Solon v. Midwest Med. Records Ass'n Inc

• Decision Date: 18 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 107719.,107719.
• Citation: 925 N.E.2d 1113,236 Ill.2d 433,338 Ill.Dec. 907
• Parties: Walter SOLON et al., on Behalf of Themselves and a Class of Others Similarly Situated, Appellees,v.MIDWEST MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

236 Ill.2d 433

925 N.E.2d 1113

338 Ill.Dec. 907

Walter SOLON et al., on Behalf of Themselves and a Class of Others Similarly Situated, Appellees,v.MIDWEST MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant.

No. 107719.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 18, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alan R. Borlack, of Bailey Borlack Nadelhoffer LLC, and James A. Flesch, of Glickman, Flesch & Rosenwein, all of Chicago, for appellant.

Arthur Loevy, Michael Kanovitz, Roshna Bala Keen, Jonathan Loevy, of Loevy & Loevy, and Edward M. Burnes, all of Chicago, for appellees.

Keith A. Karlson, of Richard J. Reimer & Associates LLC, Hinsdale, for amicus curiaeIllinois Trial Lawyers Association.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIERdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

The certified question at issue addresses the proper interpretation of sections 8-2001and8-2003 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/8-2001, 8-2003(West 2004)), which limit any handling charge imposed for processing requests for copies of medical records.In its motion to dismiss the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff class, the defendant, Midwest Medical Records Association, Inc.(MMRA), argued that charging a $20 handling charge for processing medical record requests was per se reasonable under sections 8-2001and8-2003.The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion to dismiss but agreed to certify a question on the issue for interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(155 Ill.2d R. 308).With one justice dissenting, the appellate court held that a $20 handling charge was not per se reasonable under the statutory language.386 Ill.App.3d 78, 325 Ill.Dec. 474, 898 N.E.2d 207.

MMRA sought review of the statutory construction question in this court.For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.BACKGROUND

In 2004, named plaintiffsWalter Solon and Cynthia Zaletel filed a four-count class action lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant MMRA, a management company that contracts with hospitals and health-care practitioners to handle requests for patient medical records.The trial court certified the class, and amended complaints were filed.The third-amended complaint alleged that MMRA overcharged for fulfilling patient requests for medical records, resulting in a breach of contract, as well as violations of sections 8-2001and8-2003 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/8-2001, 8-2003(West 2004)), section 2 of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act(815 ILCS 505/2(West 2004)), and section 2 of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act(815 ILCS 510/2(West 2004)).This appeal relates only to count II of the third-amended complaint, alleging that MMRA violated restrictions in sections 8-2001and8-2003 of the Code by charging more than the permissible amount for providing requested copies of medical records.

As alleged in the complaint, MMRA entered into exclusive contracts with health-care providers to fulfill requests for medical records.MMRA employees worked within those offices, receiving copy requests locating and copying records, sending copies, and performing related administrative work.MMRA did not charge the health-care providers for these services, choosing instead to bill directly the requesting party.MMRA charged a flat handling charge plus a variable per-page charge for the copies.The handling charges of $20 in 2002 and $20.48 in 2003 were within the statutory “ not to exceed” amount (effective January 20, 2003, the Comptroller adjusted the handling charge for inflation from $20 to $20.48 in accordance with the Consumer Price Index pursuant to section 8-2006 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/8-2006(West 2004))).The third-amended complaint alleged that MMRA's charges violated the pricing restrictions in sections 8-2001and8-2003 of the Code.

The complaint sought damages “in the amount of the difference between the actual sums charged for these copies and the least of the reasonable expense of production, Illinois' statutory price limit for copies applicable to the type of copies MMRA furnished, or a fair price for the copies,” plus expenses and attorney fees.The complaint also sought an injunction barring MMRA “from charging prices in excess of the least of the reasonable expense of production, Illinois' statutory price limit for copies applicable to the type of copies MMRA furnished, or a fair price for the copies.”

