Solomon v. Emanuelson

Citation586 F. Supp. 280
Decision Date29 February 1984
Docket NumberCiv. No. N-79-58.
PartiesRobert A. SOLOMON, and New Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Herbert L. EMANUELSON, Jr., Chairman, Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the Bar of New Haven County, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Michael O. Sheehan, New Haven Legal Assistance Assoc. Inc., New Haven, Conn., for plaintiffs.

James R. Greenfield, Greenfield, Krick & Jacobs, P.C., New Haven, Conn., John D. LaBelle, LaBelle, Rothenberg & LaBelle, Manchester, Conn., for defendants.

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE'S RULING

DALY, Chief Judge.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This civil rights suit, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, concerns a constitutional challenge to a state bar admission rule, namely Section 21(4) of the Connecticut Practice Book. That rule requires lawyers seeking admission to the Connecticut Bar without examination to be Connecticut residents for at least six months before their applications for admission will be processed. When this suit commenced in 1979, plaintiff Robert A. Solomon was an experienced Pennsylvania attorney in good standing and employed by plaintiff New Haven Legal Assistance Association ("NHLAA"). On moving to Connecticut to work for NHLAA, Mr. Solomon had sought admission without examination to the bar of this state. Defendants Herbert L. Emanuelson Jr., et al., members of the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the New Haven County Bar, refused to file Mr. Solomon's application in accordance with Section 21(4). After requests for waiver of the six-month waiting rule proved unsuccessful, plaintiffs filed suit for damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the Court referred those motions to Magistrate Arthur H. Latimer. In his ruling, Magistrate Latimer held the six month waiting rule of Section 21(4) to be unconstitutional and invalid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and thereby granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to constitutional liability. No declaratory or injunctive relief was granted on the premise that such measures were unnecessary since Section 21(4) was under review by responsible state officials who would not likely "ignore" the ruling of this Court. Ruling on Pending Motions at 286. Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment was likewise granted on the issue of immunity. Magistrate Latimer found that the defendants were "at a minimum" entitled to a qualified immunity and that such an immunity would apply here, since the defendants were simply acting in a ministerial role, and in good faith, in carrying out the rules of the Superior Court. Id. at 286.

Plaintiffs have objected to the Magistrate's Ruling on several counts. First, plaintiffs seek an award of nominal damages to recognize their constitutional deprivations. Second, plaintiff NHLAA seeks injunctive relief against further enforcement of Section 21(4) to ensure the free and full use of its staff and hiring practices. Third, plaintiff NHLAA seeks a declaratory judgment to "clarify" the Magistrate's Ruling of unconstitutionality. Finally, plaintiffs request that this Court retain jurisdiction to determine their claims for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standing

Before proceeding to the merits of the plaintiffs' objections, it is necessary to consider issues of standing. Since this litigation began, Mr. Solomon has been admitted to the Connecticut Bar, and he therefore concedes his claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief are "moot." Memorandum in Support of Objection at 3. But see Lane v. Reid, 559 F.Supp. 1047, 1052 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (holding that certain claims for declaratory relief survive challenges of mootness).

Plaintiff NHLAA, however, asserts a different legal stance. Since 1982, it has hired one attorney who was subject to the six-month waiting rule and, as of November 1983, was considering another who would have been subject to the rule if hired. Memorandum in Support of Objection at 3. NHLAA further alleges that enforcement of the rule caused them and continues to cause them to invest extra resources to manage and supervise its staff attorneys who are waiting to satisfy the residency requirement. First Amended Complaint at Paragraph 25; Supplemental Affidavit at 2.

In light of these facts, the Court finds NHLAA has the requisite standing to assert its claims. The alleged inability to use fully an attorney's services for six months constitutes an "actual injury" which is necessary for standing. See Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Moreover, the fact that NHLAA hired an attorney after Mr. Solomon who was likewise subject to the rule demonstrates that its injury was not an isolated one, but capable of repetition. Indeed, the injury is "capable of repetition yet evading review" since the six-month waiting period invariably passes before the plaintiff can fully litigate its claim. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). It is thus apparent that the "mootness" of Mr. Solomon's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief does not extend to plaintiff NHLAA.

B. Nominal Damages

Plaintiffs' claim for nominal damages rests on a recent Second Circuit case which awarded nominal relief to victims of procedural due process violations, notwithstanding any subsequent finding of qualified immunity. McKenna v. Peekskill Housing Authority, 647 F.2d 332, 336 (2d Cir.1981). Despite the McKenna ruling, which permits, but does not require, nominal relief where qualified immunity is found, the Court in this case finds no reason to depart from the general rule that denies all damage relief where a good faith defense is established. See Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford v. Chaucer, 451 F.Supp. 210 (D.Conn.1978). Unlike the defendants in McKenna who adopted and enforced their own intrusive regulations, defendants in this case merely followed a rule promulgated by the State Superior Court. Also, at the time of the complained-of enforcement, the rule's constitutionality was unclear, so that defendants could not be expected to know of its invalidity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Court therefore agrees with the Magistrate's finding that defendants good faith defense presently shields them from all damage liability, including nominal relief.

C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Defendants' good faith immunity from damages does not bar declaratory and injunctive relief. Chinese For Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1978). It is therefore appropriate to view this action as if it were brought solely for those remedies. See Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford, supra, 451 F.Supp. at 213 (citations omitted).

This Court has recognized that declaratory relief is always a matter of the Court's discretion. Baker v. Regional High School No. 5, 476 F.Supp. 319, 324 (D.Conn.1979). The standards for granting such relief may therefore vary, but the Second Circuit has elaborated that the granting of a declaratory judgment is proper only (1) where the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; or (2) where it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rosen, 445 F.2d 1012, 1014 (2d Cir.1971). In the present case, plaintiff NHLAA seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality primarily to "clarify" the Magistrate's Ruling. See Objection at 2. The Court finds that ruling sufficiently clear; indeed even the defendants now state that Section 21(4) runs "contrary to the guarantees of the Privileges and Immunities Clause." First Memorandum in Opposition to Objection at 3. However, given the defendants' continued enforcement of the waiting rule and plaintiff NHLAA's recurring injury, it is apparent that some further measure should be taken. Declaratory judgment offers a reasonable solution in that it will provide collateral estoppel effect to the Magistrate's Ruling of unconstitutionality, making that ruling binding in any subsequent litigation between the parties. See C.A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts, Section 100, at 677 (4th ed. 1983), citing Restatement Second of Judgments, Section 33 (1982). Also, while not deciding this issue, it should be noted that defendants' continued enforcement of Section 21(4) in the face of a federally-issued declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality may very well constitute bad faith conduct that would deprive them of their qualified immunity from damages. A declaratory judgment would serve a useful purpose towards the resolution of this controversy and is therefore appropriate under the circumstances. See Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins., 629 F.2d 757, 763 (2nd Cir.1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).

That plaintiff NHLAA has received a declaratory judgment does not also entitle it to injunctive relief, however. The Second Circuit has recognized that an injunction is an "extraordinary" remedy, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 482 F.Supp. 22, 28 (D.C.N.Y.1979), affirmed 616 F.2d 38 (2nd Cir.1980) that is designed to "deter and not to punish." Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir.1969). Indeed, the Supreme Court has displayed a similar attitude by writing: "At the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state statute or local ordinance, a district court can generally protect the interests of a plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, therefore the stronger injunctive medicine will be unnecessary." Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975).

With these considerations in mind, the...

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