the chipper crew. (Hoppenstedt Decl., Doc. No. 41-2 ¶ 8.)[3] According to Hoppenstedt, he reassigned Solima to work with new partners either because of “complaints by Mr. Solima about his partner or complaints from other employees about Mr. Solima.” (Id. ¶ 9.)
The plaintiff purports to deny the truth of that statement, but the record does not support his denial. It is undisputed that Solima was initially assigned to work with Randy Parker on a chipper crew. Randy Parker was Solima's designated “trainer” for on-the-job training. At the time, Parker had been employed by the City for approximately fifteen years and was over sixty years old. In November 2018, Solima requested to be assigned to a new partner. According to Solima, around that time, Hoppenstedt announced that he was switching up partners after there had been altercations between two other employees. By then, Solima had obtained his Commercial Driver's License and Randy Parker was going on vacation. The plaintiff thought that this would be “a good opportunity” to ask to be reassigned to a new partner. (Doc. No. 46-2, Solima Dep. 93.) He also testified, however, that he conveyed to Hoppenstedt various complaints about Parker when he spoke to him about changing partners. (Id. at 92-93 (); see also Doc. No. 49, Solima Decl. ¶ 30 ( ).)
Solima was partnered with another Public Works employee, Randall Richards. According to Hoppenstedt, Richards complained to him in November 2018 that Solima was condescending and difficult to work with, and he threatened to quit if he was forced to partner with Solima. (Doc No. 41-2 ¶¶ 10-11.) The plaintiff protests that he can neither admit nor deny the truth of private conversations between Hoppenstedt and Richards. (Doc. No. 47, Resp. to Statement Nos. 17-18.) However, Solima denies that he was condescending and further denies that Richards ever complained that he was. (Doc. No. 46-2, Solima Dep. 58.) Solima testified that he never had a problem getting along with Richards, but he did have a problem with the fact that Richards smoked in the truck. To resolve this problem, Solima approached Richards and asked him to smoke outside the truck while the plaintiff was loading branches into the chipper. Richards agreed. (Doc. No. 46-2, Solima Dep. 57-58.) Solima never complained to Hoppenstedt about Richards' smoking. (Doc. No. 41-3, Solima Dep. 138.) Richards later told Solima that...
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