Solis v. Union
| Decision Date | 28 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–3264.,10–3264. |
| Citation | 638 F.3d 956 |
| Parties | Hilda L. SOLIS, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellant,v.AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1005, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Sharon Swingle, DOJ, argued, Michael Jay Singer, DOJ, on the brief, Washington, DC, for appellant.M. William O'Brien, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
Hilda L. Solis, the United States Secretary of Labor (“the Secretary”), appeals the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment to Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1005 (“Local 1005”), on the Secretary's claim that Local 1005's November 2008 election procedures violated the “adequate safeguards” provision of the Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Prior to October 2007, Local 1005 represented only bus drivers and other transport workers employed by MetroTransit, the public transportation organization for Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. Because the LMRDA excludes from its scope labor organizations that solely represent employees of “any State or political subdivision thereof,” see § 402(e), the LMRDA did not apply to Local 1005. In October, 2007, Local 1005 was certified as the bargaining representative for a private bus line based in Rochester, Minnesota. Thereafter, because Local 1005 no longer represented only public employees, it became subject to the provisions of the LMRDA. See Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir.1994) ().
Thus, after October of 2007, Local 1005's bylaws were subject to the provisions of the LMRDA, and any bylaws provision inconsistent with the LMRDA could no longer be enforced. Article 30 of Local 1005's bylaws imposed a meeting attendance requirement for members seeking an elected union office. This requirement stated that a member was not eligible for any office unless that member “attended not less than six (6) regular meetings each year during the twenty-four months prior to and including the nomination meetings” (hereinafter “meeting attendance requirement”). Local 1005 had enforced the meeting attendance requirement in previous elections, and the requirement was well known among the membership. However, according to Section 14.2 of the Amalgamated Transit Union Constitution (“Constitution”), the meeting attendance requirement applied only to those elections “not covered by the [LMRDA].” Once its elections were subject to the LMRDA, the Constitution dictated that Local 1005 could not enforce the meeting attendance requirement in the bylaws. Article 30 of the bylaws also required that any office-seeker must have been a union member for two years prior to the nominations meeting (hereinafter “membership requirement”). The membership requirement did not present a conflict with the Constitution, and Local 1005 could enforce this requirement in an election subject to the LMRDA.
In preparation for Local 1005's tri-annual election of union officers, Local 1005 scheduled two meetings for September 23, 2008, at which members could nominate other members interested in running for an elected position. On August 26, 2008, twenty-nine days before the nominations meetings and nearly three weeks earlier than required by the bylaws, Local 1005 posted written notices on all of its workplace bulletin boards and on its website describing the upcoming elections and the nominations meetings. In those written notices, Local 1005 accurately informed its members of the only eligibility requirement for a member to run for office:
AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 30 OF THE LOCAL BYLAWS: NO MEMBER SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO ANY ELECTIVE OR APPOINTIVE OFFICE, OR AS A DELEGATE OR ALTERNATE OF THIS LOCAL, OR TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND ANY CAUCUSES OR SEMINARS UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN A REGULAR MEMBER OF THIS LOCAL FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN TWO (2) YEARS.
The written notices did not mention Article 30's now-inapplicable meeting attendance requirement; they simply listed the only eligibility prerequisite for candidates in the November 2008 election—the membership requirement.
Nonetheless, a small number of Local 1005 members expressed confusion to current officeholders and shop stewards about whether the meeting attendance requirement applied to the 2008 election. Those inquiries were answered correctly. Members who asked whether the meeting attendance requirement still applied were told that it did not. Local 1005 did not post any other written notices, except for meeting reminders.
Local 1005's tri-annual election took place as planned on November 12, 2008. On November 19, 2008, six Local 1005 members—led by member Thomas Noland—complained in writing to the Local 1005 Executive Board about the election, contending that there was widespread confusion about the meeting attendance requirement. The Executive Board met with Noland and the five other complaining members and unanimously rejected their complaint on December 1, 2008. After pursuing other intra-union remedies, Noland dispatched a complaint letter to the Secretary on February 28, 2009.
The Secretary began an investigation of Local 1005's November 2008 election and, soon after, brought this action against Local 1005 pursuant to the “adequate safeguards” provision of the LMRDA. The Secretary and Local 1005 each moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Local 1005's motion and denied the Secretary's motion, and the Secretary now appeals.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Taylor v. St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 625 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir.2010) (per curiam). “Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
When conducting an election, the LMRDA requires a union to provide “[a]dequate safeguards to insure a fair election.” 29 U.S.C. § 481(c). Proof of a violation of the “adequate safeguards” provision is prima facie evidence that the violation “may have affected” the outcome of the election, shifting the burden to the union to prove that the results of the election would have been the same absent the violation. See Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Emps. Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 506–07, 88 S.Ct. 1743, 20 L.Ed.2d 763 (1968). If the Secretary proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of the “adequate safeguards” provision has occurred, and if that violation “may have affected the outcome of an election,” the court must declare the election void and order a new election under the Secretary's supervision. See § 482(c). The Secretary's regulation interpreting the “adequate safeguards” provision provides two specific examples of such safeguards, summarized by the Ninth Circuit as: “(1) if one candidate is permitted to have his nickname on the ballot, the other should enjoy the same privilege, and (2) voting instructions must be intelligible.” Brock v. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc., 762 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.1985) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 452.110). “The inclusion of these mechanical procedural safeguards as examples of the required safeguards suggests that the Secretary, like Congress, construed the adequate safeguards provision narrowly.” Id. While the LMRDA requires local unions to provide its members with “adequate notice” of its requirements for seeking elected office and for voting, see Brock v. Dist. 6, United Mine Workers of Am., 1985 WL 13586, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished per curiam), “perfect notice” is not required, see Marshall v. Provision House Workers Union, Local 274, 623 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.1980) (per curiam).
As an initial matter, the Secretary argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its analysis. The Secretary points to the district court's statement that the Secretary's “allegations in this case simply do not reveal any sort of corruption, dictatorial practices, or racketeering, or even anything more than sloppiness.” We find this argument unavailing. To be sure, the Secretary need not provide evidence of “corruption, dictatorial practices, or racketeering” to establish a violation of the “adequate safeguards” provision of the LMRDA. See, e.g., Hotel, Motel & Club Emps., 391 U.S. at 506–07, 88 S.Ct. 1743; Donovan v. Local 10902, Commc'ns. Workers of Am., AFL–CIO, 650 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir.1981) (per curiam). However, the district court did not decide the case on this basis. Rather, the district court concluded that, although the Secretary “argues that the Union was required to do more” than post accurate written notices and respond to inquiries appropriately, “[the Secretary] does not ... point the Court to any such requirement in the statutes, the regulations, or the caselaw.” Because the district court found that Local 1005 was not required to take more safeguards than it did—and not because the Secretary failed to show evidence of “corruption, dictatorial practices, or racketeering”—the district court found no violation of § 481(c). Accordingly, we find the Secretary's position unpersuasive and proceed to her central contention in this appeal.
The Secretary contends that the district court erred when it determined that Local 1005 did not violate the “adequate safeguards” provision of the LMRDA. It is undisputed that Local 1005 did not enforce the meeting attendance requirement at any point during the November 2008 election process. The Secretary only argues that Local...
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