Solis-Ramirez v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, SOLIS-RAMIREZ
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before HATCHETT and CLARK; PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 758 F.2d 1426 |
| Parties | Guillermo, individually and on Behalf of Paula Sandra SOLIS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Immigration and Naturalization Service, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Docket Number | SOLIS-RAMIREZ,No. 84-3057,84-3057 |
| Decision Date | 25 April 1985 |
Page 1426
Sandra SOLIS, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Eleventh Circuit.
Page 1427
Charles R. Colbrunn, Orlando, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Jeffrey J. Tinley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Orlando, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and STAFFORD *, District Judge.
Page 1428
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Guillermo Solis-Ramirez seeks relief from an adverse decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regarding his immigration petition. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.
Guillermo Solis-Ramirez is a native of Mexico who seeks immigrant status in the United States. In 1976, after filing the appropriate material with the United States Consulate at Monterey, Mexico, he was classified as a "special immigrant" and given a priority date of August 5, 1976. Under the immigration laws in effect at that time a special immigrant was one "born in any independent foreign country of the Western Hemisphere or in the Canal Zone and the spouse and children of any such immigrant...." 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1101(a)(27)(A) (Act of 1965). Even after being accorded that status, Solis-Ramirez could not be lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States until he had been issued an immigrant visa number from INS. However, immigration laws only permit a limited number of visas to be issued each year. In 1976, as now, the number of applicants was much greater than the number of visas actually available. Consequently, Congress established a method of allocating the available visas. Under current law, visas are assigned based upon three factors: the applicant's preference classification, the applicant's place of birth and the applicant's priority date. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1153(a) (1982).
In 1976, when Solis-Ramirez originally was accorded his priority date, immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were not given a preference classification. Instead, visas were allocated to special immigrants based only upon their priority date, assuming all other requirements were met. Special immigrants normally had to have a labor certification before being granted a visa. However this requirement was waived for special immigrants who were parents, spouses or children of United States citizens. 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1182(a)(14) (1965 Act). Solis-Ramirez was exempt from the labor certification requirement because he has a daughter who is a United States citizen. Therefore, under the law in effect at the time, Solis-Ramirez had met all the requirements for immigration in 1976 and merely had to wait until his priority date was reached at which time he would be issued a visa. But the backlog of applications gave his application little chance of reaching the priority date.
In October of 1976 the immigration laws were amended. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703. Under the new law immigrants from the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world are treated equally. All are subject to the same preference classification system. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1153(a) (1982). Immigrants from the Western Hemisphere who had acquired priority dates under the old law were integrated into the preference system by a "savings clause." This clause provides that such immigrants will retain their old priority date and will be classified as non-preference (Section 203(a)(8)) immigrants until another classification is acquired:
[Aliens from the Western Hemisphere] who established a priority date at a consular office on the basis of entitlement to immigrant status under statutory or regulatory provisions in existence on the day before the effective date of this Act shall be deemed to be entitled to immigrant status under section 203(a)(8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and shall be accorded the priority date previously established by him. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the acquisition by such an alien of a preference status under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by section 4 of this Act. Any petition filed by, or in behalf of, such an alien to accord him a preference status under section 203(a) shall, upon approval, be deemed to have been filed as of the
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priority date previously established by such alien....Immigration and Nationality Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-571, Sec. 9(b), 90 Stat. 2703, 2707 (1976) (hereinafter "savings...
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Norfolk Bus. Dist. v. HUD, Civil Action No. 2:96cv308.
...by reference into the pleadings are also not matters outside the pleadings. Id. (citing Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1985)). Where reports or documents are attached to complaints or adopted by reference into pleadings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), no conv......
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U.S. v. Veal, 95-4427
...of legislative history is unnecessary "unless a statute is inescapably ambiguous." Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam); see United States v. Rush, 874 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir.1989) (stating that, where statutory language is cle......
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Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Haddad, 90-0779-CIV.
...a statute, courts must first look to the plain meaning of the statute itself." Solis-Ramirez v. United States Department of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting, United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir.1981). It is only when a statute is inescapably ambiguous t......
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Atkins v. Indus. Telecommunications Ass'n, 93-CV-1101.
...therein by reference. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994); Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (report attached to complaint considered part of pleadings for all purposes including a Rule 12(b)(6) --------Notes: 1 Atkins cl......
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Norfolk Bus. Dist. v. HUD, Civil Action No. 2:96cv308.
...incorporated by reference into the pleadings are also not matters outside the pleadings. Id. (citing Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1985)). Where reports or documents are attached to complaints or adopted by reference into pleadings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 1......
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U.S. v. Veal
...of legislative history is unnecessary "unless a statute is inescapably ambiguous." Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam); see United States v. Rush, 874 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir.1989) (stating that, where statutory language is cle......
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Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Haddad, 90-0779-CIV.
...that in construing a statute, courts must first look to the plain meaning of the statute itself." Solis-Ramirez v. United States Department of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting, United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir.1981). It is only when a statute is ines......
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Atkins v. Indus. Telecommunications Ass'n, 93-CV-1101.
...and incorporated therein by reference. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994); Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (report attached to complaint considered part of pleadings for all purposes including a Rule 12(b)(6) 1 Atkins ......