Solinsky v. City of Wilkes-Barre
Citation | 375 Pa. 87,99 A.2d 570 |
Parties | SOLINSKY et al. v. CITY OF WILKES-BARRE. Appeals of SOLINSKY. |
Decision Date | 15 October 1953 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Action against city by pedestrian and her husband for injuries to pedestrian resulting when pedestrian slipped on icy street. The Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County at No. 602 January Term, 1951, W. A. Valentine, P. J., rendered compulsory nonsuit and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Stearne, J., held that where slippery condition of street was not due to artificial causes, such as dangerous accumulation by snow following a sewer stoppage, but was due to natural causes, city was not liable.
Judgments affirmed.
Roy B. Pope, Ralph J. Johnston, Johnston & Pope Wilkes-Barre, for appellants.
J. Thirwall Griffith, Howard E. Kennedy, Wilkes-Barre, for appellee.
Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
Plaintiffs instituted this action of trespass for damages for injury to the wife-plaintiff, resulting from a fall on an unlighted portion of a street in defendant-city at about 11:30 p. m. on December 24, 1948. The court below entered a compulsory nonsuit which it refused to take off. Plaintiffs appealed.
Viewing the testimony, as we must, in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and giving them the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible therefrom, the controlling facts are as follows: plaintiffs resided on Reno Lane, which is one block in length and connects Dock Lane with Coal Street in Wilkes-Barre. It has a hard surface, is unpaved and has no sidewalks. The surface is about 15 feet in width, running from fence to fence of the homes fronting both sides of the street. It is used in its entirety by both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
On December 19, 1948, there had been a reasonably heavy snowfall of five or six inches. There was no subsequent fall of snow prior to midnight of December 24. Between the fall of snow on December 19 and the time of the accident the weather was ‘ below freezing and above freezing.’ It ‘ would thaw out during the day and freeze at night.’ Automobiles passing over the street made ruts and ridges of a depth of three to four inches, and at no time was any part of the street free of these ruts and ridges. Its surface was in the same condition on the 24th as it was on the 21st. There was no proof of attempts by the city to clear the street or to ash it. The wife-plaintiff, who had crossed the street twice previously on the same day, left her home at approximately 11:30 p. m. on December 24 and proceeded diagonally along the bed of the street reaching near the center thereof where she slipped on a ridge of ice, fell, and was injured thereby.
The negligence charged against the city was its failure to maintain the street in a safe condition, after it had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition of the street.
The suggested remedy of snow removal or spreading ashes is impracticable, if not impossible. To remove the snow from all the streets of a city the size of Wilkes-Barre, and within a few days after a normal snow fall, is obviously impossible. To place ashes or cinders over all the streets of the city following a normal snow fall would be futile. Ashes and cinders sink during a thaw. Ice formed at night after a thaw would be free from such ashes or cinders.
A municipality is not liable for personal injuries sustained by an individual who falls because of a generally slippery condition of either a street or sidewalk, which occurs in all cities of Pennsylvania in winter due to the presence of ice and snow, accumulated as a result of natural causes . Strauch v. City of Scranton, 157 Pa.Super. 174, 42 A.2d 96,affirmed per curiam in 353 Pa. 10, 44 A.2d 258, is peculiarly apposite. There a pedestrian was injured by a fall on an icy rut in an unpaved roadway. The ice was formed by natural surface drainage . The facts, which nearly parallel the present ones, were:
(Italics supplied.)
Judge HIRT, speaking for an unanimous court, said:
( ) ( ) .’ (Italics supplied.)
In Hendrickson v. Chester City, 221 Pa. 120, 70 A. 552, 553, this Court said, per curiam:
* * *'
An excellent exposition of this principle may be found in 25 Am.Jur. 800, Sec. 519:
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This Court so held in Bailey v. Oil City, 305 Pa. 325, at page 327, 157 A. 486, at page 487, 80 A.L.R. 1148, where we said:
Even had it been practical or possible to have removed the snow from this street immediately after its fall, the city would also be required to remove the snow from all its other streets . This relatively infrequently traveled one block lane certainly would not have taken precedence over main streets of this busy city. See Beebe v. City of Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 214, 219, 167 A. 570. A jury will not be permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the city in selecting streets first to be cleared.
A distinction exists...
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