Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1707.,03-1707.
• Citation: 389 F.3d 167
• Parties: Francine SOLOMON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUBURN HILLS POLICE DEPARTMENT, a municipal corporation, Defendant, Officer David Miller, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

389 F.3d 167

Francine SOLOMON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUBURN HILLS POLICE DEPARTMENT, a municipal corporation, Defendant, Officer David Miller, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-1707.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: August 13, 2004.

Decided and Filed: November 10, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Daniel J. Kelly, Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, Troy, MI, for Defendant. Barbara H. Goldman, Sheldon L. Miller & Assoc., Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff. ON BRIEF: G. Gus Morris, Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, Troy, MI, for Appellant. Barbara H. Goldman, Sheldon L. Miller & Assoc., Southfield, MI, for Appellee.

Before: KEITH, MARTIN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

KEITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MARTIN, J., joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 175-76), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Officer David Miller appeals the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural

This lawsuit arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Francine Solomon ("Solomon"). After she was arrested, Solomon filed a complaint against the Auburn Hills Police Department ("AHPD") and Officer David Miller ("Officer Miller") alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for assault and battery and gross negligence. Solomon then filed a motion to amend her complaint, and both defendants moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that Officer Miller was entitled to qualified immunity.

On May 9, 2003, the district court granted the AHPD's motion for summary judgment because Solomon had not alleged that a policy, procedure, or custom of the City of Auburn Hills was the cause of the alleged deprivation. Moreover, the district court ruled that Solomon should be allowed to amend her complaint to clarify that she was suing Officer Miller in his individual capacity. The district court denied Officer Miller's motion for summary judgment after finding that he was not entitled to qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment claims because a jury question existed as to whether his conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The district court also left standing the state claims against Officer Miller for assault and battery and gross negligence.

Officer Miller timely filed an appeal with this court as to the issue of qualified immunity. Our opinion today addresses whether the district court erred when it determined that Officer Miller was not entitled to qualified immunity and consequently denied his motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we find that the district court was correct in its decision; Officer Miller was not entitled to qualify immunity and, therefore, he was not entitled to summary judgment.

B. Factual

On Saturday, March 24, 2001, Solomon took her six children and several of their friends to see a movie at the Star Theatre at Great Lakes Crossing ("Theatre") in Auburn Hills, Michigan. Because the children ranged in age from three to eighteen, Solomon planned to accompany the younger children to a G-rated movie and Solomon's eighteen-year-old son and his girlfriend planned to accompany the older children to an R-rated movie. Solomon explained this to the ticket seller when she purchased the tickets for the two movies. When her adult son attempted to enter the R-rated movie theater with the other children, the usher informed him that the children would not be allowed into the theater without a parent. Solomon then approached the usher and explained that she was the mother of several of the children and that they had permission to be in the R-rated movie, but she would be watching the G-rated movie with her younger children. The usher referred Solomon to customer relations.

Solomon then explained her situation to the Theatre manager, who responded that Theatre policy required a parent or guardian to accompany minor children into an R-rated movie. Solomon left customer relations and walked with her younger children toward the movie theater showing the G-rated movie. Before she reached the theater entrance, another Theatre employee informed Solomon that the older children could not see the R-rated movie without her accompanying them. Even though Solomon did not want to take her young children to see an R-rated movie, she went into the R-rated movie theater as instructed by Theatre management.

After Solomon was seated in the R-rated movie theater, the Theatre security guards entered and informed Solomon that she had to leave because she had not purchased tickets for that particular movie. Solomon refused to leave because she was following the manager's instructions. Shortly thereafter, AHPD officers Miller and Raskin — both of whom were between 230 and 250 pounds and at least five-feet-eight-inches tall¹ — arrived. The officers entered the theater, found Solomon sitting with her three young children, and instructed Solomon to leave. Solomon informed the police officers that she had purchased tickets and attempted to explain the situation, but the officers insisted that she leave. After Solomon refused, Officer Miller told her that she was under arrest for trespassing. Officer Miller grabbed her arm to make her leave, and Solomon, pushing her foot against the seat in front of her, backed away from the officer. Officer Miller then informed her that she was under arrest for assaulting a police officer.² At that point, Officer Raskin asked Solomon to speak with the police officers in the lobby and Solomon agreed. Solomon's children and their friends followed Solomon out of the R-rated movie theater.

When Solomon entered the hallway, she handed her toddler to her son's girlfriend, and Solomon explained to her children that she was going to talk with the officers. In the lobby, Officer Raskin motioned for Solomon to walk toward him. As Solomon was walking toward Officer Raskin, Officer Miller came up behind her, grabbed her arm, and attempted to leg sweep her. Solomon tripped but did not fall; when she regained her balance, she folded her arms across her chest. In response to Officer Miller's action, Solomon yelled, "Why are you doing this[?] I did not do anything."

At this point, Officer Miller grabbed her left arm and Officer Raskin grabbed her right arm. The officers threw Solomon up against a wall and knocked her face into a display case. Solomon did not attempt to pull away from them and the Officers gave no directives to Solomon. Officer Raskin then handcuffed Solomon's right arm behind her back. Officer Miller pushed up against Solomon with his entire body weight, shoving his arm against her back and his leg in between hers. Solomon was pinned against the wall and could not move; her right arm was already handcuffed and her left arm was straight along her side. Without uttering any instruction to Solomon, Officer Miller forcibly bent her left arm behind her and "hear[d] a popping sound and her left arm [went] limp." J.A. at 148 (Deposition of Officer Miller).

Solomon was subsequently taken to Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, where she was diagnosed with a comminuted fracture of her left elbow; she also had several bruises from being thrown against the wall. Solomon was hospitalized for six days for surgical treatment of the fracture and underwent a second operation at a later date. She also underwent extensive physical therapy and endures continual complications.

Solomon was later charged with resisting arrest, assault on a police officer, and trespass. As part of a plea bargain, Solomon pleaded guilty to trespass and attempted resisting arrest.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

While a denial of summary judgment is usually considered an interlocutory order and not appealable, when the denial occurs because the moving party is not entitled to qualified immunity, we may review that decision. Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 298 (6th Cir.2002). All facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and the relevant questions are "strictly legal." Id. at 299. "As a purely legal determination, the district court's denial of qualified immunity is subject to de novo review." Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir.2002). "[T]o the extent that there is disagreement about the facts... we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff[ ], taking all inferences in [her] favor." Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir.2004).

B. Analysis

Through the use of qualified immunity, the law shields "government officials performing discretionary functions... from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The United States Supreme Court has constructed a two-part test to determine whether an officer-defendant should be granted qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). First, a court must consider whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the answer is yes, the court must then decide "whether the right was clearly established." Id. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation that he confronted." Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

In the case before us, the district court reached the correct decision in denying Officer Miller summary judgment, but its rationale intertwined the standard for determining qualified immunity and the standard for granting summary judgment. The district court failed to completely evaluate the second...