MMRA filed a motion to dismiss count II of the third-amended complaint under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615(West 2004)), arguing that the handling charges were per se reasonable as within the “not to exceed” charges permitted by the statutes.MMRA noted that other than the “not to exceed” amount, the statutes do not provide any criteria (or expert commission or board) to determine what is a “reasonable” handling charge.Among other cases, MMRA cited a recent Texas opinion In re Metro ROI, Inc.,203 S.W.3d 400, 406(Tex.App.2006), which construed the maximum fee set out in its similarly worded statute as presumptively reasonable.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

MMRA filed a motion for certification of an immediate interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(155 Ill.2d R. 308), and the trial court certified the following question for review: “Is it reasonable per se for a provider of medical record copies under 735 ILCS §§ 5/8-2001,2003 to charge the full amount of the $20 process fee, or is the provider limited to a lesser charge if the evidence shows that the lesser charge is all that is reasonable?”

The appellate court initially denied MMRA's request for interlocutory appeal under Rule 308, and MMRA filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court.We entered a supervisory order instructing the appellate court to vacate its order and to consider the certified question on the merits.A divided appellate court then found that the statutory language was unambiguous and that a flat $20 handling charge was not per se reasonable.386 Ill.App.3d at 81-84, 325 Ill.Dec. 474, 898 N.E.2d 207.The court rejected MMRA's argument that extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, should be considered in interpreting the statutory provisions and instead examined only the plain language of the statutory provisions.386 Ill.App.3d at 82-83, 325 Ill.Dec. 474, 898 N.E.2d 207.In his dissent, Justice Greiman relied upon both legislative history and the rationale of In re Metro ROI, Inc.,203 S.W.3d 400, to conclude that a flat $20 handling charge was per se reasonable and that the majority's conclusion created absurd, unjust, and inconvenient consequences.386 Ill.App.3d at 84-88, 325 Ill.Dec. 474, 898 N.E.2d 207(Greiman, J., dissenting).

This court allowed MMRA's petition for leave to appeal.210 Ill. 2d R. 315.We also granted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association(ITLA) leave to file an amicus curiae brief.210 Ill. 2d R. 345.

II.ANALYSIS

The trial court's certified question raises the sole issue for review in this interlocutory appeal.To qualify for an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(155 Ill.2d R. 308), a certified question must present an issue of law that is reviewable de novo.Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,227 Ill.2d 147, 153, 316 Ill.Dec. 505, 879 N.E.2d 893(2007).The certified question here is one of statutory construction, well established to constitute a question of law subject to de novo review.People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery,235 Ill.2d 73, 79, 335 Ill.Dec. 592, 919 N.E.2d 311(2009).

The certified question we are asked to answer is: “Is it reasonable per se for a provider of medical record copies under 735 ILCS §§ 5/8-2001,2003 to charge the full amount of the $20 process fee, or is the provider limited to a lesser charge if the evidence shows that the lesser charge is all that is reasonable?”

In answering the same question, the appellate majority determined that a $20 handling charge was not per se reasonable.MMRA argues that this interpretation causes absurd, unjust, and inconvenient results by endlessly forcing each record provider to face litigation over the reasonableness of the handling charge assessed for each individual record request without any judicial guidelines.In addition, MMRA argues that the appellate court majority failed to consider the legislative purpose, the evils to be remedied, the consequences of the alternative constructions set out in the certified question, and the real-world context and activities.

As we have consistently held, our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.Blum v. Koster,235 Ill.2d 21, 29, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333(2009).The most reliable indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.Blum,235 Ill.2d at 29, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333.

In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the statute it its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.Blum,235 Ill.2d at 29, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333.When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction.Blum,235 Ill.2d at 29, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333.

However, if a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways, the statute will be deemed ambiguous.Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C.,235 Ill.2d 1, 11, 335 Ill.Dec. 581, 919 N.E.2d 300(2009).If the statute is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic aids of construction in order to discern the legislative intent.Landis,235 Ill.2d at 11, 335 Ill.Dec. 581, 919 N.E.2d 300.We construe the statute to avoid rendering any part of it meaningless or superfluous.Blum,235 Ill.2d at 29, 335 Ill.Dec. 614,...