Solman v. Shapiro
| Decision Date | 13 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | Civ. 12790. |
| Citation | 300 F. Supp. 409 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Edna SOLMAN, on her own behalf and as Next Friend of Vance Gosman and James Solman, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Bernard SHAPIRO, Commissioner of Welfare, State of Connecticut. |
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David M. Lesser, New Haven, Conn., Thomas Jay Solomon, Waterbury, Conn., William H. Clendenen, Jr., New Haven, Conn., for plaintiffs.
Francis J. MacGregor, Edward J. Peters, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., East Hartford, Conn., for defendants.
Before SMITH, C. J., and BLUMENFELD and CLARIE, JJ.
Judgment Affirmed October 13, 1969. See 90 S.Ct. 25.
Plaintiffs bring this class action1 to challenge the validity of a statute relating to the administration of that part of Connecticut's comprehensive scheme of public assistance relating to Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). See Conn.Gen.Stats. §§ 17-84 to 17-107.2 They are all recipients of AFDC benefits which the defendant has threatened to curtail in whole or part in each case because the needy children have a stepfather living in the house. Specifically, they challenge § 17-87(a) insofar as it provides that in determining the need of an AFDC recipient who has a stepparent, the income of the stepparent shall be considered as available for the support of the recipient. Plaintiffs contend that since a stepparent in Connecticut is not legally obligated to support the stepchild, see Conn.Gen.Stats. § 17-320, § 17-87(a) is inconsistent with Part A of Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610, with federal regulations promulgated thereunder, 45 C.F.R. § 203.1, and with the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The cause of action is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343.3 Since plaintiffs seek an injunction restraining enforcement of a state statute on constitutional grounds that are not insubstantial, cf. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839, 88 S.Ct. 63, 19 L.Ed.2d 102 (1967), a three-judge district court has been convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.4
The portion of the statute challenged, Conn.Gen.Stats. § 17-87(a), provides in part:
"In the determination of such need of the dependent children, the ability and income of a stepparent shall be considered as available for the support of the family, including himself, his wife, and his minor stepchild or stepchildren residing with him * * *."
The statute is implemented by a regulation with provides in part:
"When an employed stepparent is in the home, eligibility in regard to the need requirements exists only if the stepparent's income together with other available income is insufficient to meet total family need * * *."5 1 Conn. State Welfare Manual § 345.3.
Under the scheme of cooperative federalism for carrying out the AFDC program, state plans for distribution of aid must conform with federal laws and regulations, in order for the state to receive federal funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 1302. One such regulation is 45 C.F.R. § 203.1, which reads in part:
This federal regulation was issued in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128 (1968). In that case the validity of Alabama's "substitute father" regulation was challenged. Under it, Alabama had denied AFDC payments to the children of a mother who cohabited with any single or married able-bodied man. Alabama's regulation was based on an interpretation it gave to the definition of "dependent child" in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a): "a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with any of several listed relatives * * *." (Emphasis added.) Alabama considered the "substitute father" not to be an absent "parent" within the federal statute, and consequently held that a child in such a home did not qualify as "a dependent child."
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis. It noted that under Alabama law a "substitute father" was not among those legally obligated to support the child. The Court went on:
392 U.S. at 329, 88 S.Ct. at 2139.
It follows from this detailed analysis by the Supreme Court that Connecticut's statute providing that the "income of a stepparent shall be considered as available for the support of his minor * * * stepchildren residing with him" squarely contravenes the regulation which states that that "is not an acceptable basis * * * for assuming the availability of income by the State." Connecticut does not have a state law of general applicability imposing an obligation on a stepfather to support his minor stepchildren. Ladd v. Welfare Comm'r, 3 Conn.Cir. 504, 507 n. 5, 217 A.2d 490 n. 5 (1965). See Conn. Gen.Stats. § 17-320.
In an attempt to avoid the full thrust of King v. Smith, the state asks us to focus attention on a different provision of the federal statutes where parental relationship is not a factor bearing upon a child's qualification for benefit payments but is claimed to affect only the amount of such payments. The section is 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7), the relevant portion of which provides that the state welfare agency "shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming AFDC, or of any other individual (living in the same home as such child and relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of the child or relative claiming such aid * * *." (Emphasis added.) Using this text, the state argues that since the income of the stepfather living in the home is taken into account only in determining the "total family need," it is not relying upon the stepfather's income to find a stepchild ineligible for assistance under § 606(a), and, therefore, King v. Smith is inapposite.
Since the state relies upon this emphasized portion of § 602(a) (7) to support the action it has taken against these plaintiffs, the question of its applicability must be examined. If the theory of the state rests on the conclusion that the needs "of any other individual (living in the same home as such child * * *) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of the child" permit it to take into account the income of the stepparent to reduce or discontinue the payments for aid to stepchildren, it misreads the statute. The textually interlocked "other individual" has a special meaning.
Of course, what standards of welfare assistance a state may adopt which will qualify for its receipt of federal funds depends on the Social Security Act. A state's plan may provide for certain special needs, not necessary for all individuals. Section 602(a) (7) recognizes the validity of such a type of special need.6 It takes into account cases where it is found desirable to provide a qualified recipient of assistance with something more than what is necessary for mere physical subsistence. An example would be a case of a child whose mother works and there is also another child in the family above the age for eligibility for aid to dependent children. However, the state may consider that the continued presence in the home of the older child is essential to the well-being of the younger child (as distinguished from the necessaries to support life) and serves to strengthen family life, and thus may include his needs in the family budget. Although the need of the older child is met, it is not a "recipient" of benefits.
Thus, in such a case, under § 602(a) (7) an individual living in the house whose needs and income ...
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