Solomon v. Kan. City Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-00902-CV-RK |
| Parties | FALICA SOLOMON, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 9.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 10, 20, 24.) Oral arguments on the motion were held on January 30, 2020. (Doc. 25.) After careful consideration, the Motion to Remand (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff originally filed this action in state court alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010, et seq. (Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges two counts against Defendant, disability discrimination and retaliation. (Id.) According to the petition, Plaintiff is an 18 year-old female, African American, disabled student, who attended Defendant's school district from August 2016 until November 2017. Prior to attending Defendant's school district, Plaintiff had an Individual Education Plan ("IEP"), in which she received medically required homebound instruction due to her disability. When Plaintiff was physically present at her former school, she required and received special seating as part of her IEP. Upon enrolling in Defendant's school district, Plaintiff provided her education record, including her IEP to Defendant. However, once enrolled, Plaintiff alleges Defendant refused to provide Plaintiff an IEP and refused to accommodate Plaintiff's special seating needs. Among other things, Plaintiff additionally alleges she was denied a homebound instructor, was refused assignments on an ongoing basis, was recorded as absent when teachers did not provide assignments, and barred her mother from the school after her mother made complaints. Defendant timely removed the action to this Court, arguing that Plaintiff's claims in reality arose under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 ("IDEA"). (Doc. 1.)
Legal Standard
"[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2009). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction[.]" Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). "A defendant may remove an action to federal court if the case falls within the original jurisdiction of the district courts." Gillespie v. Block Maint. Solutions, No. 12-947-CV-W-DGK, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155153, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 30, 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1441(a)). If the case is not within the original jurisdiction of the district court, remand is required. Id. "Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law." Id.; 28 U.S.C.§ 1331. "A cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law." Crews v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2001). A party seeking removal and opposing remand carries the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, any doubts about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand. In re Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Discussion
Defendants argue federal jurisdiction exists because Plaintiff's petition states a cause of action arising under federal law, and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff's petition raises a substantial question of federal law. Both arguments are without merit.
Defendant first argues Plaintiff's petition arises under federal law because the crux of Plaintiff's complaint is the denial of a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") guaranteed by IDEA. (Doc. 1, p. 5-7) (citing Fry v. Napoleon Comty. Sch., 137 S.Ct. 743, 755 (2017)). In Fry, the Supreme Court analyzed how to tell when a plaintiff is seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE under IDEA. Fry, 137 U.S. at 755. The Supreme Court stated that what matters is the crux, or gravamen, of a plaintiff's complaint, and that courts should set aside attempts at artful pleading. Id. From this, Defendant argues the crux of Plaintiff's petition involves claims arising under the IDEA, and thus, federal jurisdiction exists.
By its plain language, § 1415(l) applies only to federal laws. See Moore, 828 F.3d at 693 (); Evergreen Sch. Dist. v. N.F., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (W.D. Wash. 2005) ( ) Unlike in Fry, and the other cases cited by Defendant, Plaintiff here has alleged only state law claims. As the master of her claim, Plaintiff can avoid federal court by exclusive reliance on state law. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
Second, courts within this circuit, and across the county, have remanded state law claims even when the Plaintiff brought claims under IDEA or similar federal laws. See McCauley v. Francis Howell School District, No. 4:15-CV-866 NAB, 2016 WL 795804 at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2016) (); Payne v. Norfork Sch. Dist., No. 3:18-CV-3072, 2019 WL 4131084, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2019) (same); C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (same); Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 2008) (); Eads ex rel. Eads v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 289, Franklin Cty., Kan., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1137 (D. Kan. 2002) (). "Outside the area of complete preemption (which does not apply in the IDEA context), . . . 'the existence of a federal issue' in a complaint that relies on state law is 'rarely' sufficient to allow removal of a state complaint to federal court." Miksis v. Evanston Twp.High Sch. Dist. # 202, 235 F. Supp. 3d 960, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2017). Unlike the cases cited above, Plaintiff here did not even allege other federal law claims.
Third, Defendant has not cited any controlling or persuasive case in which a plaintiff alleged solely state law claims, the defendant removed it to federal court on the basis of IDEA, and the federal court retained jurisdiction. Defendant cites to Miksis, 235 F. Supp. 3d 960, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2017), to support its argument for removal. In Miksis, the plaintiffs alleged a state-law claim for breach of contract. Id. The contract that was allegedly breached was a settlement agreement the parties had agreed to in order to resolve a previous lawsuit arising under IDEA. Id. The defendant in Miksis argued jurisdiction was proper because of "the interrelationship between the Settlement Agreement and the IDEA" and that "in order to determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek, the Court must interpret and apply principles from the IDEA." Id. (quotation omitted). The court in Miksis held federal jurisdiction existed based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Miksis is distinguishable for several reasons. Unlike in this case, which alleges state-law claims wholly independent of IDEA, the plaintiffs in Miksis alleged a claim for breach of a settlement agreement arising out of a lawsuit under IDEA. Id. at 968-71. The defendant in Miksis was therefore right when they argued the court would be required to apply and interpret principles from IDEA to determine if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief. Id. at 977. Here, however, the court will apply the MHRA; interpretation and application of the IDEA will be unnecessary. Further, unlike the Plaintiff here, the plaintiffs in Miksis did not oppose removal. Id. Finally, the court in Miksis declined to find federal jurisdiction based on breach of an agreement to settle a federal claim, federal question jurisdiction based on IDEA, or federal question jurisdiction based on an embedded issue of federal law. Id. at 978-82. Instead, the court found jurisdiction based on supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the court found the plaintiffs invoked their federal rights under IDEA. Id. at 983. The court reasoned the plaintiffs invoked their federal rights by alleging defendant had a legal duty under IDEA to provide a free appropriate education and breached that duty by failing to comply with the agreed to transition plan and settlement. Id. at 983. In this case, Plaintiff has not invoked her federal rights. Therefore, because the Court finds Plaintiff's claims do not arise under any...
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